

THE LONDON QUARTERLY & HOLBORN REVIEW

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THE STATE OF OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES TODAY

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Editorial Comments

THE STATE OF OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES TODAY

THE EXCELLENT reception accorded to the recent issue of the LONDON QUARTERLY & HOLBORN REVIEW which contained a series of articles dealing with *The State of New Testament Studies Today* has encouraged the Editor to plan a second similar series, this time on the Old Testament. He has asked six eminent Old Testament scholars to contribute these articles, and has done me the honour of asking me to contribute the 'introductory editorial', a service which Dr Vincent Taylor did for the previous series. I have the pleasure of knowing all six contributors personally, four of them for many years; this gives me added pleasure. Every one of them has made considerable contributions to the study of the Old Testament, and the names of all of them are honoured wherever the Scriptures are studied with care and devotion.

One of the contributors in particular must receive honour, not only in respect of the service he has rendered to sound scholarship, but also because he has lived to an honoured old age and, academically speaking, has lived to see children's children themselves teaching yet another generation. Such a man is indeed blessed of the Lord, doubly blessed. I refer to Professor Theodore Robinson. The Editor has asked him to write on a subject he has made peculiarly his own. Concerning Professor Robinson I have a story to tell. I think it is true to say that, apart from the 'history' and the 'religion' which he wrote in collaboration with the late Dr Oesterley, the book by which he is best known is his *Prophecy and the Prophets* in the Duckworth 'Studies in Theology' series. In the third chapter of this book he deals with the *Nebi'im*, those 'ecstatic' prophets of Old Israel who were characterized by the frenzies which seized them. It so happens that whenever this frenzy is referred to in a discussion, almost always reference is made to Theodore Robinson's book, and indeed, it is for this chapter that the book is most remembered. This is curious, because it is an excellent book throughout, and many other important matters are emphasized. I can remember a discussion many years ago at a meeting of the Society for Old Testament Studies, when a member had read a paper on some aspect of Prophecy, and the discussion had turned on this matter of ecstasy. I can see now Theodore Robinson, with his very tall, spare figure, slowly unbending himself as if made up of many hinges out of a very low and comfortable armchair, and saying with his own brand of wry humour that he considered himself the most unfortunate of men, because he had written a book of which 'nobody seems to have read more than the first three chapters'.

My contribution to this symposium consists in emphasizing one important element in modern Bible study which can easily be missed in two series when one concerns the New Testament and the other concerns the Old Testament. I am concerned with what I think is the very important development of the last thirty years or so which emphasizes the Unity of the Bible, the fact that the whole Bible is the Word of God, the fact that the Old Testament is the background of the New Testament, and that there are many threads running through them both. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the New Testament

apart from the Old Testament. It is essential that we search the (Old Testament) Scriptures in proper and scholarly fashion to discover in what way and how they speak of Christ.

This theme can be illustrated by a study of the phrase 'peculiar people', where the word 'peculiar' is used in the sense of the Latin *peculiaris*, 'that which relates to private property', 'belonging particularly to oneself'. Thus the word 'peculiar' represents truly that special, that unique, relationship between God and Israel which is a central theme of the Old Testament. Israel was always conscious that she belonged to God uniquely. No other people stood in this relationship. 'You only have I known out of all the families of the earth' (Amos 3₂), where the Hebrew verb translated 'known' involves personal knowledge rather than intellectual apprehension. Or again, 'The Lord's portion is his people: Jacob is the lot of his inheritance (Deut. 32₉)'.

There are three questions to be asked concerning God's choice of Israel. The answers are important because they provide the essential link between the two Testaments, and consist also of the very centre and core of Christianity.

1. *How did Israel come to be God's people?* The answer is that God chose them; it is not that they chose Him. The story of the Bush is that God came down, God Himself, to rescue a race of slaves, and to make them into a people, His people, the People of God. This is the fundamental fact of the history of Israel, for Israel's history is what the Germans have called *Heilgeschichte*—literally, 'holy history'. It was God who took action; it was God who made the first move. He saw these slaves and the gradual worsening of their condition. He said, 'THIS is the people I choose. I will make them mine. I will show them my *chesed* (steadfast love, 'sure love', covenant love) beyond every other people. They shall be my *segullah*, my own particular, special, prized possession.' He chose them; they did not choose Him—and they read the whole of their history in this way. Israel's history has no meaning apart from this fact.

This same insistence has come right down into Christianity. He chose us; we did not choose Him. The more we know of God's ways with us, the more certainly we know that this is true. The older we grow in the Christian faith, the more we talk in terms of God's choice of us. When we are 'babes in Christ' we speak in terms of choosing Christ, and we are right; but as we grow more and more into the fullness of His stature we speak in terms of Christ choosing us, and still we are right.

2. *Why did God choose them?* What was there in them that influenced His choice? The answer is 'Nothing: nothing at all.' A generation or so ago, it used to be the fashion to say: The Greeks had a genius for beauty, the Romans for law, the Hebrews for religion. We do not speak in this way today. The only genius the Hebrews had for religion was in going astray and worshipping other gods—as indeed the prophets were always saying. The reasons for God's choice are emphasized in Deuteronomy 7, 8, and 9: it was not because they were many (they were not many, they were few); it was not because they were rich (they were not rich, they were poor); it was not because they were righteous (they were not righteous, apart only from a small remnant). It was not because of anything they had or were or did. It was all because of His great love for them. It was 'all of grace'.

This same insistence also has come right down into Christianity. It is the doctrine of FREE GRACE. All that we have and all that we are we owe to Him. Even our love for Him arises out of the fact and thrives on the experience that He first loved us.

3. *For what purpose did God choose them?* The answer is to be found in Isaiah 43^{10, 12}, 55⁴: 'Ye are my witnesses.' Israel was called not simply to be God's 'peculiar possession', but to be God's witnesses. The *locus classicus* is Isaiah 49⁶: 'Yea, he saith, It is too light a thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth.' This was the reason for the choice; this was the hidden purpose of Israel's trials. It involved ultimately the breaking down of all middle walls of partition which the exclusive post-exilic Judaism raised, and the exclusion of all doctrines concerning the people of God which do not depend upon the fundamental beliefs of free grace and undeserved favour.

This same insistence also has come right down into Christianity. Out of it springs a doctrine of the Church, that doctrine dear to Protestants, that the mark of the Church is that it follows its Master in 'seeking to save that which is lost.'

I have given an example of the way in which the New Testament doctrine develops out of the Old Testament, and in this as in all other cases generally, what we have primarily to do is to take the doctrine of the Prophets and use Matthew 1₂₁ and Ephesians 2₁₄ as the 'solvent'.
NORMAN H. SNAITH

The subject planned for the Symposium in the April number will be the Holy Communion.

PHILOLOGY AND TEXTUAL CRITICISM

THOSE who are concerned with the study of the Scriptures in their original forms, whether they are philologists or textual critics, are conscious that their studies, if they are directed nowhere else, will inevitably lead to anti-quarianism, and that, in the present context at least, is a dead end, a cul-de-sac. The study of the Hebrew and the Greek must be more than just a mental exercise, more or less pleasurable. It must be more even than the attempt to demonstrate what the author wrote and what he meant. It must, the Bible being what it is, lead to communication. The scholar takes the raw material of the original texts, passes it through the machinery of his mind, and the end-product is in a form ready for use, a translation. Here is the justification for the inclusion of an article on philology and textual criticism in a review, which, in the words of the Editor, 'circulates mainly among ministers of various denominations'. For the preaching of the Word, Bible translations are needed, and the preacher is entitled to have a translation based on the latest results of biblical scholarship. So this article must be an attempt to show what developments in Old Testament studies afford the modern translator of the Hebrew Bible help towards his aim of achieving the best translation of the best text.

The best printed text is that in the third and subsequent editions of Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica*, published first in 1937 at Stuttgart by the Württemberg Bibelanstalt. The seventh edition (1951) gives variants from the Dead Sea scroll of Isaiah and the Habakkuk Commentary; the variants were also published separately in 1951 by O. Eissfeldt as Fasc. 17 of the *Bib. Heb.* This Bible comprises two parts, a text and a double apparatus. The text, edited by Dr P. Kahle, is a genuine ben Asher text, and the return to this form of the Hebrew 'marks a unique event in the history of the study of the Massoretic text (B. J. Roberts, *The Old Testament Text and Versions*, 1951, p.91; a new edition of this excellent introduction would be most welcome.) Kahle's text is taken from Codex Leningradensis B19a, a manuscript important because it is our earliest dated codex of the whole Hebrew Bible, for according to its colophon it was completed in A D 1008, and because it is based on manuscripts prepared by ben Asher (died c. 950). The corrections in this codex, which were studied by Professor Castro of Madrid in *Sefarad*, xv, 1955 and earlier by Professor G. Quell when the manuscript was sent to Germany in 1926 for Kahle's use, may embody a collation of this manuscript with other ben Asher texts, and the value of the codex is greatly increased by the disappearance of the famous model codex of Aleppo¹ during the Arab-Jewish struggle in 1948. E. Würthwein says that 'the latest information is that it has been destroyed by fire' (*The Text of the Old Testament*, English trans. by P. R. Ackroyd, 1957, p.26). If this is correct, it is all the more unfortunate that the authorities of the Karaite synagogue at Aleppo had out of superstition not allowed their manuscript to be photographed. The question of publishing a facsimile of the Russian manuscript should now be given serious consideration.

The other part of Kittel's *Bib. Heb.* is the double apparatus, which in the upper register records variants from other Hebrew manuscripts along with readings supposed to be presupposed by the versions and in the lower register

suggestions towards the emendation of the Massoretic text. This part of the edition, the work of various scholars and therefore uneven, is less satisfactory, for much of the evidence cited is erroneous and many of the suggestions are unnecessary or fatuous. A new edition is on the way, and this it may be expected will prove to be a more efficient tool.

Another edition of the Hebrew text which has appeared in recent years is that published in 1953 in Jerusalem by the Magnes Press. A description of the editorial method or methods employed in the production of this Bible has been given by Kahle in *Vetus Testamentum*, Vol. 3, pp.416-20. The work was begun by Professor Umberto Cassuto, who proposed to use ben Asher manuscripts to reconstruct as far as possible the text of ben Asher in its definitive form. Unfortunately, Cassuto did not live to carry out this project, and the publishers have reproduced C. D. Ginsburg's British and Foreign Bible Society edition (1908), with certain alterations made on the basis of material collected by Cassuto. But Ginsburg's text is substantially that printed in 1524-5 by Jacob ben Chayim, an eclectic text based on late and poor material. Kahle's verdict on the Jerusalem edition is that it is a 'mixed-up Bible', and one can but regret that Cassuto's name should be associated with a production so far removed from the scholarly work he had planned.

Principal N. H. Snaith of Headingley College has for some years been engaged on the preparation of a Hebrew Bible for the British and Foreign Bible Society to take the place of their Letteris edition; it ought to have appeared before these words are in print. Snaith claims for his Bible that it is the true ben Asher text and very close to that printed by Kahle, although he uses quite different sources. He began by noticing that the readings preferred by Jedidiah Solomon ben Abraham Norzi (c. 1560-1626), the celebrated author of a critical and Massoretic work published later under the title *Minhat shai* (Mantua, 1742-4), agreed with the first hand of Spanish manuscripts in the British Museum and elsewhere. Snaith writes: 'These MSS. have suffered the general fate and have been "corrected" to the Ben Chayim text, held to be the true Massoretic text until the researches of Professor Paul Kahle' (*Vetus Testamentum*, Vol. 7, p.207). It is on the original hands of these Spanish manuscripts, especially B.M. Or. 2625-7 and Or. 2375 and the David Sassoon Shem Tob manuscript, that he has based his edition. If it seems a long way from Aleppo and Leningrad to Toledo, one must remember that Spain was early a centre of Jewish learning, and it is quite probable that, among Hebrew manuscripts brought there, there would be some with good ben Asher texts. The problems raised by what differences there are between the texts of Kahle and Snaith must wait until both lie before us, but it is well to remind ourselves that the older manuscript is not necessarily the better nor the earlier scribe the more reliable. It is to be hoped that Dr Snaith, out of the wide knowledge and experience gained in the production of his Bible, will provide at least some of the information needed for the solution of the problem, and the British and Foreign Bible Society would earn the gratitude of Biblical scholars if it were to encourage him to give us a *Bible House Paper* on the subject.

Here one might mention Cecil Roth, *The Aberdeen Codex of the Hebrew Bible* (1958). This manuscript, described by Dr Johnson as 'of exquisite penmanship', is dated A D 1493-4. It is written in a beautiful Sephardi hand and

was produced probably in Italy by refugees from Spain, for various features such as the illumination and binding suggest Naples as its place of origin. Dr Roth provides a full introduction to the manuscript, bringing to the discussion of its history and of many of its details his wide knowledge of matters Jewish. The enlightened policy of the University of Aberdeen in making more widely available information about one of its manuscript treasures and in producing so handsome a volume, for it is beautifully printed and well illustrated by twenty-five plates, is warmly to be commended.

If it be objected that most of the evidence surveyed so far is of concern mostly to the Old Testament specialist, of the next topic it will be admitted that it has caught the imagination even of those with very little interest in things biblical. The Dead Sea Scrolls have been the subject of a whole library of books, from technical treatises by experts in both Testaments to popular works whether by reverend scholars or by lay journalists. Here we are concerned with one aspect only of these documents, their contribution to the study of the text of the Hebrew Bible. Before the discovery of the Scrolls in 1947 and later, it was generally held that there were few important differences preserved in the textual tradition of the Old Testament. The labours of Kennicott and de Rossi in comparing a large array of manuscripts had resulted in a negligible number of significant variants. Though this number might be increased by bringing in evidence from other sources, such as Talmudic literature and texts from the Cairo Geniza, it was not until the Scrolls added their witness that there was any considerable quantity of divergent Hebrew evidence. At first while only the St Mark's Isaiah Scroll was available the problem was comparatively simple. On the whole, that document was regarded as confirming the reliability of the Massoretic text, its accuracy and its antiquity. The two texts diverged in a limited number of significant readings or readings which have a bearing on the meaning and so on the translation of the Book of Isaiah. It is worth recalling that the American *Revised Standard Version* gives the reading of the Scroll in only thirteen places where it departs from the traditional text, and in eight of these thirteen passages the Scroll has some degree of versional support. Other groups of scholars might decide on a different list, for at least one of the American revisers, Millar Burrows, has had second thoughts, and he records that each variant was discussed on its merits and rarely was the committee unanimous.

But with the discovery of the manuscripts in Cave IV and elsewhere the problem is no longer simple. We are confronted with different early recensions of the Hebrew Bible, and the number varies in different parts of the Old Testament. There is first the Massoretic text, which we ought now to term the Hebrew Standard Version or some such name, for it is now seen as an ancient tradition extant in early manuscripts. Alongside it in the historical books we must put a manuscript tradition which follows the Septuagint systematically, and indeed the archaic Samuel text (4 Q Sam^b) 'often preserves a text superior to both the Septuagint and Hebrew *textus receptus*' (F. M. Cross, Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumrân*, 1958, p.133n.). Of another Samuel scroll it is said: 'Not only is the text of this scroll related to that of the Septuagint; it also agrees more closely than the Massoretic text with the text of 1-2 Samuel used in the composition of 1 Chronicles' (Millar Burrows, *More Light*

on the *Dead Sea Scrolls*, 1958, p.139). Similar conditions and similar problems exist in the textual tradition of other parts of the Old Testament; the reader may be referred to the up-to-date summaries given in the works of Cross and Burrows just cited.

From this it is evident that the Old Testament scholar is confronted with two subjects for investigation. There is the general question of the relation of our present Hebrew text to the new material. Is our Hebrew Bible the best witness to what was written by the Old Testament authors and editors? Do any of the new texts represent an older and/or a better tradition? The new edition of Sir Frederic Kenyon's *Our Bible and the Ancient Manuscripts* (revised by A. W. Adams, with an Introduction by G. R. Driver, 1958, p.154) concludes: 'If the Massoretic text is ever to be driven from the assured position of supremacy, which it has held since the days of Origen and of Jerome, it will only be when the great bulk of sober criticism and the general intelligence of Biblical students have been convinced that the change is necessary', and it adds: 'It is very doubtful whether such a conviction will ever be reached.'

The other relates to the evaluation of individual readings. Each will have to be examined on its merits, and judged, for example, as to whether it represents an error, a scribal correction or a genuine tradition. Obviously there is going to be less room for conjectural emendation; one hesitates to go further. In textual emendation based on the Septuagint, Professor de Boer has emphasized the need for caution. We should all agree. Then he continues: 'Any suggestion from the versions to emend the Hebrew text, that treats them as variants to the Hebrew text and not as translations with their own purpose and history, must be called premature' (*Oudtestamentische Studien*, VI.4). It is here that there will have to be some rethinking occasioned by the nature of some of the Dead Sea manuscripts. If, for example, we consider the text of Samuel from Cave IV, it is clear that the Septuagint is a faithful representative of a type of Hebrew text and reproduces its *Vorlage* closely. The Septuagint must once again be regarded as a primary tool in the hands of the textual critic. This is contrary to most recent textual theory and practice; it gives support, however, to older scholars, to Wellhausen and S. R. Driver.

For work on the versions reference must be made to the volumes of Kenyon, Roberts, and Würthwein, and to *The Bible in Its Ancient and English Versions* edited by H. Wheeler Robinson (1954). There is a useful section on this subject by Professor D. Winton Thomas in H. H. Rowley (ed.), *The Old Testament and Modern Study* (1951).

Before turning to those developments in Philology which are useful in the production of an up-to-date translation of the Hebrew, we note that elementary grammars continue to appear, most of them with some good features, yet very few which one would care to substitute for the well-thumbed tools we criticize so freely. It is with high hopes that we wait for the grammar being prepared by Professor Mauchline to take the place of the out-worn *Davidson*. More advanced and admirable is C. Brockelmann, *Hebräische Syntax* (1956). The Koehler-Baumgartner Lexicon is complete, and it has been followed by a *Supplementum* (1958) which gives not only additions and corrections, but also a German-Hebrew word list. Mention may also be made of the concordance with translations into German, English, and Latin made by

G. Lisowsky. This work, *Konkordanz zum hebräischen Alten Testament*, is duplicated from a hand-written manuscript.

But to treat the subject more generally, one might say that many branches of Old Testament studies have made contributions to the understanding of the Hebrew text. Archaeology has solved some problems. Thus the word rendered 'image' or 'idol' in the A.V. and 'sun-pillar' by the *Oxford Lexicon* becomes 'incense-stand' in Koehler, the change being due to the finding at Palmyra of an incense-altar with the very word on it. Another equally well-known example of such a discovery throwing light on an obscure word was the finding of weights inscribed with the word *šim*. The word means 'two-thirds of a shekel' and fits into the price-list at 1 Samuel 13²¹.

The texts discovered at Ras Shamra have also shed light on obscure Old Testament passages. At Proverbs 26²³, for example, the A.V. has 'Burning lips and a wicked heart are like a potsherd covered with silver dross'. But the words translated 'silver dross' are peculiar, for, if anything, they mean 'silver of dross', whereas one would expect 'dross of silver'; and, further, there is no evidence that any such substance was used in coating earthen vessels. The Ras Shamra texts suggest that the words, taken as a unit, are equivalent to a Ugaritic expression meaning 'like glaze'. The verse may then be rendered: 'Like the glaze covering an earthen vessel are smooth lips with an evil heart.'

Our knowledge of Biblical geography has also made considerable advances and helped to elucidate the Hebrew text. Thus where the A.V. has 'the entering in of Hamath' and the *Oxford Lexicon* 'the entrance to Hamath', the correct name of the place has been shown to be Lebo-Hamath. Often the versions point to the true text, as at Isaiah 15⁹, where the A.V. has Dimon, but the Vulgate Dibon, the chief city of Moab where the famous Moabite stone was discovered in 1868. Now the St Mark's Scroll supports the Vulgate reading. So it is with many passages; the meaning is clearer, the map-work easier, and our translation more accurate.

Finally, one may choose for comment the important study of lost Hebrew roots. The use of the cognate languages to explain Hebrew words is not new. A variation of this is to find that one Hebrew word may conceal more than one root—i.e. two roots in Arabic, for example, may be written alike in Hebrew and so the two roots may become telescoped under one heading. A glance through the lexicon shows that there are many instances of different roots having the same spelling, the record being held, I should imagine, by the combination 'rb, which covers no fewer than six entries in the *Oxford Lexicon*. Recent researches have shown that there may be many more examples of this phenomenon than had been suspected. In this country this line has been developed most notably by the doyen of British Semitists, Professor G. R. Driver, but others have used this method of elucidating obscurities. Thus Professor D. Winton Thomas has subjected the common word meaning 'know' to this type of analysis, and he finds that in addition to the ordinary root there is another with the same consonants which means 'be still, quiet, humiliated'. At Judges 16⁹ Samson is bound, but when he starts up in alarm 'he brake the withs, as a thread of tow is broken when it toucheth fire'. And the A.V. continues: 'So his strength was not known.' But that contradicts what has just been said; for surely by his action in breaking his bonds his strength was

known. But if the verb is the other root we get a perfectly good meaning: 'So his strength was not brought low.' And we accept this rendering all the more readily because it is supported by the Syriac version.

There are many other roots to which this type of analysis may be applied, some giving equally convincing results, others arousing some hesitation. When in a few of the occurrences of a common Hebrew word a new root is discovered on the strength of that root being in a cognate language, one wants an assurance that the root is not very rare also in the cognate tongue. And even when such a cognate root does explain certain Hebrew passages, care should be taken not to extend the application to other passages unnecessarily. It is a good key for the unlocking of the meaning of the Hebrew text; it should not be used to force a meaning out of the text.

W. D. MCHARDY

¹ J. L. Teicher, 'The Ben Asher Bible Manuscripts' (*Journal of Jewish Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 17-25), denies that the Aleppo codex is the 'model' codex of ben Asher consulted by Maimonides in Cairo; of the Leningrad codex he says that it represents an eclectic, not a genuine, ben Asher text. Kahle's reply we may expect in the forthcoming new edition of his *The Cairo Geniza* (Blackwell).

LITERARY CRITICISM AND ORAL TRADITION

LITERARY CRITICISM may be said to arise from the very nature of the biblical material. For, while it is inspired, authoritative and revelatory in character, it is also literature. The Old Testament, for example, is a collection of books, coming to us from various ages in Israel's life and written by various hands. Even in our familiar English versions we can recognize the difference in style between the various books. There is a difference in style and vocabulary between *Amos* and *Jeremiah*, between *Job* and *Ecclesiastes*, or between *Deuteronomy* and the first four books of the Law. The more frequently and carefully we read our Bibles, the clearer do those differences become. When we notice them, we are exercising literary criticism. It is obvious that that kind of study will gain in effectiveness when it is applied to the books in their original language. Further, the same kind of study may be applied to a particular book in order to determine whether it shows unity or diversity of authorship. That requires a much more exact and careful use of the method and can only properly be undertaken by one who has a command of the language and an acute sensitiveness to style. That may seem to leave most of us

in the hands of the expert, except that the methods and conclusions of any one scholar must be submitted to the rigorous examination of other equally competent scholars; only after a long period of testing are they likely to be accepted, and then probably in a modified form.

We should perhaps add here, that this mode of study has nothing to do with the character of the literature as revelation, authoritative and inspired, except that not infrequently that distinctive quality of the Word is made more clear. Further, the word 'criticism' is not used in its popular sense with its suggestion of condemnation. It is used in its quite precise sense of estimating the qualities of a work for the purposes of comparison.

Sometimes in the Old Testament we have a valuable check on the methods of literary criticism. The author of Chronicles is clearly making use of older material for a specific purpose. We can recognize his older material and we can recognize his own distinctive contribution. His older material is mainly drawn from the Book of Kings, and we can set the relevant passages side by side in order to make the demonstration. Or again, the manner in which the material in the Book of Kings is presented suggests what is clear from a study of the style, namely, that it has been compiled from previously existing material—royal archives, stories about prophets and Temple records—together with comments from one who has been deeply impressed by the teaching of Deuteronomy. With this in mind we can proceed to those parts of the Old Testament where we have no independent check.

With the term 'literary criticism' we inevitably associate the names of Reuss, Graf, and Wellhausen, whose brilliant work in the nineteenth century set before the public the result of their studies on the Pentateuch. We do well to remember, however, that their work was the culmination of studies by a succession of scholars beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century; while even as early as 1678 the beginning of this approach may be seen in R. Simon's *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament*. The recognition of four main strands in the Pentateuch was suggested by de Wette in 1805. It was the work of Reuss, Graf, and Wellhausen to associate the results of literary analysis with what appeared to be the historical developments of Israel's religion. They presented the order of the documents as J, E, D, P while recognizing that J and E had been at times so skilfully interwoven that they could not always be confidently separated. The Deuteronomic Code they confidently assigned to the time of Josiah, and concluded that the ceremonial and worship of the Priestly Code did not appear as a system until after the Exile period. These results were based on (1) literary criteria, (2) differences in religious standpoint, and (3) the historical background suggested by each of the sources.

Since Wellhausen's day, the hypothesis has been subjected to rigorous examination and some of the details have been modified. In general it has gained increasing recognition among Old Testament scholars. It has the merit, not only of distinguishing the literary strands of the Pentateuch (that had been done by earlier scholars), but of associating them with certain decisive moments in Israel's history and religious experience for which the evidence was to be found in the Old Testament. Further examination has suggested to some scholars that each of these documents has had a previous literary history—for example, Otto Eissfeldt would divide J into L (a lay source), and J. Similarly,

various hands have been suspected in D and P. But while these suggestions would modify, they do little to alter the recognition of the main strands. Most would feel that Deuteronomy, although it comes into clear view in Josiah's reign, must have been written before Josiah's reign and probably soon after Hezekiah's reform. There have been those who have advocated a date after Josiah (Hölscher and, independently, Kennett); others have suggested a much earlier date; A. C. Welch proposed a date early in the monarchy period; and E. Robertson would place it in the time of Samuel. These views, while they have all drawn attention to phenomena in *Deuteronomy* which may not be overlooked, have not gained general acceptance. It has, of course, been recognized that in each of the documents, older material has been incorporated. The existence of Hammurabi's Code provides evidence for that, since there is much in Israel's civil code that bears a strong resemblance to that seventeenth-century B.C. code. Of the 'documents' it is probably fair to say that most doubt has been expressed about E, at least as a written source in the Pentateuch.

The weakest feature of the Wellhausen hypothesis is its reliance on an evolutionary development of Israel's religion. This was perhaps inevitable in the mental climate of the last century. A further weakness was the tendency to think too exclusively in terms of 'documents'. Its strength lay in the objective criteria which compel a recognition of various strata in the Pentateuch. A new approach to an understanding of Pentateuchal origins, which has consequences also for an understanding of the processes by which other Old Testament books reached their present form, derives especially from Ivan Engnell of Uppsala. This draws attention to the very important part which Oral Tradition plays in the East in the preservation of material. Such traditions would be preserved and transmitted at various cult centres, and associated with certain important cult rituals. The traditions may well have been given written form, but the oral tradition continued. We are to see units of oral tradition, complexes of tradition and collections of tradition, with circles of traditionists and schools within which these traditions were handed on through the generations. In the East, it is suggested, a far higher value was placed on an orally transmitted tradition than on its written expression, and evidence from the East goes far to support that suggestion. There is much in the present books of Amos and Hosea that can be best explained by supposing that the prophetic oracles were preserved and transmitted orally among different groups of disciples until the conditions of the Exile compelled their reduction to written form. At times the manner in which the tradition has been preserved reflects the insights gained from the master's oracles by the disciples in the later historical situation. We are then to see a continuing group or groups of disciples whose lives were continually enriched and renewed by the prophet's words, so that they came to a deeper understanding of the circumstances of their day and made new applications of the prophetic oracles (cf. Amos 2_{4t}). In terms of Hebrew psychology, the 'soul' of the prophet, itself quickened by the Word of the Lord, entered into the 'soul' of the disciples, so that they in turn were strengthened and made sensitive to the work of God in new situations. It is obvious that there is here a parallel between the books of the Prophets in the Old Testament and the Gospels in the New, between the groups of prophets' disciples and the Christian communities in Rome, Antioch, and Caesarea.

When we turn to the Pentateuch, we are to see behind the present corpus of literature both written and orally preserved material, the whole having been integrated in its final form in the post-exilic period. It consists of civil law, ceremonial requirements, teaching, and material deriving from cultic recitals. Engnell makes a distinction between the Deuteronomic work (Deuteronomy-Kings) and the Priestly work (Genesis-Numbers). The former has as a nucleus laws, resting on ancient practice coming from various centres and mainly North Israelite in origin, but as a whole dominated by the interests of the Jerusalem shrine. It reached final expression in exilic (cf. 2 Kings 25_{27a}) or post-exilic times. The latter represents more completely the southern tradition, originally that of Hebron and Kadesh Barnea, but ultimately that of Jerusalem. Here too there is much that has been preserved from ancient times, and in this the oral transmission is a particularly strong element. But again, the final presentation in its present written form belongs to the post-exilic era, i.e. fifth century B.C. It was natural enough for Deuteronomy to be combined with the Tetrateuch, since the human 'constant' is Moses.

One important consequence of this mode of study is to see the Pentateuchal and 'historical' material in terms of a worshipping community. In such a community the greatest care would be taken to preserve the ancient tradition, although it might well have new applications. The Passover legend is remembered not because there were historians in Israel, but because this is Salvation-history and it was savingly remembered (so compare Ps 106). The stories of the Patriarchs were similarly important as expanding such ancient liturgical utterances as Deuteronomy 26_{5ff}. The ceremonial laws are designed and expanded over the generations in order that the people and priests might rightly approach the Holy Saviour.

It is evident that we must use the word 'document' with some care. Nonetheless, it would seem that we still have to deal with material that was indicated by the letters JE, D, and P, but allowing for a much greater fluidity than the word 'document' would suggest to the Western mind. Each of the strata will include pre-exilic material and post-exilic modification. This is, of course, entirely consistent with a religion which is living and, while remaining firmly anchored to its decisive beginning in the Mosaic period, is yet capable of meeting new situations and the needs of men in those situations.

We would invite the reader to consult a most valuable article by C. R. North '*Pentateuchal Criticism*' in *the Old Testament and Modern Study*, ed. H. H. Rowley (O.U.P., 1951); and E. Nielsen, *Oral Tradition* (S.C.M., 1954). It may be too early to say how far this method will commend itself to Old Testament scholarship; but it can be said that it is making a valuable contribution to our understanding, not only of the Old Testament books, but also of the life and religion of Israel.

A. S. HERBERT

ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF ISRAEL

WITH THE liberation of the Near East from Ottoman domination, archaeology passed from the heroic to the scientific era, and the period between the two world wars was indeed its golden age. Data, however, were accumulated so fast and in such volume that a just appraisal of their worth was not immediately possible and extravagant claims were too often made, a notable instance being the Ras Shamra texts and their relevance to Hebrew origins. The post-war period has offered fewer facilities for large-scale excavation, but the respite from field-work has made it possible to study critically the results of earlier work, which have generally been set in better perspective. A feature of the activity between the wars was the objectivity of most field archaeologists and the establishment of the science on an academic level. Biblical contacts were welcomed, but archaeologists were conscious that they were working in a much larger field, their study being the interplay of cultures and the development of the life of man in the cradle of Western civilization. The elucidation of Scripture was a by-product of this study, and Biblical study has been none the poorer for the objective attitude of the archaeologist. It will be our task under the limitations of this brief article to assess the contribution of recent archaeology to the study of the origins, history, and culture of Israel in the context of the ancient Near East, and thereby to discover how much Israel shared with her neighbours and how much she transcended their experience.

Archaeology defines the horizons of the patriarchal period in attesting a recession of civilization in Palestine and Syria towards the end of the third millennium BC, a feature of the revival being the assertion of Egyptian influence. From Egypt itself execration texts from Luxor and Saqqara,¹ from respectively the middle and end of the nineteenth century, name and localize chiefs of Palestine and southern Syria among the enemies of the Pharaoh, and so give the first real clue to the ethnology and political geography of Palestine. The settlements, among which Jerusalem is named for the first time, were fairly thinly distributed, and the population, of Amorite stock, was not quite assimilated to the settled life, as is indicated by the plurality of chiefs in single localities. These were the local conditions with which the Hebrew patriarchs were familiar. The distribution of typically Amorite names in this period from the south to the north of Mesopotamia and southwards through Palestine reflects the traditional wanderings of Abraham. Certain features of Mesopotamian law, e.g. licensed concubinage in the event of childlessness, which is attested in the Code of Hammurabi of Babylon (1724-1672),² suggests the verisimilitude of the tradition associating Abraham with Mesopotamia. Domestic archives from ancient Nuzu in northern Mesopotamia³ suggest similar conclusions in the case of Jacob, possession of *teraphim* (household gods) giving the right of inheritance even in preference to a son of the house (cf. Gen 31₃₂₋₅). Archaeology, however, cannot particularize further concerning the Hebrew patriarchs.

It has often been suggested that the occupation of Egypt by the alien Hyksos c. 1730 accounts for the promotion of Joseph, and that the resurgence of native Egyptian power and the expulsion of the Hyksos c. 1580 explains the

persecution of the Hebrews by 'a Pharaoh who knew not Joseph'. The matter is not so simple, and a date for the Exodus in the Eighteenth Dynasty is, in our opinion, quite impossible.⁴ Actually a papyrus recently discovered in the Brooklyn Museum, New York,⁵ lists a number of Semites in Egypt, certain of whom were chamberlains in native households, but this was before the Hyksos period;⁶ and other texts from after this time⁷ which attest Semites in Egypt indicate that it is hazardous to confine Joseph to the Hyksos period. Similarly, the inscriptions of Horemheb, the founder of the Nineteenth Dynasty, recording his relief of Asiatics in the Eastern Delta 'after the manner of their fathers from the beginning' suggests many descents to Egypt and many cases of exodus also.

Archaeology, if unable to furnish evidence for a fixed date for the Hebrew conquest of Palestine which would support the account of combined operations in the Book of Joshua, has confirmed the account in Judges 1_{9ff}, according to which the Hebrew settlement was sporadic, confined mainly to the hills of the interior, and effected by the tribes acting for the most part independently. Certain sites, such as Bethel and Tell Beit Mirsim (possibly Qiryath Sepher also known as Debir), were destroyed about the beginning of the Iron Age (c. thirteenth century) and rebuilt on a meaner scale, and other settlements in the hills, such as Tell el-Ful (Gibeah of Saul) and Seilun (Shiloh), took their origin in this period. Various sites traditionally associated with the Israelite settlement have been excavated, and the results of earlier excavations checked in the light of more accurate knowledge of Palestinian ceramics. Ai ('ruined mound'), it is found, lay derelict between c. 2000 and c. 1150,⁸ and the only explanation of the rôle it plays in Hebrew tradition is that the site was occupied by the men of Bethel to stem the Hebrew advance from Jericho. Recent work at Jericho compels a drastic revision of the positive views of Garstang, the very scanty evidence of the Late Bronze city suggesting c. 1350-1325 as the latest date of occupation. Experienced archaeologists are now very chary of using evidence from Jericho for this period. Recent literary criticism has discerned the strong impress of cult-legend from the neighbouring shrine of Gilgal in the Biblical account of the fall of Jericho;⁹ and M. Noth has suggested that this account was elaborated to explain the fact that when the last Israelite tribe to penetrate Palestine—namely, Benjamin—settled there, this once strong city was found in ruins. Bethel was destroyed just before or just after 1300,¹⁰ and about the same time inscriptions of Seti I at Bethshan attest the activity of *Apiru* in the hills to the north.¹¹ These may well be Hebrews of the tribe of Naphtali, who may have later penetrated to Upper Galilee and defeated the local Canaanites under the hegemony of Hazor at the Waters of Merom (possibly Meirun by Safed at the head of the Wadi el-Amud). After this action Hazor was destroyed, an event which the recent excavations of Yadin have dated just before 1200 B.C.¹² This is roughly the date of the destruction of Tell Beit Mirsim and Tell ed-Duweir (Lachish) in the South,¹³ but here we must reckon with the independent action of Othniel the Kenizzite, while Lachish may have been destroyed by the Philistines and kindred peoples who settled the coastal plain early in the twelfth century. In sum, archaeology has demonstrated that the Hebrew settlement and the development of the state is symptomatic of the general situation in the Near East in the first phase of the

Iron Age, and must be studied in the context of Aramaean folk-movements of that time, a *terminus a quo* being the movements of the Jacob tribes, who are probably to be included in the Khabiru of the Amarna Tablets (c. 1400).¹⁴ The surface exploration of Glueck in Transjordan gives c. 1300 as the *terminus a quo* for the wandering of the Israelites in the Arabah, there being no kingdoms of Edom or Moab to oppose their progress before that time. The question is still open, however, as to the proportion of the Israelites involved in this great trek. The mention of Israel in Palestine in the stele of Merneptah (1223) suggests that some at least of the Israelites were already settled, and we regard these as a tribal confederacy of certain of the older Jacob (or Leah) tribes who had settled there in the Amarna period.

The settlement of Israel in the hills of Palestine is marked by the destruction of certain sites, such as Tell Beit Mirsim and Bethel, and rebuilding on a less pretentious scale, and by the building and fortification of hill-towns in districts hitherto thinly populated. A feature of these fortifications is casemate walling, the Anatolian connexions of which, noticed by Albright, may suggest that the technique was borrowed by the Hebrews from the Philistines, who had presumably become familiar with it when they and their kinsfolk served as mercenaries of the Hittites. A typical fortress was excavated by Albright at Tell el-Ful (Gibeah of Saul), and it may have been originally a Philistine garrison-post (1 Sam. 13, after the LXX) before it served as quarters for Saul and his striking-force, including David.

Material remains of David's reign are rare, though the fortification of Bethshemesh and Tell Beit Mirsim on the Philistine frontier may date from this time. Solomon's reign, however, is characterized by great material development, traces of which have been discovered in Glueck's exploration of the copper mines of the Arabah and the factory-site and slave-compound of Tell el-Kheleif with its blast-furnaces near the north shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, where a certain amount of evidence for shipbuilding was also discovered (1 Kings 9₂₆). The fortifications of Megiddo (Level IV), Lachish, Gezer, and now Hazor, with their heavily fortified double gateways, illustrate the conception of fortified cities in the new state of Israel, though the Megiddo fortification is actually later and those of Lachish are possibly the work of Rehoboam. A detailed study of the pottery of Megiddo in the light of that from Samaria¹⁵ may yet prove that the famous 'stables of Solomon' at Megiddo with accommodation for 450 horses (cf. 1 Kings 9₁₉, 10₂₆)¹⁶ were really Ahab's.

For the new constitution in Israel, archaeology has adduced important evidence. The Ras Shamra texts have made possible a reconstruction of the Canaanite conception of kingship, which, we maintain, rather than the monarchy in Mesopotamia and Egypt, was the prototype of the Hebrew kingship though in a somewhat selective fashion typical of the Hebrew ethos and the personal wisdom of David. The sacral aspect of Israelite kingship is the subject of another study, but we may mention that in its secular aspect the new office, even from the time of Saul (1 Sam 7₁₀, 17₂₅, 22), adopted the conception of feudal power, which administrative and legal texts from Atchanah¹⁷ in North Syria and from the palace at Ras Shamra¹⁸ show to have been current in Canaan since the fourteenth century. Deeds of conveyance from Ras Shamra show that much, if not all, of the land was at the king's disposal, carrying burdens

to the palace in taxation in money, produce, labour of serfs, and beasts of burden. This is an illuminating commentary on the fiscal administration of Solomon (1 Kings 4_{7ff}, 11_{26ff}, 12₁₋₁₉).

Recent archaeology has also shed light on the Disruption of the Hebrew kingdom. The recovery of a fragment of a stele of Sheshonk I at Megiddo bears out his inscription at Karnak (ancient Thebes), formerly disputed, where the mention of towns in northern Palestine among his conquests (cf. 1 Kings 14₂₅₋₆) suggests that the kingdom of Jeroboam took its origin as a vassal state of Egypt. Judah was now on the defensive against Israel and Egypt, and it is significant that the excavations at Tell ed-Duweir in the South and at Tell en-Nasbeh (one of the Mizpahs) on the north frontier of Judah revealed very strong fortifications from this period (cf. 1 Kings 15₁₆₋₂₂; 2 Chron 11₉). Excavations at Tell el-Far'a seven miles north-east of Shechem, prove that this considerable Bronze Age city, probably ancient Tirzah, once the capital of North Israel, flourished until c. 900, when it was partially destroyed, possibly in the civil disorders out of which Omri emerged victor. The subsequent reduction in the status of the town coincides with the building of the new capital, Samaria.¹⁹ Since this was a virgin site until built by Omri in 880, the pottery of Samaria (see footnote 15, page 20) is an important means of accurate dating in Palestinian ceramics.

At Samaria itself the remains of the Israelite palaces have already become familiar since Reisner's excavations.²⁰ Now the later work of J. W. Crowfoot compels a revision of Reisner's dates.²¹ No differentiation is made between the buildings of Omri and Ahab; the celebrated ivories are dated to Ahab's time; and the fiscal dockets, which illustrate the agricultural economy and religious syncretism of Israel in Hosea's time, prove to be from the time of Jeroboam II.

In this period Assyrian annals supplement Palestinian archaeology in the reconstruction of the history of Israel, and from the annals of Tiglath-Pileser III we learn the brutal truth that in 732 Galilee, Transjordan, and the Plain of Sharon were annexed to the Assyrian Empire as the provinces of Megiddo, Gilzau (Gilead), and Du'ru (Dor) (cf. 2 Kings 15₂₉ and possibly Isa 9₁). This campaign was marked by the destruction of the third level at Megiddo and the rebuilding of the site as the administrative centre of the province Megiddo, with a large fort commanding a view of Esdraelon and the Galilean foothills. Yadin's recent excavations at the great frontier-city of Hazor in Upper Galilee have given further evidence of the ravages of Tiglath-Pileser.²²

After the Disruption Judah was very much restricted within her strongly fortified borders and was apparently forced to seek expansion in the direction of Edom (2 Kings 14₇). There was also an attempt to revive maritime enterprise through Eziongeber on the Gulf of Aqaba (2 Kings 14₂₂; 2 Chron 26₁₀, 27₄). Evidence of this activity has recently been found in Glueck's discovery of various fortified sites of the eighth century on the passes to the Arabah.²³ Land was also reclaimed in certain semi-desert regions, the first settlement at Qumran (probably the City of Salt) dating from this time.

The decline of the Jewish state is now much elucidated by the publication of later parts of the Babylonian Chronicle by D. J. Wiseman.²⁴ This chronicle shows that after the fall of Nineveh (612) and Harran (610) an Egyptian army

advanced over the Euphrates and made a great, but unsuccessful, effort to retake Harran. On his way the Pharaoh (Necho) encountered Josiah at Megiddo and blasted hopes of a revival of the glories of David's kingdom. This encounter may now be dated in or just before Tammuz (June-July) 609, and Necho's deposition of Josiah's son Jehoahaz and his elevation of Jehoiakim to the throne may, by the same evidence, be dated to the autumn of that year.²⁵ The subsequent conflict of Babylon and Egypt in the coastal plain of Palestine and the periodic involvement of Judah is lucidly documented in the *Babylonian Chronicle*, which dates the siege of Jerusalem precisely from December (Chislew) 598 to March (Adar) 597, when the city fell and Jehoiachin was captured with his family after a reign of three months (2 Kings 24₈). As is already well known, the last phase of the history of the state of Judah is graphically illustrated by the excavations at Tell ed-Duweir (Lachish), especially by the famous Lachish Letters. These, however, must be used soberly, only five of them being more than hopelessly fragmentary. They attest divided counsels in Judah (cf. Jer 38₄), with suspicion and state espionage, men of doubtful loyalty or pacifist leanings being taken into custody (cf. Jer 38₁₃₋₂₁). Since the fall of Azekah, mentioned with Jerusalem and Lachish in Jeremiah, is indicated, these documents, communications of a military officer or a local political agent with the Governor of Lachish, may well be from the last days of the kingdom. They are, however, advisedly cryptic, and we may not particularize concerning events or personnel. They are, notwithstanding, an excellent commentary on Jeremiah.

The Babylonian Exile, such an important period in literature and religion, still remains comparatively obscure. Mizpah apparently served as the provincial capital after the destruction of Jerusalem, its location at Tell en-Nasbeh being suggested by the fact that, though almost every site explored in Judah now shows traces of destruction, Tell en-Nasbeh was undisturbed. Neither local archaeology nor Babylonian documents give any hint of the administration of Palestine. A few cuneiform tablets, brief fiscal dockets from the basement of Nebuchadrezzar's citadel in Babylon, published in 1939,²⁶ actually mention rations to the captive king Jehoiachin and his family (2 Kings 25₃₀). They mention others from Palestine and Syria, including Philistines, and refer specifically to certain craftsmen, who are also mentioned as being deported with Jehoiachin (2 Kings 24₁₄).

Much more is known of the Persian administration of Palestine after the victory of Cyrus the Great in 539, when Palestine was part of the fifth satrapy 'Beyond the River'. Judah was one administrative district along with Samaria, Ammon beyond Jordan, Ashdod in the coastal plain, and Arabia extending as far north as Hebron, with Lachish probably as its administrative centre. Here the site of the old Jewish palace-fort was occupied by a much more modest residence of the Persian period, possibly the seat of 'Gishmu the Arabian', with Sanballat of Samaria and Tobiah of Ammon, the antagonist of Nehemiah (Neh. 2₁₉) in his fortification of Jerusalem. The district of Ashdod had a very mixed population. Military colonists from Mesopotamia had been planted by Assyria; more recently Edomites²⁷ had migrated from the east; and excavations by the Mandatory Department of Antiquities²⁸ near Haifa at Tell Abu Hawam and Athlit, together with a Phoenician inscription from the sarcophagus

of Eshmunazzar of Sidon (c. 300), attest Phoenician settlement throughout the district. Hence the region was less conservative than Judah in Hellenistic times and was eventually the field of Philip the Evangelist. The province of Judah, called Yehud on official stamps on coins and jar-handles (as in the Book of Ezra), was under a Persian governor, at least from the end of the fifth century, as we know from one of the papyri from the Jewish military colony near Assouan. It is not certain that influential Jews, such as Zerubbabel, had any official status, but the high priest was eventually admitted as an assessor to the Governor, his name actually appearing on coins, such as one found at Bethsur, the frontier town just north of Hebron.

The Diaspora of Israel is attested mainly by documents. In cuneiform texts from Nippur in southern Mesopotamia, from the business archives of the Murashu firm of bankers and estate brokers in the Persian period, various Jewish names indicate that some at least of the descendants of the exiles had risen to affluence. The numbers and influence, economic and intellectual, of the Jews in Lower Egypt is familiar from Roman history and from papyri, as well as from the writings of Philo. The papyri from Elephantine have long been known. In the royal directive regarding the Festival of Unleavened Bread the influence of a Jewish commissioner for religious affairs is apparent, suggesting the status and commission of Ezra (Ezra 7_{12ff}). The story of this interesting community is carried a little further with the recent publication of more of these documents,²⁹ and it is interesting to note that the ruined temple, regarding which the local elders had corresponded with the Persian Governor and the high priest in Jerusalem, was apparently restored. Inscriptions from Asia Minor and references in Latin writers of the early Empire indicate a wide dispersion of Jews throughout the Mediterranean, which, as indicated in the Acts and Pauline Epistles, had already begun presumably in the Greek period. A synagogue was discovered at Delos as early as the second century BC, and others with inscriptions at Miletus, Pirene, and Aegina may be as early. We have published new epigraphic evidence for Jewish settlement in Cyrenaica in the Ptolemaic period.³⁰

There are few tangible remains of the Hasmonaeen ascendancy except coins, though there is abundant evidence of the spread of Hellenism in Palestine which provoked the Jewish nationalist revolt. The passage from the defensive to triumph under the Hasmonaeans can be traced from the flourishing and recession of strategic settlements at the head and foot of passes from the coastal plain to Judah, settlements such as Bethsur,³¹ Marissa, Gezer, and Samaria. The most significant discovery of this period, of course, is the monastic settlement, probably Essene, at Khirbet Qumrân and Ain Feshkha, which illustrates a phase in the life of Israel between the Jewish and the Christian eras.

Apart from the commentary on the political development of Israel furnished by archaeology, the culture of Israel is much elucidated by the more intensive study of documents from Babylon, Mari on the mid-Euphrates, and Assyria, and especially by the Ras Shamra texts discovered in the excavation there since 1929 by Professor Schaeffer and published by Virolleaud and, recently, Nougayrol. As a result Canaan on the eve of the Hebrew settlement is known to us in detail far exceeding the most sanguine hopes of scholars of a generation ago. Excavations of Late Bronze Age settlements such as Megiddo, Taanach, Bethshan,

Tell Beit Mirsim, Tell ed-Duweir, and now Hazor (Tell el-Qedah) had already given their material evidence of Canaan. At Tell ed-Duweir, Hazor, and particularly at Bethshan temples of the deities of the fertility-cult, Baal-Hadad, Anath, and Astarte, have been excavated and we are familiar with the features of these deities from reliefs and figurines in metal and clay.³² The Canaanite shrine is also familiar, with its outer and inner courts, and 'holy of holies', altars for burnt offerings and incense, and occasionally standing-stones as signs of the presence of gods. The citadels, fortified gates, and walls of Canaanite cities, the houses of the inhabitants, workshops, tombs and their grave-deposits in limestone caves in some *wadi* adjacent to the settlement, and the earthenware utensils of the inhabitants and the weapons of the warriors are well known and are conveniently accessible in several excellent manuals.³³ Epigraphic fragments in alphabetic script from Sinai and Byblos and cuneiform texts from Shechem and Taanach indicate that written records were kept in Canaan as early as c. 1500. From a century or so later the Amarna Tablets have long been valued as evidence for the political situation and geography of Palestine. The value of all this matter, however, is outweighed by the direct evidence of the Ras Shamra texts, the greatest contribution which archaeology has made to Old Testament scholarship.

These texts, from the time of Jacob's penetration of Palestine, are most valuable because of their variety and fullness. Administrative texts in alphabetic and syllabic cuneiform from the palace³⁴ elucidate the relative status of the king and various classes of subject, and the fiscal system. Legal texts in syllabic cuneiform,³⁵ though disappointing in that they do not illustrate the range of Canaanite law, supplement the administrative texts in respect to royal authority and the conditions of land-tenure. All this matter is vitally relevant to the development of the Hebrew constitution under David and Solomon.

Legends of epic style and near-epic proportions³⁶ concerning ancient kings (Keret and Dan'el) and anthropomorphisms in the very graphic and extensive mythology admirably illustrate Canaanite society and social conventions such as marriage, funeral, and birth rites, hospitality, asylum, etc.,³⁷ and supply the living context in which Hebrew society may be more fully studied.

The mythological texts,³⁸ besides illustrating Canaanite poetry, the conventions and possibly also the language of which were freely adopted by the Hebrews, are of great importance as the verbal expression of Canaanite religion with which the Israelites were confronted on settling in Palestine. Briefly, the main body of Canaanite mythology concerns the vicissitudes of Baal ('lord'), which is a title of Hadad ('thunderer'), the god of autumn and winter storms and secondarily of the vegetation thereby promoted. In three mythological fragments, Baal, as the storm-god and tutelary deity of Order in nature, engages the unruly waters (Sea and River), triumphs, and is acclaimed as king. This theme, and indeed the language and imagery of the Canaanite myth, was appropriated by the Israelites, and in passages in the prophets and certain psalms³⁹ the connexion of the themes of the kingship of God and the triumph of Cosmos over Chaos, particularized in Creation or in victory over the political enemies of Israel, is noteworthy; we have accordingly suggested that the ideology of the Kingship of God was, with due modification, adopted by the Israelite settlers together with related elements of Canaanite mythology, which

was the verbal accompaniment of seasonal rituals of imitative magic in the local peasants' year.⁴⁰

The rest of the Baal-mythology concerns the vicissitudes of Baal in conflict with Mot (Death, Sterility). Baal is here obviously the dying and rising vegetation god, the local variation of Mesopotamian Tammuz, Egyptian Osiris, and Greek Dionysus. The building of a 'house' (palace or temple) for Baal on the eve of the thunder and 'early rains' of autumn recalls Solomon's dedication of the Temple at that season (1 Kings 8₂), and the destruction of Mot by reaping-hook, threshing-shovel, fire, and millstone is obviously the rite of desacralization of the new crop, the offering of the first sheaf described in Leviticus 2₁₄. Such correspondences suggest the functional nature of these myths relating to seasonal rituals in the agricultural year. In view of similar rituals in Israel indicated by the instances just cited, it is highly significant that the ideology of the myths of Baal's conflict with Mot never won acceptance in Israelite theology. The Ras Shamra texts, in indicating what Israel accepted and what she rejected in Canaanite culture, serve to emphasize the peculiar ethos of that peculiar people.

JOHN GRAY

¹ K. Sethe, 'Die Ächtung feindlicher Fürsten, Völker, und Dinge auf altägyptischen Tongefäßscherben des mittleren Reiches', *Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, Phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1926. G. Posener, 'Nouveaux Textes hiératiques de Proscription', *Mélanges syriens offerts à M. René Dussaud*, 1939, pp.313-17. Idem, *Princes et Pays d'Asie et de Nubie, textes hiératiques sur des figurines d'envoûtement du Moyen Empire*, 1940.

² Dates now revised since the Mari tablets show Hammurabi to be the younger contemporary of Shamsi-Adad I of Ashur. Recently discovered Assyrian king-lists make it possible to determine the date of Shamsi-Adad reasonably precisely.

³ C. H. Gordon, 'Biblical Customs and the Nuzu Tablets', *Biblical Archeologist*, 3, 1940, pp.1-12, and, more fully, *Introduction to Old Testament Times*, 1953, pp.104, 110-19.

⁴ Arguments against this early date are fully stated in H. H. Rowley, *From Joseph to Joshua*, 1950.

⁵ G. Posener, 'Les Asiatiques en Égypte sous le XII^e et le XIII^e Dynasties', *Syria*, XXXIV, 1957, pp.145-63.

⁶ This is legal matter and is accurately dated between 1842 and 1742 B.C.

⁷ E.g. the Harris Papyrus (c. 1200), which mentions wholesale confiscations of Egyptian property in time of famine by a Syrian official Arisu.

⁸ J. Marquet-Krause, *Syria*, XVI, 1935, pp.325-45.

⁹ E.g. A. Alt, 'Josua', *Kleine Schriften*, I, 1953, pp.176-92; M. Noth, *Das Buch Josua*, 1953; G. von Rad, *Das Formgeschichtliche Problem des Hexateuchs*, 1938; H. J. Kraus, 'Gilgal, ein Beitrag zur Kultusgeschichte Israels', *Vetus Testamentum*, I, 1951, pp.181-91.

¹⁰ M. Noth, *Geschichte Israels*, 1950, pp.63ff.

¹¹ A. Rowe, *The Topography and History of Bethshan*, 1930, p.30. 'Khabiru of the mountains of Yarmuth' is now read for Rowe's 'K. of the mountain of Jordan'.

¹² Y. Yadin, 'Some Aspects of the Material Culture of Northern Israel during the Canaanite and Israelite Periods, in the Light of Excavations at Hazor', *Antiquity and Survival*, II, 1957, p.166.

¹³ J. L. Starkey dated this event 'towards the close of the Nineteenth Dynasty', *P.E.F.O.S.*, 1935, p.239. A scarab of Ramses III from a disturbed deposit in the city suggests to Miss O. Tuftell that the place may have fallen 'a decade or so after rather than before 1200 B.C.', *Lachish III, The Iron Age*, 1953, p.46.

¹⁴ The activities of the Khabiru about Shechem mentioned in the Amarna Tablets possibly coincide with the activities of the Jacob-tribes in the same vicinity mentioned in Genesis 34.

¹⁵ G. M. Crowfoot and K. M. Kenyon, in *Samaria-Sebaste*, III, 1957.

¹⁶ Here, however, there is no mention of horses in connexion with Megiddo.

¹⁷ S. Smith, *Antiquaries Journal*, XIX, 1939, p.43.

¹⁸ J. Nougayrol, *Mission de Ras Shamra VI. Le Palais Royal d'Ugarit. Textes accadiens et hourrites des Archives Est, Ouest, et Centrales* (ed. C. F. A. Schaeffer), 1955.

¹⁹ R. De Vaux, *La Revue Biblique*, LXII, 1955, pp.587ff.

²⁰ *Harvard Excavations at Samaria (1908-10)*, 1924.

²¹ J. W. Crowfoot, *Samaria-Sebaste*, I, 1942.

²² Y. Yadin, op. cit., pp.168-9.

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KINGSHIP AND THE CULT

FEW of the recent developments in the study of the Old Testament have created greater perplexity in the minds of those who are not specialists in this field than the attempts to reconstruct the Jerusalem cult and to interpret the place of the king in the social and religious life of ancient Israel. It appears to many that conjecture has taken the place of assured results and imagination usurped the position of scholarship, with the resulting picture becoming a grotesque and warped shadow of what the religion of Judah really was. This uncertainty is due partly to the fact that much of the early work was written in German,¹ while English studies have largely been confined to carefully argued, scholarly monographs, partly to the very novelty of the conclusions reached. Moreover, the whole question has itself been hotly contested, and the debate is far from being concluded.

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²³ N. Glueck, 'The Fifth Season of Exploration in the Negeb', *B.A.S.O.R.*, 145, 1957, pp.11-25.

²⁴ D. J. Wiseman, *Chronicles of Chaldean Kings (626-556 B.C.) in the British Museum*, 1956, supplementing C. J. Gadd, *The Fall of Nineveh*, 1923, and Sidney Smith, *Babylonian Historical Texts*, 1924.

²⁵ The *Babylonian Chronicle* states definitely that Necho's Mesopotamian campaign lasted from Tammuz to Ellul (August-September) of 609.

²⁶ E. F. Weidner, 'Jojachin, König von Juda, in babylonischen Keilschrifttexten', *Mélanges syriens offerts à M. René Dussaud*, II, 1939, pp.923-35.

²⁷ Including the family of Herod the Great.

²⁸ H. Vincent, 'Tell Abu Hawam. Origines de Haifa', *La Revue Biblique*, XLIV, 1935, pp.435ff (review of the excavation by R. W. Hamilton); C. N. Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrim's Castle, Athlit', *Quarterly Statement of the Department of Antiquities of Palestine*, VI, 1938, pp.121-52.

²⁹ E. G. Kraeling, *The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri*, 1953.

³⁰ *Cyrenaican Expedition of the University of Manchester* (1952), pp.43-56. The inscriptions (epitaphs) are from the early Roman Imperial period, but the prevalence of the name Ptolemy seems to indicate an origin in the Hellenistic period.

³¹ O. R. Sellers, *The Citadel of Beth Sur*, 1933.

³² Baal is depicted as a warrior in short kilt and helmet embellished with bull's horns, brandishing a mace and grasping a thunderbolt. Reshef, the god of plague and destruction, is depicted as Mekal (consumer) with a gazelle-horn head-dress, as in Egyptian sculptures, in a well-known relief from the Late Bronze Age at malaria-ridden Bethshan; and clay plaques of nude, pregnant or suckling females, though perhaps amulets rather than objects of worship, reproduce the features of the fertility-goddesses, as their stylized coiffure indicates.

³³ The most comprehensive of the more recent publications is A. G. Barrois' *Manuel d'Archéologie Biblique*, I, 1939; II, 1953. W. F. Albright's syntheses in *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* (1942) and *The Archaeology of Palestine* (1949) are excellent, a special feature of all Albright's work being his mastery both of ancient documents and of field archaeology.

³⁴ C. Virolleaud, 'Les villes et les corporations du royaume d'Ugarit', *Syria*, XXI, 1940, pp.123-51; 'Lettres et documents administratifs de Ras Shamra', *Syria*, XXI, 1940, pp.247-76.

³⁵ J. Nougayrol, op. cit.

³⁶ For text see C. H. Gordon, *Ugaritic Handbook*, 1947, or *Ugaritic Manual*, 1955, or G. R. Driver, *Canaanite Myths and Legends*, 1956. For working translations see Gordon, *Ugaritic Literature*, 1949, or Driver, op. cit.

³⁷ A. van Selms, *Marriage and Family Life in Ugaritic Literature*, 1954. We have taken a similar approach in our study of Canaanite society in our *Legacy of Canaan* (Supplements to *Vetus Testamentum* V), 1957, pp.160-88.

³⁸ For text and working translation see Gordon and Driver, op. cit.

³⁹ E.g. Psalms 10₁₆, 29₁₀, 47_{7ff}, 93₂, 145₁₃, 146_{10a}.

⁴⁰ This view finds its most outstanding representative in S. Mowinkel in his recent works, *Han som Kommer*, 1951 (now translated into English by G. W. Anderson), and *Offersang og Sangoffer*, 1951. German scholarship inclines against the view here expressed.

In this article no attempt will be made to sketch the course of the discussion which largely revolves around the exact interpretation and dating of texts. Such outlines are readily available elsewhere.² Instead the background to this work will be given, with an outline of the ritual which has emerged and some comments on the position this reconstructed cult has with regard to general Old Testament studies.

I. Research into the cult of ancient Israel has been strongly influenced by the recognition of three facts:³ that the Israelites adopted many Canaanite practices and beliefs when they entered Palestine, that the thought of ancient Israel was akin to that of the so-called 'primitive' peoples, and that Israel's religious life was far more varied and complex than had previously been allowed. We will examine these in turn.

(a) THE INFLUENCE OF CANAAN

The Old Testament itself recognizes that the ideal of conquering Palestine, annihilating the previous inhabitants, and forming a people of pure Israelite stock was in fact never achieved. Many parts of the country could not be wrested from the Canaanites at all. Sometimes they were defeated and made slaves; at other times they entered into treaties with the Israelites, and the two peoples lived side by side and mixed freely. Ezekiel's taunt at Jerusalem contained much sober truth, 'Thy birth and thy nativity is of the land of the Canaanite; the Amorite was thy father, and thy mother was an Hittite' (Ezek 16₃). The very language which the Israelites came to speak was the language of Canaan (Isa 19₁₈), and with it much of the civilization of the people they conquered must have been taken over by the invaders. Many of the laws which were later collected in the Pentateuch were probably of Canaanite origin, and in religion also Canaanite ideas and practices were adopted. Sometimes these were plainly condemned by official religion as apostasy. Sometimes they were grafted into the Yahweh religion with complete acceptance, as seems to have happened with the three great Israelite feasts which are in essence agricultural festivals (Exod 23₁₄₋₁₇). The question then arises how far this Canaanite influence went, and how much is still discernible in the Old Testament texts which have been preserved and edited by post-exilic Judaism. The task of answering this question is made easier by the important discoveries at Ras Shamra, for these have presented the first extensive religious texts from the region of Syria and Palestine, and have enabled a much more exact understanding of Canaanite religion to be obtained.⁴

It has become increasingly clear, therefore, that Israelite religion did not exist in a vacuum. It can only be understood in the setting of the ancient Near East, and the religion of Ras Shamra and Mesopotamia sheds valuable light upon it. Those who seek to rediscover the Jerusalem cult in the time of the monarchy would say that a detailed study of the Old Testament, and especially of some of the psalms, shows that, despite the tenacious persistence of ideas belonging to the Yahwism of the desert, the borrowing from the pre-Israelite cult was extensive, though this borrowing was not indiscriminate and was often radically remoulded by the dominant spirit of the Yahweh faith.

(b) ISRAELITE WAYS OF THOUGHT

Anthropology as well as archaeology has made an important contribution to our understanding of the Old Testament. Both Pedersen and Mowinckel were influenced by the Danish scholar Vilhelm Grønbech, while A. R. Johnson acknowledges the importance of the work of L. Lévy-Bruhl and G. van der Leeuw for his own study of Hebrew thought.⁵ It has been realized that Israel was not only a Semitic and Eastern people, but also a 'primitive' people, and this means that a considerable effort must be made to understand the ways in which the Israelites thought if the Old Testament is to be interpreted at all adequately. Our modern Western ideas have to be set firmly on one side. On the simplest level this can be seen in the Hebrews' psychology. They regarded the heart as the seat of the intellect and will rather than of the emotions, and thought of man, not as a duality of body and spirit, but rather as a unified, animated personality. More difficult for us to understand is the Hebrew idea of corporate personality, the study of which has become so closely associated with H. Wheeler Robinson.⁶ By this is meant that to the Hebrew there was no clear distinction between the individual and the group, and in a sense a man's personality reached out beyond his body to his family, descendants, 'name', and possessions, so that it was entirely reasonable in their eyes for Achan's family, for example, to be involved in his guilt (Josh 7₂₄). A further feature of Israelite thought concerned life and death. Death was regarded as a weak, indeed the weakest, form of life, and sickness was a partial death. Life in its fullness meant activity and vitality and was radically opposed to death, and Yahweh was above all the 'Living God', active and life-giving.

(c) LIVING ISRAELITE RELIGION

The Wellhausen reconstruction of Israelite religion tended to assume that there was but a single line of development and to lay a predominant emphasis on the prophets. This has overshadowed much thought about the Old Testament, but recently there has been a revolt against both these emphases. It has been seen that Israelite religion was a many-sided thing. This in turn has meant that we can no longer treat prophetic religion as the only form of Yahweh faith, though it may be the form which points forward more clearly than others to the New Testament, and that the prophets themselves may have been more closely associated with the organized religion than had once been thought. Above all, Gunkel's form criticism, with its classification of the psalms and the assertion that they had originally a particular setting in the religious life of Israel, emphasized that there were areas of that religious life which up till then had hardly been explored at all, though Gunkel himself rejected the cultic interpretations of the psalms.

It is, then, this organized, official ritual which Mowinckel and others have attempted to reconstruct, with an endeavour to picture this religion imaginatively in such a way that we today can share in some measure the faith and fervour of these pre-exilic worshippers of Yahweh.

II. A discussion of kingship and the cult involves three main questions—the place of the king in the life of Israel, the songs and ritual of the temple festival, and the part played by the king at that festival.⁷

(a) THE KING IN ANCIENT ISRAEL

Even a superficial survey of the historical books shows that the king played an important part in the life of ancient Israel. Apart from Elisha and the reference in Amos 6₆, he alone in the time before the Exile is anointed. As the 'anointed of Yahweh' his person is sacrosanct, and David fears to molest Saul although he is his bitter enemy (1 Sam 24₆; 2 Sam 1₁₄). Endowed with God's spirit (1 Sam 16₁₃) he is closely connected with Israelite religious observances. The temples at Jerusalem and Bethel were royal chapels, David and Solomon were instrumental in building the Jerusalem temple, and David's ritual dancing before the ark when it was brought into the royal city brings him into close contact with the central cult object (2 Sam 6₁₄). He can offer sacrifice (2 Sam 6₁₇, 24₂₅). Moreover, the sin of the king can cause disaster for the people (cf. 2 Sam 21₁, 24; 1 Kings 18₁₈), a fact which must be thought of in terms of corporate personality, the king being regarded as the focal point of the nation. This appears more strongly in 2 Samuel 21₁₇ and Lamentations 4₂₀, where the welfare of the people is bound up with the welfare of the king. This last idea appears in some of the psalms which Gunkel grouped together as 'royal psalms', psalms which seem almost certainly to come from the time of the monarchy and to refer to the reigning member of the (Davidic) dynasty. Thus Psalm 72 pictures the ideal king and shows that the welfare of the people depends on the 'righteousness' of the king, 'righteousness' which is given him by God.

As the prosperity of the nation is closely linked with the righteousness of the king, so the king himself stands in a close relationship to God. It is doubtful whether he was thought to be divine, despite Psalm 45₆, 'Thy (i.e. the king's) throne, O God, is for ever and ever', which can be interpreted as the exaggeration of court etiquette, or as meaning, 'Thy throne is everlasting like that of God', and in spite of the fact that Solomon's throne with its seven steps may have been intended to symbolize divinity (1 Kings 10₁₈₋₂₀).⁸ He may be spoken of as the *adopted* son of God (Ps 2₇; cf. 2 Sam 7₁₄; Ps 89₂₆), but, after taking into account the clear stress on the covenant and the humanity of the king,⁹ it seems that A. R. Johnson is correct in asserting that the king is at most a *potential* extension of Yahweh's personality, however intimate he may be with God.

(b) THE PRE-EXILIC CULT

It is often felt that Mowinkel and those who have followed his lead have been trying to invent a new festival for the existence of which there is no evidence in the Old Testament. This is a misunderstanding. What these scholars have been attempting is to recover some of the ritual which was performed during the autumn feast of Ingathering or Tabernacles, which according to post-exilic sources lasted eight days (Lev 23_{33ff}). There is no question that this feast was observed and that in the period before the exile it was the most important of the festivals, *the* feast indeed.

It is true that there is little direct evidence for the worship which took place at this feast, though it would seem reasonable to suppose that rituals were performed during each of the days of the feast as at a similar festival in Babylon. Taking this hint and noticing that a group of Gunkel's psalms contained the phrase 'Yahweh is King' or 'Yahweh has become King' (Ps 47, 93, 95-9), it

has been suggested that they were originally sung then, and it is claimed that a careful study of these and others which may plausibly be assigned to this festival enables us to know something of the ritual and beliefs which obtained there. In the limits of this article it is only possible to allude to a few of the passages on which the suggested ritual is based, and it should be stressed that the strength of the case lies in the carefully amassed and sifted evidence as it is displayed in the books already referred to.

It is not to be expected that it will be possible to set out the worship in precise detail, since no one thinks of describing or explaining a living ritual and, by their nature, the songs which accompanied it only give us glimpses into the worshipping community.

An important feature would appear to have been the celebration of Yahweh as Lord of nature and the One who secures for His people the autumn rains and hence prosperity during the coming year. This is spoken of in terms of His supremacy over the forces of chaos and the waters which surround the fruitful earth and are ever threatening to overwhelm it (Ps 29, 93). There seems to have been a procession up to the temple in which the ark played an important part, and the entry of Yahweh into His temple was that of a king victorious over his foes (Ps 24). This victory was probably enacted in some kind of ritual combat, for the worshippers speak of *seeing* it, and we should probably think of this drama as a 'creative analogy' (a feature well known to comparative religion) anticipating and helping forward Yahweh's future victory over the forces of 'death' (cf. Ps. 48_{8, 9}). We notice also that Yahweh as the Lord of morality, makes moral demands on His worshippers. Only the righteous may enter His temple (Ps 24₃₋₆), and the festival enables the worshippers to renew their obedience to Him (Ps 95_{7b}). Moreover, this was no narrow nationalistic religion, for the victory of Yahweh over the enemies of His people is regarded as but the earthly counterpart of His victory over the unjust heathen gods who will be banished, Yahweh Himself then ruling over all men in righteousness and giving universal peace (Ps 46, 82, 98). Thus a festival which in Canaanite religion may have been predominantly a means of securing the success of the crops for the coming year is ethicized and given a message for the future on the plane of history; though the contrast between the two cultures is perhaps not to be too sharply accentuated, for some would claim that the idea of 'righteousness' was firmly embedded in the pre-Israelite Jerusalem cult and that David took over many of its features, including the name of 'the Most High' for Yahweh (cf. Ps 46₄).

(c) THE PLACE OF THE KING IN THE CULT

As the centre of the national life and the one who maintains its righteousness and hence its prosperity, it is to be expected that the king would play an important part in this ritual, and this is suggested by Psalm 84, which has many features already met with in the festival and which contains a special prayer for the king, Yahweh's anointed. From Psalm 18, 89, 101, and 118 it has been argued that he was an actor in a ritual drama. As the people's representative he was attacked by his nation's foes and humiliated almost to the point of being vanquished, but in his extremity, when all seemed lost, God intervened and saved him. He was then enthroned as Yahweh's adopted son

triumphant over his enemies and with a world rule entrusted to him (Ps 2). If this is the correct interpretation of these psalms, we see that the cult portrayed in a vivid way the need of the king and the nation to rely utterly upon God and to be true to the covenant.

III. In conclusion, some general observations may be made.

(1) Although the direct evidence for this reconstruction is rather slight, it should not be overlooked that the indirect evidence is cumulative and impressive. Psalms which could never be fitted satisfactorily into any known historical situation and which can only with difficulty be interpreted as eschatological prophecy now gain in meaning, and many obscurities in them have become plain. And it should be noted that the reconstruction sometimes explains the sense of the present Hebrew text where it had previously been considered inexplicable apart from emendation.¹⁰ The purpose of some of the furnishings of the temple also falls into place, such as that of the bronze sea (1 Kings 7_{23ff}, 2 Kings 16₁₇, 25₁₃), which plainly was a cult object of some importance and would now seem to have represented the primeval waters.

(2) Some words of the prophets gain in vividness if they are read with the living cult as the background. Two examples may be given. The call of Isaiah may well have occurred in the temple itself during the festival; the stress on the kingship of Yahweh would then show that the prophet in that moment of inspiration realized what this really meant in its moral demands on the nation. Again, Jeremiah 8_{19, 20} may mean that the people are saying that the autumn feast has come round and yet the 'salvation' by Yahweh which the cult set forth has not been realized in the removal of their sufferings.

(3) Without going into very complicated questions which admit of no simple solution, it may be suggested that the prophetic 'Day of the Lord' may go back to a popular belief that the salvation of Yahweh celebrated in the cult would one day be fully experienced in the triumph of Israel, that the Messianic hope is the figure of the king projected into the future, and that Second Isaiah may have been indebted to the cultic humiliation of the king for part of his description of the Suffering Servant.

(4) Finally, a word of caution may be added. This research into the ritual of the Jerusalem temple from the tenth to the sixth centuries BC has led to exciting results. But over-emphasis will only bring the whole subject into disrepute. The evidence is by no means unambiguous and needs to be worked over still more, and it must also be remembered that this is but one facet of the religious life of Israel. The prophetic work and the message of post-exilic Judaism need to be listened to even as we are straining our eyes to see the Israelite king emerging from the mists.

CYRIL S. RODD

¹ The greatest loss is that Mowinckel's *Studies in the Psalms* were never translated.

² Of especial value are: A. R. Johnson, *Divine Kingship and the O.T.* (E.T., lxii, pp.41f.) and the articles by A. R. Johnson and G. W. Anderson on the Psalms and Hebrew Religion in *The Old Testament and Modern Study* (edit. H. H. Rowley, Oxford, 1951). Important studies in English are: A. R. Johnson, *Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel* (Cardiff, 1955), S. Mowinckel, *He that Cometh* (trans. G. W. Anderson, Oxford, 1956, esp. pp.21-95), N. H. Snaith, *The Jewish New Year Festival* (London, 1947), and J. Pedersen, *Israel, I-II and III-IV* (Copenhagen, 1926 and 1940).

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OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY

WHEN, EIGHT years ago, in the volume entitled *The Old Testament and Modern Study* (Edit. by H. H. Rowley, 1951), the present writer attempted a survey of the contributions to Old Testament theology made during the preceding thirty years, he was able to report 'a steadily growing interest and concern accompanied by a very wholesome sense of the extreme difficulty of the questions which are involved'. It was suggested that the most significant movement of thought seemed to be away from the conception of Old Testament theology as a systematic statement of religious beliefs reflected in the Old Testament writings and towards an emphasis upon revelation through certain events of history. Through the events God spoke His Word. This creative Word aimed at eliciting a response from men and, when this response was made, there came into being what the Bible calls 'knowledge of God'. A theology of the Old Testament was essentially a critique of this knowledge of God such as could usefully be carried on only from the inside point of view possible for the Christian thinker as—to borrow a thought of the late Principal H. Wheeler Robinson—'a resident alien' in the Old Testament. This critique involved value judgements. This, however, did not mean that the theologian was to read into the Old Testament what was not there. On the contrary, there was need of this special viewpoint of his if he was to be able truly to see what was there.

It will be for the reader to judge how far this expression of opinion has been a pointer along the road which the recent development of thought has followed.

In 1952 a small book appeared which clarified the issues in a decisive manner. This was the American scholar G. E. Wright's *God Who Acts: Old Testament Theology as Recital*. Wright's main contention, in which he followed the lead given by G. von Rad in Germany, was that Old Testament theology must be based in the main on Israel's cultic proclamation of the redemptive acts of God in her history, this being the Old Testament counterpart of the *kerygma* of the New Testament. One great merit of this book is that its author is guided by the Bible itself in thinking neither of God nor of man as if they were substantives with qualities to be enumerated and classified, but as subjects of action through which they reveal themselves as what they are. Wright also makes it clear that 'Biblical knowing is an event in the intercourse between

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³ This method of approaching the subject does not imply that research into the cult was conducted in this order.

⁴ For a careful appraisal of the material from Ras Shamra, see J. Gray, *The Legacy of Canaan* (Leiden, 1957).

⁵ *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel* (Cardiff, 1949), p.7, n.1 (but cf. n.4).

⁶ Cf. his article on Hebrew Psychology (*The People and the Book*, edit. A. S. Peake, Oxford, 1925).

⁷ Much of the following is based on A. R. Johnson's work, but it should not be taken as an exposition of his views.

⁸ As Mowinckel and others assert. (Cf. *He That Cometh*, p.62, though this categorical statement seems to be modified later in the chapter.)

⁹ Cf. Psalm 89₁₋₃₇ and 2 Samuel 23₁₋₇.

¹⁰ Cf. *Sacral Kingship*, pp.81, n.1 and 115, n.5.

two personalities'. From this he draws the conclusion that man comes to know himself only in the act of decision by which he relates himself to God's will. A Biblical anthropology must, therefore, consist largely, not of a description of man's nature as if it were something static, but of narrative exhibiting man's activity both in obedience and in disobedience to God. The criticism which may perhaps be passed on Wright's account of the content of Old Testament theology is that he does not relate sufficiently closely the cultic recital of the divine acts by which God reveals Himself to the response which man makes or fails to make in daily living to these acts which he proclaims. It is in moments of personal decision that man comes to know, not only himself, but God; God reveals Himself, in a way that tests the sincerity of the cultic recital, in the quality of life of the community which He calls into being and claims as His own. As Eichrodt says very wisely in the Preface to the new edition of his *Old Testament Theology*, it will not do to make the substance of Old Testament theology no more than an account of Israel's *Heilsgeschichte* such as, in detachment from Israel's response in faith and life, may easily become mere myth. The *Heilsgeschichte* must be anchored in history by a witness which is made, not only in cultic word, but also in a life informed by the spirit of God. It is not enough to say that God elected Israel. That Israel continued century after century to recite that fact was possible only because God was at work within Israel. It may have been the response only of a remnant and a very imperfect response at that, but the response, such as it was, is an essential part of the subject-matter of Old Testament theology.

During the last few years an unusual number of books dealing with the field of study under discussion has become available. L. Köhler's *Old Testament Theology* has appeared in English translation, and E. Jacob's treatment of the subject has appeared both in French and in English. The first two volumes of the Roman Catholic scholar P. van Imschoot's *Theologie de L'Ancien Testament* have also been published. Köhler's book is of value for its conciseness and excellent power of definition, but it is essentially backward-looking, in that it presents a systematization of the religious ideas of the Old Testament under headings dictated by dogmatic theology. The special merit of Jacob's book is to be found in his brilliant discussion of history as the Biblical medium of revelation.

Apart, however, from the welcome reappearance of the first volume of Eichrodt's monumental and indispensable *Theologie des Alten Testaments* in a revised edition, the two recent events of outstanding interest in the field of study under discussion have been the publication last year of the first volume of G. von Rad's long-awaited *Theologie des Alten Testaments* and the publication in Dutch in 1955, in German in 1956, and in English last year, of Th. C. Vriezen's *An Outline of Old Testament Theology* in its second revised edition, the original edition having appeared as long ago as 1949. It may be confidently affirmed that no one can reach an adequate understanding of the present position of Old Testament theology who has not come to grips with the different presentations of the subject in these three works.

Eichrodt, it will be recalled, makes what he describes as a cross-section through the historical process of Israel's religion and, by examining the result, seeks to determine what are the constants in the Hebrew faith. His

description takes systematic form, the organizing principle being the idea of the covenant, recognized as central to Israel's thought of her relation to God. Due account is taken of the movement of thought and practice and the changes that that brings. It may be claimed that it was Eichrodt's pioneer work which, more than any other single cause, brought about the tremendous revival of interest in the theological study of the Old Testament. It may be that he has found a greater degree of unity in the Old Testament than is actually there, but it still remains true that he did a tremendous service in following the lead of the sociologist Max Weber and directing attention to the central importance in Israel's religion of the covenant.

The approach of von Rad to the theological problem of the Old Testament is essentially different from that of Eichrodt. Von Rad is impressed by the variety of theological viewpoints among the Old Testament writers. It has now become clear that the varied form-critical work on such themes as the Hexateuch, Deuteronomy, and Chronicles which previously came from his pen had been converging on the massive theological work of which we now have the first fascinating instalment. Von Rad's method is first to give a sketch of the main crises of Israel's history and then to show how its *kerygmatic* significance was testified to by a great variety of witnesses. The Old Testament enables us to view the events from the primeval beginnings up to the conquest of Canaan through the eyes of such writers or schools of writers as we designate by the familiar sigla J, E, D, and P. Particular attention may be drawn to von Rad's brilliant study of the Yahwist. In all this he is returning to the ground he made his own in his commentary on Genesis. The next section deals with the monarchy and what that involved for Israel. Here we are given a penetrating study of the material in the books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, and also in the so-called royal psalms, which reflect the theological concern of those who realized how fateful was the new departure in Israel's religion. A concluding section deals with Israel's response in worship and in life as evidenced by the Psalter and the Wisdom writings. The second volume is to deal with the theologies of the prophets. There is perhaps no book published in recent times so calculated to revitalize Old Testament studies. May the English translation not be long delayed!

Further light upon von Rad's theological views regarding the Old Testament may be obtained by turning back to the controversial article which he contributed to a notable symposium published in a special number of *Evangelische Theologie* (1952, Heft 1/2) which may be regarded as programmatic for the new series of Old Testament commentaries being edited by Martin Noth. The article in question deals with what von Rad calls the typological interpretation of the Old Testament, though he is not quite sure himself if he has chosen the right word to convey his meaning. He starts off by pointing to the different kinds of analogical reasoning which we commonly use in our ordinary thinking and goes on to argue that the Old Testament primarily bears witness to a certain series of events in which God manifested Himself on behalf of His people—the Old Testament *credenda*—and that we have repetitions of this pattern of events both within the Old Testament (e.g. in Deutero-Isaiah) and especially in the New Testament. Only the acts of God in the events are theologically significant. Accidental correspondences must be dismissed as

irrelevant. That there are such correspondences is of course true. Professor Rowley in his book, *The Unity of the Bible*, speaks of a certain divine signature which repeats itself in the events of Israel's history, and the present writer has himself drawn attention to this repeating pattern (v. *Record and Revelation*, Edit. by H. W. Robinson, p.241).

Von Rad, however, combines with his emphasis upon the kerygmatic events of the *Heilsgeschichte* a certain deprecation of the attempt to identify oneself with the religious experience of the Hebrews, to take one's stand, as it were, where they stood, on the ground that to do so is not really possible. He thinks that we talk much too glibly of man's encounter with God in the Old Testament. At best, he maintains, our knowledge of Old Testament piety is second-hand and indirect, while our knowledge of the Old Testament *kerygma* is first-hand and direct. We must be guided by the Old Testament's own emphasis.

It may be urged in reply to this view of von Rad (which seems to be shared by Noth, as appears from his essay in the same symposium) that, while what he says may be true of the early stages of Israel's history and of religious experience narrowly understood, we do have in the Old Testament evidence of the response made in life, this being reflected, for example, in Hebrew law. Moreover, we have to account for the ethical judgements of the prophets, implying as they do a conscience in Israel to which the prophets could appeal and which they did not themselves call into being. On the matter of typology, it may be admitted that, as we look back, we can see correspondences between events in the Old and in the New Testaments—This is that!—but these correspondences could mislead, as we know from the New Testament. The correspondence between Christ and David could blind most of Jesus' contemporaries and prevent them from seeing Him as He really was. For us typological thought may involve the danger of adopting a spectator attitude to Scripture. Thus we may sometimes miss the humbling encounter with the living God to which an Old Testament incident can lead us. We may admit the danger of illegitimate spiritualizations, but surely it is often possible to stand near enough to where the Old Testament witnesses stood to hear an echo of the voice they heard.

Great as von Rad's achievement is—and it is a very great one—it seems to the present writer that the distinctive contribution of Vriezen to the current debate is worthy of equal attention. In his general view of the Old Testament, Vriezen stands very close to Eichrodt. Where he goes beyond the latter is in his insistence that a theology of the Old Testament can be written only from a theological point of view; Eichrodt's contention is that it must be a purely historical study. In Vriezen's opinion value judgements are demanded, and that would mean that a Christian can look at the Old Testament theologically only from the Christian angle. This has nothing to do with so-called Christological exegesis as in W. Vischer's work. The aim is to bring the Old Testament under a light which reveals without distorting. What this seems to point forward to is the long labour of responsible Christian exegesis of the Old Testament which will enable us, with minds illuminated by the New Testament, to listen ever more attentively to the witness of the Old Testament, until through that discipline its relevance becomes manifest. This will keep us from making glib and hasty summaries of the Old Testament teaching.

Vriezen makes the point that Old Testament theology, as a part of Biblical theology, has the important function of serving as a connecting link between dogmatic theology and historical theology. It evaluates material before handing it over to the dogmatic theologian for use in his systematic work. It is for lack of a discipline such as this that the handling of the Old Testament by dogmatic theologians has sometimes been seriously out of date. If there are dangers here they will just have to be faced, and the dogmatic theologian is entitled to instruct the Biblical theologian while being instructed by him. Gabler's 'redding of the marches' long ago between Biblical theology and dogmatic theology is no longer completely satisfactory and must not be allowed to paralyse thought.

In conclusion, brief reference may be made to two contemporary lines of study which are important for the proper development of Old Testament theology. One is the investigation of the meaning of individual key-words in the Old Testament and the study of the central theological topics which the Old Testament suggests for consideration. Much that is to be found in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* is relevant here. As noteworthy examples of semantic investigation may be instanced N. H. Snaith's *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament* and A. R. Johnson's *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel* and the study of linguistic usage in Vriezen's *Die Erwählung Gottes im Alten Testament*, a book which has also a vital bearing on the tremendous theological problem posed to Christian thought by the continued existence of the Jewish people.

The other line of study is the debate which has been going on for many years regarding the cultic significance of the Monarchy in Israel and the related topic of the Messianic expectation. The literature on these subjects is vast and much of it highly technical. One thinks with gratitude of the work of men like Mowinckel and Bentzen in Scandinavia, of H. J. Kraus in Germany, and of A. R. Johnson in this country. The latter's *Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel*, a monograph on the royal psalms, has a bearing on the main contention of this essay, illustrating as it does the way in which men of faith and insight in Judah sought to make the new institution of the monarchy serve the end of preserving and enhancing the unique faith and way of life which distinguished Israel. Johnson is doing a notable service by providing a counterpoise to the excessive emphasis on *Heilsgeschichte* in the contemporary study of the Old Testament.

Books such as those which have been cited have a very real bearing on the task of the Old Testament theologian. What helps him most is what brings him closest to the actual spiritual struggles of those whose witness is recorded for us in the Old Testament.

The theological debate about the Old Testament has gone on all down the Christian centuries. As aids to understand the stage it has reached today two recent books may be recommended: E. G. Kraeling's *The Old Testament since the Reformation* and H. J. Kraus's *Geschichte der Historisch-Kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart*. On a subject closely allied to the subject of this essay there is no better recent book than J. K. S. Reid's *The Authority of Scripture*. It is necessary that the Biblical theologian should never forget that the ultimate authority is not the letter which kills, but the living God who speaks.

NORMAN W. PORTEOUS

PROPHECY

IN THIS country the first quarter of the present century saw a general disinclination to undertake serious study of the Old Testament. It is not necessary to go into details; suffice it to say that the reasons were in part critical, in part theological and ethical, and in part economic. But the last thirty years have seen a revival of interest in Old Testament studies, and especially in the prophetic literature. It would be too much to say that the movement has been uniform throughout the whole world of Christian biblical students, but there are signs of a steady trend in certain directions, and in the following paragraphs an attempt will be made to sketch the general direction to which scholars seem to be moving, and to state views which may ultimately hold the field, though their acceptance seems at present only partial in some respects. We can most conveniently glance at four directions in which recent advance points to a fuller understanding of these men and of their work. We touch, then, on the peculiar psychology of the Hebrew prophet, the textual criticism of the books themselves, the position of higher criticism, and the principles on which sound exegesis should be based.

(i) Since the publication of Hölscher's *Die Profeten* in 1914 it has been widely recognized that the Hebrew term for 'prophet' (*nābī*) inevitably suggested to the ancient Israelite a person who was liable at times to fall into an abnormal state, in which he might (and usually would) perform strange and wild deeds of which even he would be incapable in his normal condition. The behaviour of the Baal 'prophets' on Carmel is a good illustration; within Israel we find a conspicuous example in Saul, who in one such fit tried to pin David to the wall with a javelin, and in another stripped off his clothes and lay naked for a day and a night (1 Sam 19^{10, 24}). This phenomenon was not confined to Israel; in later times it spread to Egypt and the classical world, and we have descriptions of it from several Greek and Latin authors. A comparative study of these references suggests that its original home was in Anatolia, whence it spread south and west.

In Saul's day the 'prophet' was clearly distinguished from the 'seer', the man possessed of second sight and second hearing, the man who, when the fit was on him, could see and hear things inaudible and invisible to others, and even to himself in his normal state. A note in 1 Samuel 9, suggests that from the time of David onwards these two forms of divine inspiration coalesced; Amos, no 'prophet' till he received the divine call, could be described both as prophet and seer. In the prophetic books we often read of 'visions': 'Yahweh made me see'. It is quite possible, too, that the phrase usually rendered 'thus saith the LORD' may well have meant 'Thus said Yahweh', and that the prophet does, in fact, describe an experience of 'second hearing' parallel to that of 'second sight'.

It is not easy for a devout Christian student to admit that divine inspiration could manifest itself in behaviour which today would be associated with insanity or epilepsy. But in the nearer east such abnormal behaviour was, and still is, associated to a sudden access of divine power, temporarily dominating and, indeed, transforming a human personality (cp. 1 Sam. 10₆). When we

examine our own feelings more closely we have to admit that our instinctive repulsion is aesthetic rather than ethical or theological, and we can understand that God should use a medium of transmission which would be universally accepted as a guarantee of divine authority. Some scholars, however, while accepting the main principle, would limit this 'ecstatic' condition to a small number of a prophet's utterances, perhaps even to his initial call to his ministry. 'Second sight' and 'second hearing' on the other hand, would be almost universally admitted; the prophet knew that the words he spoke were not his, for he had actually heard Yahweh speak, and at times actually seen Him. To the prophet these experiences were just as real as those of normal life.

(ii) Textual criticism is concerned solely with the attempt to recover the exact words of the original writer or speaker. Since these were handed down from generation to generation in copies made by hand, there are inevitably variations in the forms taken by the text. From an early period the greatest care has been taken to see that the copies made coincided exactly with those from which they were taken. The recent discoveries at Qumran and its neighbourhood have given us very little continuous Biblical text; only the books of Isaiah and Habakkuk are yet available *in extenso* to the ordinary student. But these show that the demand for careful and exact duplication of the text was already recognized, and (except in spelling) these MSS. differ very little from our printed Hebrew Bibles. But at an earlier date, perhaps one or two centuries earlier, Alexander the Great had drafted large numbers of Jews to his new Egyptian city of Alexandria. It seems clear that they took copies of the sacred books with them, not all at once, but at different points in their history. The process probably began with the Law, and the rest followed. As time passed it became necessary for the Jew whose normal language was now Greek to have the Scriptures in his vernacular, and Greek translations were made. These have come down to us in what we know as the 'Septuagint', which was actually the Bible of most, if not all, of the New Testament writers, and remained the official Old Testament of the Mediterranean Church till the days of Jerome, being translated into other vernaculars as required. In a very large number of cases this 'Septuagint' (LXX) is based on a Hebrew text which differed from that of the Palestinian tradition represented in the 'Scrolls' and our printed Bibles. Except, perhaps, in the Orthodox Eastern Church, no one would today claim that the LXX necessarily has priority over the traditional Hebrew text ('M.T.'), but it is generally recognized that it has to be taken into account and that very often it gives us a useful indication of the original text; a modern scholar would certainly accept a large number of its readings in preference to those of the M.T. It is now generally agreed that in every case where there is a difference of text, a decision between the alternatives must be made on the comparative merits of the two readings. From time to time other ancient versions, especially the Vulgate (Jerome's text), the Targums (vernacular Aramaic translations used by Jews), the Syriac (still the official Bible of some eastern Christians, e.g. the ancient Indian Church), and others may be a help. Some, especially the Coptic versions, help us to check the accuracy of the LXX tradition itself.

In this connexion we should also note the recovery of the principles which underlie the forms of Hebrew poetry. This is essentially a modern study. It

goes back to Lowth, who, in the middle of the eighteenth century, propounded his doctrine of 'parallelism'. Every line of Hebrew poetry contains two, or possibly three parts. There is always a certain correspondence between them, but it is primarily a correspondence of thought, not of sound. The term 'parallelism' is a little unfortunate, since it suggests to some minds a simple repetition of an idea, though in slightly different words. This does happen, but it is comparatively rare, and 'balance' would give a better idea of the facts, for quite often the sense simply runs on and the 'balance' is purely numerical, the two parts of the line having the same, or nearly the same number of thought-units.

Serious study of Hebrew poetic form was revived about 1876, and since that time there have been frequent attempts to find a sound-basis as well as a thought-basis for poetic form. None, however, has commanded anything like general approval, and it seems unlikely that any ever will. In the early years of this century it was widely felt that exactly the same 'metre' must be found in all lines of the same poem. This theory led to a large number of conjectural emendations *metri causa*, most of which would not be made today. There are still differences of opinion as to the permissible extent of variation, but some is almost universally admitted. Two main types are usually recognized, 3+2, varying with 2+3 and 2+2, and 3+3, varying with 2+2+2 and even 3+3+3. It is interesting to find that quite often where the M.T. has an 'incorrect' line (judged by the standards just mentioned), the LXX renders a 'correct' Hebrew text. This also happens occasionally where we find the same passage in more than one place, e.g. Micah 4₁ is 'correct', while Isaiah 2₂ is not.

Philological research has also, in recent years, reduced the number of passages in which conjectural emendation is inevitable. The Mesopotamian languages, Assyrian and Babylonian, are better known today than ever before in the Christian era. One whole literature, hitherto lost for centuries, has been revealed to us in Ugaritic, and the comparative study of languages long known to us has thrown light on much that was previously obscure. New meanings for familiar Hebrew words have been found, and can at times be applied to passages which have seemed almost meaningless. The forthcoming edition of the *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon* will give us new and better renderings in many cases, and will often satisfy us that the text needs no alteration.

(iii) Higher criticism, properly speaking, is concerned with three matters, and three only: the structure, the date and the authorship of the documents it studies. It is necessary to stress this fact, since it is often thought that it challenges the historicity of biblical statements or denies the divine inspiration of scripture. It is possible that there have been higher critics (there are none in this country and few elsewhere, if any) who might justly be charged with these matters, but if the charge is true it can be brought only against an individual, who would hold his heterodox views even if he had never heard of higher criticism. Every higher critic known to the present writer would insist on his belief that a prophetic utterance has a divine origin and authority, though he may not be able to accept either the traditional view or those of his colleagues as to the instruments God used in the transmission of His truth. *In the Bible as a whole, including the prophets, we have a divine revelation of eternal truth, given in a form adapted to an immediate occasion.* The critic's task is to study the methods God used in transmitting this truth, and so prepare the way for

a fuller understanding of it for his own age and conditions. The most obvious example of the last clause in the definition just given is to be seen in the language; the prophetic books were not written in English, or in Greek or in Latin. But other aspects also demand attention. The historical background cannot be ignored, nor can the social structure and racial psychology of ancient Israel; inevitably (unless we are to adopt a doctrine of mechanical dictation like that held in orthodox Islam) the personality of God's chosen instruments affects the form in which His words were first given to man; and finally, we must recognize that this form is also largely conditioned by the audience to whom the truth was first stated.

In the earlier stages of modern higher criticism (which goes back to the latter part of the seventeenth century) men's attention was unfortunately caught by the third, and least important, of the three critical subjects mentioned—the human authorship. Today the centre of interest is where it always should have been, in the structure of the books. Few serious Old Testament scholars today would regard the prophets as being primarily 'authors', writing and 'publishing' their 'sermons' for the instruction and edification of their own and later generations. It is, of course, agreed that sometimes they wrote or dictated parts of what they had said, but with a few exceptions, particularly Jeremiah and Ezekiel, our prophetic books consist mainly of utterances addressed to a contemporary audience and handed down orally, perhaps for generations, before being committed to writing.

During the last fifty years careful students have noted three distinct types of writing in the prophetic books. First, we have a great deal of poetry, though Jeremiah has a large proportion of prose, Ezekiel is nearly all prose, and among the 'Twelve' Jonah (except ch. 2), Haggai, and Zechariah are entirely in prose form.

Except in a few cases (e.g. the later chapters of Ezekiel) the poems are short, sometimes very short, and for fifty years it has been recognized that these brief 'oracles' have come down to us in 'collections' of various lengths. The longer books, especially Isaiah and Jeremiah, include several of these collections. Hosea almost certainly has two, one short and one longer. Some of the 'Twelve' (e.g. Obadiah) contain only one each.

It is now widely held that the individual oracles now included in these collections were handed down orally for some time; indeed, a brilliant young Scandinavian group of scholars has recently suggested that they were not written at all till centuries after they were uttered. But, early or late, they were written down, and since the discovery of the 'Lachish Letters' it has been suggested that the original transcriptions may often have been on bits of potsherd, which may account for some peculiar features in them.

The time came when people began to collect them, keeping together those which the collector ascribed to the same prophet; if style is any criterion, he was usually right. But we do find, especially at the end of a collection, passages of uncertain meaning, and others which do not suggest the author from whom the rest come. There are also cases in which two different collectors have included the same piece; the most familiar instance is that of Isaiah 2₃₋₄ and Micah 4₁₋₄. It may be remarked that the Micah collector seems to have had the more complete form.

The habits of collectors are worth special study. They were fond of grouping together oracles which dealt with similar subjects; several prophetic books contain collections of oracles against foreign nations. Sometimes a word or phrase at the end of one oracle would occur again at the beginning of another, though they may have had little else in common. Thus Isaiah 1⁴⁻⁹, 10-17 deal with quite different subjects; the link is the mention of Sodom and Gomorrah in vv. 9 and 10.

In prophetic prose we find two types. Sometimes the prophet speaks in his own person, using the pronoun I (me, my); we may call this 'I-prose'. Elsewhere a third person tells us of some experience through which the prophet went, and the prophet is 'he' ('he-prose'). The distinction is most obvious in Hosea and Jeremiah; in the latter book we have references to certain facts in both forms: Jeremiah 7₁₋₁₅ (I-form) and 7₁₆ (he-form).

It has been suggested that the I-form is that taken by an oracle when it was written down or dictated by the prophet himself. Certainly these passages normally concentrate on what Yahweh said to the prophet, though we often have some indication of the conditions in which the oracle was delivered. Possibly the scroll written by Baruch at Jeremiah's dictation was the source from which the I-prose sections in that book were taken.

There is little to be said about the 'he-prose'. Israel was fond of collecting narratives describing events in the lives of her prophets, and the narratives in our prophetic books do not differ greatly in character from those which are found of other prophets, such as Elijah and Elisha, in the historical books. These may well have been the work of a contemporary, e.g. of Baruch in Jeremiah.

We have thus glanced at three stages in the development of our prophetic literature: first the utterance, then its transcription, and in the third place its inclusion in a collection. The final stage is that of compilation, in which the various materials already in existence were combined. Like the collector, the compiler seems to have had his methods and, it seems, a definite plan. The compiler of Jeremiah, for instance, placed an I-prose section at the head of each collection which he incorporated in the finished product, and when this type was exhausted prefixed a section of the he-prose, which first occurs in ch. 19 (the mention of Jeremiah in 18₁ may have been a copyist's slip; the rest of the chapter is in I-form). The remainder of the he-prose he placed at the end of the book. The Hosea compiler placed a he-prose passage at the head of his shorter collection and an I-prose passage at the head of the longer. In the interpretation of this book it is important to remember that there is no literary connexion between chs. 1 and 3; any exegesis which assumes that the two were meant to form a continuous narrative is open to suspicion.

(iv) How are we to interpret the prophets? From the earliest Christian times prophecy was held to be purely prediction, usually either messianic or eschatological. The nineteenth-century scholars disliked long-term prediction, and tended to regard the great prophets as preachers of righteousness with the political insight of great statesmen. The scholars of that period did valuable service in making us understand the personality of the prophets and in helping us to see them against the background of their own people and age. Men like the late G. A. Smith in a sense discovered the prophets for us, and made them live.

Today, however, biblical scholarship is coming more and more to recognize that prediction was an essential, perhaps the essential element in Old Testament prophecy. At the same time it feels that minor details must not be unduly pressed. We must look deeper into the divine purpose of this unique form of revelation which, so far as we can judge, was limited to a period of not more than four centuries. Once again, in prophecy we have 'a divine revelation of eternal truth, given in a form adapted to an immediate occasion'. Today it is the function of the expositor to crystallize that truth out of the solution in which it was first presented, and to redissolve it in terms of our own life and conditions. This done, we shall find that God is still speaking to us, and that, in spite of all apparent changes, His word is as valid for us as it was for those who listened to Amos and the great line of prophets who followed him.

THEODORE H. ROBINSON

The Editor is always pleased to consider articles, or suggestions for articles, for the LONDON QUARTERLY & HOLBORN REVIEW. Typescripts should not normally exceed 2,500 words in length, and a stamped addressed envelope should also be enclosed.

THREE MEN IN A BOAT

A Study in the Relationship of the Scientist, the Theologian, and the Philosopher

I

STUDENTS of Jerome K. Jerome will remember that three more or less thoughtful men resolved to have a boating holiday on the Thames. There is the story of how they got lost in the maze at Hampton Court, how at least one fell out of the boat, and how finally they gave it up, took to the train, and finished up at a restaurant in London, 'when we rested, our glasses at arm's length upon the table, and felt good, and thoughtful and forgiving'.

My three men in the boat are the scientist, the theologian, and the philosopher. The boat for once is not the little ecumenical vessel that has become so familiar, but the precariously rocking boat of the twentieth century. It might be an interesting exercise to imagine the boat becoming unseaworthy, so that first one and then another must be thrown overboard. The theologian might well go first, for he believes in an after-life! The scientist might follow, for he would be interested in the wonders of the deep. The philosopher might well be left, provided he had studied his Whitehead, for he would know what to do with his solitariness. Theologians and scientists of course may have other views on the order of demise.

However, I hope to make a case out for retaining the services of all three; we shall not launch out far into the deep, but keep to the much-traversed channels and trust we may arrive safely without anyone falling out of the boat and without getting lost in a maze.

My subject could have been 'Science, Theology, and Philosophy, and their mutual relationships'; but these abstractions suggest three watertight compartments, whereas history confronts us with scientists who are also theologians and philosophers, theologians who must needs be to some extent philosophers and scientists, and philosophers who are also scientists and theologians. We must beware of dabblers (which reminds me of the student who described Butler as an Anglican bishop who dabbled in ethics), for much trouble arises when the scientist steps out of his field to make pronouncements on theology, and equally when the theologian steps out of his field to pronounce on science.

In an earlier day, of course, the three fields were not separated. Thales, and the author of Genesis, for instance, were theologians, scientists, philosophers in one; yet even here Thales was more philosopher and the author of Genesis more theologian. But the spheres do overlap; we are all in the same boat.

I propose first to look at the occupants of the boat one by one, then to examine their mutual relationships, which is best done two by two, and, finally, to look at the whole company.

If I may anticipate my conclusion, it is approximately this: the scientist knows how the boat works; the theologian has his eyes on the fixed stars and says which way the boat ought to go; while the philosopher keeps on asking both of them awkward questions, even such fundamental questions as to whether the fixed stars are really fixed, in the attempt to clarify his own picture of the total situation.

THE SCIENTIST

'Science', said the late John Burnett, 'is just the Greek way of looking at things.' The Babylonians had studied the planetary system, but they had tried to link cosmic events with the births and deaths of kings and so got lost in astrology. The Egyptians had a knowledge of elementary mathematics. They were able to build the Pyramids and provide practical solutions to certain geometrical problems, but these were mostly rule-of-thumb methods. To quote Professor Burnett again—

Of course, everything depends on what we mean by science. . . . If we mean by science what Copernicus and Galileo and Kepler and Leibniz meant, there is not the slightest trace of that in Egypt or even in Babylon, while the earliest Greek ventures are unmistakably its forerunners (*Greek Philosophy*, p.5).

The scientist is not just concerned with solving practical problems, though the practical problems to be solved may set him off on his search for knowledge. He is searching for unifying principles in a world of multitudinous separate facts. Lord Acton has said—

Science is the co-ordination of a great mass of similar facts into the form of a generalization, a principle, or a law, which will enable us to predict with certainty the recurrence of events under like conditions (quoted in Cairns, *Riddle of the World*, p.44).

Karl Pearson in *Grammar of Science*, describes science thus—

The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function of science (p.60).

Now, we usually picture the scientist with the test-tube, the microscope, or the telescope, and we think of the subject-matter of his study as being so-called material things, atoms, electrons, the physical and chemical properties of matter. For the most part these do constitute the scientist's data. But the scientific method can be applied to other fields, and the theologian, the psychologist, and the social scientist are scientists dealing with data of a different kind. Perhaps we shall see the real function of science if we take the psychologist as our 'type' of scientist and ask what his function is. The psychologist examines the great mass of facts about human nature and behaviour, and attempts to form generalizations on the basis of which he can predict with some certainty likely reactions. If a psychologist studies the habits of umbrella-carrying human beings, he can probably decide that so many per cent. will leave their umbrellas on trains in any particular week. When the psychologist deals with religious matters, as Starbuck did, he can tell you at what age a religious 'appeal' is likely to succeed. But he cannot tell you *why*. He can only tell you that this in fact is the situation. He may tell you that it is the need for security that drives people to seek for a religious experience. But when he tells you that religion is an illusion he is going beyond his scientific method. The point is made in one of Studdert-Kennedy's verses—

*He takes the saints to pieces,
And labels all their parts,
He tabulates the secrets
Of loyal, loving hearts. . . .*

*His reasoning is perfect,
His proofs as plain as paint,
He has but one small weakness,
He cannot make a saint.*

(*The Psychologist from Unutterable Beauty*, p.120).

He cannot make a saint. He cannot create religious experience. He can analyse and tell us how, but not why. To quote Karl Pearson again—

The law of gravitation is a brief description of *how* every particle of matter in the universe is altering its motion with reference to every other particle. It does not tell us *why* particles thus move; it does not tell us *why* the earth describes a certain curve round the sun (*Grammar of Science*, p.99).

Further the scientist can only give us a partial and limited account of the universe. After the scientist has abstracted his principles there still remains the matter from which he has made his abstraction. He can predict what will happen to the stars, but when he is confronted with human nature and its apparent freedom, he cannot predict with any great certainty. When he tries to make assertions about what may happen to a man's 'soul' or 'mind' after the material elements, which he understands so well, have dissolved, then he is out of his depth. It is this human element which may well turn out to be the divine.

Yet within his own sphere the scientist is a philosopher. Where the philosopher is trying to take a world view which will embrace the whole universe, the scientist is sketching a picture within a frame, even though it seems to be a constantly expanding frame. The picture must be limited to those things amenable to examination by the scientific method. When he has reduced his truths to formulae, he has still only sketched a picture or created a new scientific myth, just as the author of Genesis has painted a picture (coloured as opposed to the black and white of the scientist) and created a myth. Within the scientific realm the scientific myth is valid. This is brought out clearly in a recently published essay, entitled, 'Contemporary Scientific Mythology', by Professor Toulmin of Leeds. He concludes—

What is the moral of this essay? It is, I think, no more than this: that we should beware of feeling that scientists are (as it were) initiates like priests; and also of contrasting the 'scientist' with the 'ordinary man' in a way in which we should never dream of contrasting the tinker or the bus-conductor with the ordinary man. For this habit is likely to weaken our critical faculty, our sense of relevance, and lead us to place too much weight on the *obiter dicta* of scientists. We should soon notice if a tinker or a bus-conductor started laying down the law about things on which his calling did not make him an authority: it is as well to bear in mind that a scientist off duty is as much an 'ordinary man' as a tinker or a bus-conductor off duty (*Metaphysical Beliefs*, p.77).

But this stricture does not only apply to the scientist; it applies equally to the philosopher who in a moment of weakness tells us what kind of tea to drink, and to the theologian who tells us who will win the F.A. Cup.

But within the framework of science the scientist has much to tell us. The truth he proclaims is truth of God, but not the whole Truth; when the scientist

looks in his microscope he closes one eye. Eddington, in his Gifford Lectures, warns us against expecting science to give us anything that we can accept as a permanent faith. He also likens the scientist to the artist, who will one day tell us that he has painted a beautiful sky, and on the next will tell us that he has turned it upside down and it is sea with a boat on it. Later again it may be sky with a parasol in it. But he says—

Those who look over his shoulder and use the present partially-developed picture for purposes outside science, do so at their own risk.

We have to look over his shoulder. We cannot ignore his picture, but we must heed the warning. So much, then, for the first man in the boat.

THE THEOLOGIAN

I have dealt first with the scientist because the man who knows how the boat works always arouses most interest. The man at the helm, for all his knowledge of ocean depths and fixed stars, can do little without the engineer.

If science is the Greek way of looking at things, then we may describe theology as the Hebrew way of looking at things. There are gods galore in the thought of Greece and Rome and other ancient civilizations, but for the beginning of real theology we must turn to the Jews, whose one fixed star was the revelation of God in history. For the Christian there is also the bright and morning star of the Incarnation. God is not the end of the reasoning process as He is for the metaphysician, but the beginning of the reasoning process.

Like the scientist, the theologian begins with his data, but his Data has a capital 'D'; it is 'given' by God Himself. The theologian is also scientist inasmuch as he is assembling facts and seeking to establish coherence—a theological system. The facts he is assembling, however, are of a different kind from the scientist's facts. They are facts of revelation, facts about God as He has been experienced by many different people in many different generations. The scientist's facts can be checked by another scientist. Facts of religious experience can also be verified, but only as others have the same experience; they cannot be verified scientifically. The theologian is dealing with truths that are not amenable to proof. And when we try to prove spiritual truths we fail. In Mary Webb's *Golden Arrow*, Joe tries to prove his love for Lil by putting the red-hot poker across his bare hand, but that doesn't really prove love, any more than Christ's throwing Himself down from the Temple would have proved His divinity. There is a profound truth behind the commandment, 'Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God'. The preacher cannot demonstrate; he can only say, 'O taste and see that the Lord is good.'

To reach the kind of truth with which the theologian is concerned an adventure of faith is required rather than adventures of ideas. Yet, strangely enough, it is T. H. Huxley who as well as anyone describes the religious attitude to truth.

Sit down before the fact like a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly to whatever abysses Nature leads, or you shall learn nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I have resolved at all risks to do this.

The truths of God may be hid from the wise and prudent and revealed to babes. As Huxley expresses it, the fact itself speaks with its own authority when you sit down before it as a little child. That is precisely what the theologian says. His truth, the Fact before which he sits down, *the* Fact with a capital letter, brings with it its own authority. Argument may help to dismiss doubts and open the way for faith, but the final act is the act of faith. Dr Alasdair MacIntyre writes in the same volume of essays quoted above:

We ought . . . not to be surprised that to accept religious belief is a matter not of argument, but conversion. Conversion, because there is no logical transition which will take one from unbelief to belief. The transition is not in objective considerations at all, but in the person who comes to believe. There are no logical principles which will make the transition for one. There are no reasons to which one can appeal to evade the burden of decision. And just as for the man who asks for a justification of belief the only thing to be done is to offer a description of what religion is, so the man who has come to believe can only give us his reasons for believing by relating a segment of his autobiography (*Metaphysical Beliefs*, p.209).

This last sentence is borne out by a reading of an autobiography such as that of John Rowlands (*One Man's Mind*, S.C.M.), a man trained in the discipline of science, a writer for the rationalist press, who finally became a Christian. The only process of argument is a growing dissatisfaction with the rationalist approach to life. What once seemed solid arguments against belief in God lost their power, not because they were disproved but because they proved to be 'unsatisfactory'. The Christian way of life finally proved 'satisfying'. But 'unsatisfactory' and 'satisfying' are not terms of logic or science but terms of the heart's need. The Christian truth brings its own authority. Now those who receive this truth first-hand and recognize it as such are indeed blessed. More people receive their faith second-hand, on the basis of some other authority—for example,

*Jesus loves me, this I know,
For the Bible tells me so.*

Such external authority may be the source of an awakened experience, and will always be a safeguard against subjectivism. This authority, whether it be the Church or Holy Scripture, then becomes the frame within which the theologian paints his picture. So the Roman Catholic theologian works within the framework established by the authority of the Church, and the fundamentalist within the framework of the authority of a Bible which is verbally inspired. Unless the theologian accepts the fundamentalist viewpoint, he must depend for his material upon the Biblical scholar, who within his own sphere is a scientist. He is still a man under authority, for the Word of God carries authority, even if not the authority of ecclesiastical infallibility or verbal inspiration. This turning aside from the traditional framework of ecclesiastical and Biblical authority poses many problems, but it opens the way for the truth to speak with its own authority, and allows for the fulfilment of the promise that we shall be guided into all the truth. The Bible safeguards the student from pure subjectivism, but the fact that he has to search the Scriptures and discern the word of God safeguards him against the wholesale acceptance of external authority.

Finally, just as the scientist must beware of dogmatizing on theological questions, so the theologian must beware of making utterances concerning purely scientific questions, which is the point where the fundamentalist often fails.

THE PHILOSOPHER

We turn to Greece again to discover the birthplace of the third occupant of the boat. The Greek philosopher's subject matter included everything that might be studied in all the various faculties of a modern university. Thales is usually recognized as being the father of Greek philosophy. To mention just a few of his achievements:

(1) In astronomy he was able to forecast an eclipse in the year 585 B.C., even though he may not have had any definite knowledge of the reasons for the eclipse.

(2) In engineering, he was apparently able to divert the course of a river during a military campaign and had a theory about the flooding of the Nile.

(3) In mathematics he was able to measure the distance of ships at sea, the height of the Pyramids, etc.

(4) But most important from our point of view is his cosmology. He believed that the primary substance was water, that the earth floated on water. He also believed that magnet and amber had souls.

Thales is not a philosopher because of his achievements in astronomy, engineering or mathematics. He is a philosopher because he tried to give an account of the universe which was coherent. He is a philosopher because he asks the question, 'How can we explain all these separate facts of experience?'

Paradoxically the degree of doctor of philosophy is awarded in modern times for research in almost any field of knowledge, but the genuine philosopher might object that unless the specialist in 'the rancidity of fats' or 'the habits of beetles' has attempted to fit his detailed knowledge into a total world view he is not really a philosopher. A. N. Whitehead says—

Philosophers are rationalists. They seek to go behind stubborn and irreducible facts: they wish to explain in the light of universal principles the mutual reference between the various details entering into the flux of things. Also they seek such principles as will eliminate mere arbitrariness; so that, whatever portion of fact is assumed or given, the existence of the remainder of things shall satisfy some demand of rationality. They demand meaning (*Science and Modern World*, p.166).

Lest we should think that the philosopher's data are limited to what the scientist tells him, we need the word of Henry Sidgwick, quoted by Whitehead in the same passage—

It is the primary aim of philosophy to unify completely, bring into clear coherence, all departments of rational thought, and the aim cannot be realised by any philosophy that leaves out of its view the important body of judgments and reasonings which form the subject matter of ethics (*Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir*, Appendix).

The same must be said of a philosophy that leaves out theology or other non-scientific (not unscientific) studies.

The philosopher must begin his task however with 'an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly and consistently'. This explains why he must constantly ask questions. Like Socrates, the philosopher will probably ask more questions

than he answers, but it is important that the questions should be asked. This is an essential preliminary to his fundamental task. He asks the scientist, 'What do you mean by "X"?' ('X' being the particular scientific myth or symbol). He must be equally exact in asking the poet or the theologian what their particular myths mean.

In this respect the philosopher differs from the scientist and the theologian. The scientist provides his own data and within his framework draws his picture. The theologian is provided with his data by others who have been themselves in some sense theologians; within his framework, he draws his picture. The philosopher assembles the art-gallery and from the data provided by others attempts to draw his own picture of the whole. Professor Dorothy Emmet wrote some years ago—

Philosophy is not simply a process of weaving systems of abstractions unrelated to any real or possible experience. . . . But it starts from what is already in some sense known, whether in the vivid intuition of the artist, in unsystematized common-sense beliefs, in the 'explanations' given by the scientist within his own circumscribed field; and it attempts to carry out a progressive clarification of these beliefs. Philosophical reflection is therefore a recollection in tranquillity rather than itself a moment of decisive action or of intuitive vision. But just because it cannot take the place of these, its special task is to follow behind them, and to try to clarify and interpret their significance. In this way it is a late-comer, stumbling along behind and dependent on the pioneering work of activities of mind other than itself (*Philosophy and Faith*, pp.45-6).

'This is a task,' she adds, 'which nothing but philosophy can perform.'

This is an over-simplification, of course, because the philosopher must also consider the nature of our knowledge, the nature of reality as opposed to appearance and many other problems. In so far as he is metaphysician, he is always going beyond nature as science sees it to reality. He may in the course of his study come to some conclusions about God. But if he does, he is coming to this conclusion as a logical necessity. He may describe God as First Cause, or as the Ideal, and the concept may give him satisfaction as a philosopher, but it is not God of the theologians. The philosopher may make possible a faith, but the philosopher does not give a faith. He can clarify and criticize faith, but the man who cries out with Job, 'Oh that I knew where I might find Him!' is in need of something more than the philosopher can give him.

BERNARD E. JONES

(To be concluded)

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WESLEY'S DEATH THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PRESS

DURING the eighteenth century the English Press was slowly coming into its own, and by the time Wesley died (1791) there were over fifty-three newspapers being published in London. It appears that their reporters possessed the same zeal and energy that are associated with modern reporters, and they did not tire in their efforts to present the public with the fullest details of Wesley's death.

At Richmond College there is a twelve-volume edition of Wesley's *Journal* which is interleaved with copious notes made by the Rev. Samuel Romilly Hall and was used by the Rev. Nehemiah Curnock in preparing the 'Standard Edition' of John Wesley's *Journal*. Interspersed among these notes in chronological order are a large number of contemporary newspaper-cuttings, the greater number dealing with Wesley's death. As far as I know, these cuttings have not been reproduced in any Methodist writings, and so I include the more interesting ones in this article.

The first printed news of Wesley's death seems to have appeared on the 3rd March 1791—the day after he died. One report, under the heading 'Intelligence Extraordinary', read:

Yesterday morning between the hours of nine and ten, at his house in the City Road, departed this life, in the 88th year of his age, the Rev John Wesley, A.M., Late Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.

A less formal notice also appeared on the same day in another paper:

Yesterday died, at half after nine, at his house in the City Road, the celebrated Rev. John Westley, aged near 90: he supported himself during his illness with great fortitude, and evinced in his last moments, the peace in which a Christian can die.

This was followed next day by an entertaining summary of Wesley's life, described as being 'pregnant with eventful circumstances'. The article concluded with an inaccurate account of his marriage difficulties:

. . . Mr Wesley died a widower; he was married in the year 1750—but Plutus, not Cupid, cemented the union, and divorce soon after took place—The lady died in 1781.

Of course, Wesley married in 1751 and there was no divorce, though Mrs Wesley left him on a number of occasions. The same article gives an interesting description of Wesley:

In consequence of extensive travelling, Mr Wesley was an agreeable and instructive companion;—he was a lively preacher, a fluent orator, and a truly sincere and honest man;—and that great good has been done by his means in the illiterate neighbourhoods of the Cornish tinnerns, the miners of Derbyshire, and the colliers near Bristol and Newcastle, &c. cannot be denied.

On 5th March a quaint item appeared:

The Methodists will suffer not a little by the death of Mr Wesley, whom they considered the founder of their religion, and as a father; and literally he was old enough to be the father to any Methodist now living.

That was a time when news remained fresh for many days, and consequently reports of Wesley's death appeared for nearly a week after he died. These later reports contained 'intelligence' as to the future of Methodism, and there was a great deal of speculation concerning Dr Coke, who, it was thought, would replace Wesley, as he had 'increased the converts in the West Indian Islands and other parts of America to near 50,000'. The same report, noting the activities of the general public, said:

The Mobility seems at present divided in their Promenades:—the ruins of the Albion Mills, and those of Mr John Wesley appear equally attractive.

10th March brought in a crop of reports on Wesley's funeral, typical being:

Mr Westley—The remains of this once great man, were yesterday interred in the burial ground belonging to his chapel, in the City Road, agreeable to his directions.—A vast concourse of people were assembled on this occasion.

The 'vast concourse' provided excellent opportunities for pickpockets—

Yesterday as Mr Davis, of Islington Road, was standing to see the Funeral of Mr Wesley, in the City Road, he had his pocket picked of his watch and money; but some persons standing by perceiving the villain, seized him, and after an examination at the Justice's Office, on Clerkenwell-Green, he was fully committed to Newgate for trial.

One reporter (who is to be commended for his zeal!) discovered that 'from Ash Wednesday to Easter Monday his [Wesley's] only food was bread and water' and that Whitefield 'loved a good dinner, and during the Lent season fasted upon turbot with great enthusiasm'. Another reporter, aware of the bitter Calvinistic controversy, sensed the feelings in the minds of both sides:

Some zealous defenders of the Predestination cause consign the soul of Wesley to the hottest place in Hell, whilst others imagine they see him piercing the clouds with chariots and horses of Elijah.

Wherever the reporter thought Wesley had gone, he was correct in hearing the sound of approaching thunder among the Lay Preachers:

Now he is gone, the cloven foot appears. This will in all probability be the foundation of much discord, which may eventually eradicate that body of people.

Alas, this prophecy was soon to be partially fulfilled. The Methodist people were not eradicated, however, and although it took over 100 years for the deep wounds to be healed, they can still say: 'The best of all is, God is with us.'

HERBERT W. WHITE

THE CORRELATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN TILlich'S SYSTEM

PAUL TILlich'S system claims the attention of all philosophers and theologians as a new attempt to deal with the relation of philosophy to theology. Theology has always been a source of interest to the philosopher; and, conversely, the theologian is always interested in philosophy, even if it is only to attack a particular system. Tillich's work is interesting because it claims to effect a correlation between philosophy and theology.

He begins by noting that 'there is no generally accepted definition of philosophy'.¹ The fact that he should be so concerned to obtain a *definition* of philosophy is a clue as to the method which he considers appropriate in philosophy. For a definition must be complete and is therefore possible only when we are talking about *a priori* truths. For instance, we can define what a triangle is, but to ask for a definition of 'dog' is to use the word in a different way. If we give a definition of a dog it will be a description of the sort of animal that we see in the street or else it will be a dictionary definition. Now, when Tillich says that philosophy can be called 'that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object',² he means this to apply as a description of what the philosopher actually does. On this view, then, philosophy is a description of reality as such.

Miss Emmet points out in her discussion of Tillich's epistemology that this is to be distinguished from the view of philosophy which Tillich inherited from Edmund Husserl, the phenomenologist.³ The interesting thing, however, is that both views err in the same way. For both views would make philosophy a description in no way different from science. Husserl meant by 'phenomenology' an analysis of certain basic types of human consciousness. These are held to be so related to objective contents that the structure of the latter can be read off by any disinterested process of reflection. Thus these structures are revealed to a pure act of understanding. This method is, however, of less importance for Tillich's understanding of philosophy than it is for his treatment of the question of revelation. Its relation to his philosophy is that it enabled Tillich to accept the misleading view of philosophy which seems to be very like the nineteenth-century idealist definition of philosophy as the study of the nature of reality. For the concern of the philosopher in analysing these types of consciousness is to elicit a picture of what reality is like. So, without abandoning his phenomenological heritage, Tillich can maintain that philosophy is an understanding of 'being as such' or 'reality as a whole'. As Professor Randall points out, these are terms derived from different philosophical traditions, the one Aristotelian and the other idealist.⁴ Tillich is able, however, to reconcile these two traditions, because he defines philosophy as a systematic exposition of the nature of reality. Thus he says:

Philosophy asks the ultimate question that can be asked, namely, the question as to what being, simply being, means. . . . What is the meaning of being? . . . This question and the shock with which it takes hold of us . . . is . . . the root of philosophy. Therefore, all philosophers have developed a 'first philosophy' as Aristotle calls it, namely, an interpretation of being.⁵

Tillich proceeds to defend this representation of philosophy against three possible criticisms.⁶ First, it may be said that this implies a return to old-fashioned metaphysics. This criticism, says Tillich, would seem to regard metaphysics as being something beyond human experience, a product of purely arbitrary imagination. To preserve our intellectual good name, however, let us abandon the term metaphysics so that we may show that the question of being is the question of 'what is nearer to us than anything else'. Secondly, it might be argued that this picture of philosophy is untrue in so far as it fails to recognize the primacy of epistemology in the field of philosophy. This criticism Tillich admits to be correct to a certain extent, but he contends that epistemology is impossible without an ontology. 'Epistemology is wrong only if it pretends that it can exist without an ontological basis.' Lastly, it might be said that 'there is no approach for man to the structure and meaning of being, that what being is, is revealed to us in the manifoldness of beings and in the world in which they are all united and interrelated to one another'.⁷

Let us consider these three criticisms and Tillich's answers. It is interesting to see him anxious to repudiate the charge that he is reverting to old-fashioned metaphysics. The sin of any philosophy is not so much that it is wrong as that it is out of date, and it has become a commonplace of our philosophical talk to say that metaphysics is out of date. But will Tillich's remedy do? What can he hope to achieve by abandoning the name if the business he carries out is the same? What we need is not only a new proprietor for our philosophical shop, but also a new method of business. We must recognize that to call metaphysics old-fashioned or nonsensical is worse than a cliché—it is itself nonsense. Nevertheless, it will not do to imagine that we have escaped the charge of transcendentalism if we say that the object of philosophy is 'we ourselves as we are . . . able to ask what it means that we are'.⁸ McTaggart defined metaphysics as 'the systematic study of the nature of ultimate reality'.⁹ This has been the intention of all the classical metaphysicians from Plato to Bradley, and Tillich seems to be undertaking exactly the same task.

The second criticism is likewise left unanswered in the end. For what Tillich does here is to take the point of the criticism and turn it upon itself as its rebuttal. This point is that the assertions of the type 'Jones is at home' are true only if the assertions of the type 'I know that Jones is at home' are also true. We might say that they have the same logic, and by this we should mean that there is no evidence relevant to the first which is not relevant to the second. If therefore we say that philosophy is primarily concerned with questions of epistemology as against ontology we are not denying that knowledge-statements imply reality-statements. Rather what we are doing is making the point once more that questions of philosophy are not decided by more information, that philosophy is not concerned with the description of the real. Tillich's remarks about 'the breakdown of the epistemological period of philosophy in the last decades' serve only to reveal his ignorance of the fruitful work done as a result of the 'revolution in philosophy'. His answer therefore makes no point against the criticism.

The third criticism and answer are difficult to handle because it is not very clear what the point is here. As far as we can see, the meaning is that you cannot speak of being itself, but only of particular beings. If this is indeed what is meant then it must be admitted to be true. The only use that the phrase 'being

itself' can be said to have is that of a shorthand expression for the manifoldness of beings. Therefore to speak of 'being-itself' as something over and above particular beings is to commit a category mistake. It is like the man who, on being shown the colleges of Cambridge, asks, 'But where is the University?' Therefore Tillich's answer to this criticism does not meet the real point at all. What is revealed here is something we have seen in dealing with Tillich's answer to the first criticism—namely, the confusion in Tillich's understanding of this fundamental concept in his philosophical theology, being. He is right in saying that the meaning of being is man's basic concern if this means that we are driven to ask the question, 'What is the meaning of our existence?'; but he is quite wrong in his assumption that this makes statements about the being 'in' man or the world at all meaningful. He accuses his critic here of being a dictator—that is, he regards the criticism as legislating, as a legislative definition of meaning.¹⁰ This is quite wrong again, because the critic does not deny him the right to use this form of language so long as he admits that it is not ordinary language.

That there is an object which philosophy studies is the fallacy which is revealed once more in Tillich's more recent publications. For example, when he discusses the question of the relation between theology and philosophy in *Systematic Theology*, Volume I, he begins by saying that theology deals with a special object, and this claim to the status of a realm of knowledge places it under the obligation of giving an account of its relation to other forms of knowledge. That we are right in assuming this to imply that philosophy too has an object becomes evident when we see that he proposes to 'call philosophy *that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object*'.¹¹

This refusal to see that philosophy is to be distinguished from other arts or sciences by its method rather than its subject-matter, that indeed there is no special subject-matter to philosophy, is the basic fallacy in Tillich's understanding of the nature of philosophy. His notion of what philosophy is results from the domination of the model of science, which leads him to imagine that philosophy is concerned with information just as science is. The scientist is concerned with giving us the best explanation of phenomena—that is, the most economical description of them. The philosopher, according to Tillich's view, does very much the same thing, for he too describes reality. The difference is that he does this job in a bigger and better way than the scientist. It is the whole of reality that he describes.

This domination of the model of science is the source of a double confusion, because of Tillich's strange view of the nature of scientific method. In so far as he is guided by a passion for truth, says Tillich, the philosopher is no different from the scientist.¹² But the scientist is not interested in truth; his business is to find the most likely and useful hypothesis to explain certain phenomena. The criterion by which we judge a hypothesis is that of range of predictability. If two theories are equally good from this point of view what makes us accept the one rather than the other is elegance. The philosopher collaborates with the scientist, says Tillich,¹³ and is to a certain extent dependent on what the scientist does. He admits that the philosopher neither criticizes nor augments the knowledge provided by the sciences. Yet the knowledge thus gained is 'the basis of his description of the categories, structural laws, and concepts which constitute the structure of being'. Now this is very strange indeed, and one can only believe

that we are now once more faced with this picture of the philosopher as the super-scientist.

Professor John Wisdom once said that if he were asked which was the more important for philosophy—science or fairy tales—he would have no hesitation in replying that fairy tales were. By this beautifully eccentric remark Wisdom sought to make clear that philosophy is not all like science. What the scientist does is to reduce facts to as few concepts as possible, but this sort of explanation does not concern the philosopher. The sort of 'explanation' he is concerned with is more like a logical analysis. Tillich is aware of a difference between science and philosophy which is connected with this opposition of logic and fact, but he is too fascinated by the model of science to abandon the view that philosophy is a matter of hypothesis and proof.

This tendency is seen again in the distinction he draws between philosophical assertions and theological ones, saying that the former are cosmological whilst the latter are soteriological. 'The philosopher deals with the categories of being in relation to the material which is structured by them.'¹⁴ It is not very clear to us what this means. The only meaning we can see in this is that if one speaks about the categories of being then one must speak of the way in which concrete language is used and how this language fits into other language making one common world of experience. We have already seen, however, that Tillich would deny this, and so once more we are back with transcendentalism. The philosopher looks at 'the whole of reality in order to discover the structure of reality as a whole.'¹⁵ How the 'whole of reality' differs from 'reality as a whole' it is difficult to say.

Tillich speaks of an identity or at least an analogy 'between objective and subjective reason, between the logos of reality as a whole and the logos working in [the philosopher]'.¹⁶ This is as mysterious as the evolution of the Idea in Hegel, and is some unintelligible form of idealism. What is so very baffling about this is that Tillich goes on to say that the place where philosophy stands is no place at all—it is pure reason. But if the work of philosophy is one of pure reason, what has the philosopher to do with the identity that he has mentioned? The clear intention of that remark is that of indicating the rationality of reality as a whole which is meant to be the discovery of the philosopher. The philosopher looks at the universal logos, we are told.¹⁷ And once again the strange confusion of logic and fact in Tillich's interpretation of philosophy comes to light. This is also substantially the view put forward in *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, published in 1957.

It seems to me [he says] that the oldest definition given to philosophy is, at the same time, the newest and that which always was always will be valid: Philosophy is that cognitive endeavour in which the question of being is asked. It is the simplest, most profound, and absolutely inexhaustible question—the question of what it means to say that something *is*. This word 'is' hides the riddle of all riddles, the mystery that there is anything at all.¹⁸

He contends that ontology is not the creation of imaginary worlds or transempirical realities. But if the philosopher 'looks at' something and this something is neither transempirical nor any special being, then we must confess that we are at a loss to understand what Tillich means. It seems to us that he is forced to

describe philosophy then either as an empirical science or as some peculiar *a priori* science. The fallacy of this position is what we have singled out before, namely the misconception that philosophy has a special object of study and is in essence like science though it is more general.

Hitherto we have been concerned to show the weakness of Tillich's definition of philosophy. Before we proceed to a criticism of his definition of theology let us see what lies behind this definition; for philosophy is a slow business and involves us in the dialectic of saying that this is wrong and yet in another way it is right. If we look at Tillich's definition again we shall recognize that he is describing for us one of the fundamental problems of philosophy and one of its most difficult—the problem of what we mean when we say that something is real. To grasp the nature of the question, 'Is the sense-datum real?' and again the nature of the question asked by a man in the desert, 'Is the water over there real?'—this is indeed philosophy. But what exactly are we now doing? Are we describing the real? Only in a very odd way, for our description will not fill out the description which we already possess. The point of talking about philosophy as concerned with reality is twofold. First, it reminds us that language always points to a concrete situation. In discussing anything in philosophy there is little progress made unless we realise that words are not depositories of hypostatic meaning but refer to the concrete situation in terms of which they must always be 'cashed'. This is what Wittgenstein meant by his now famous injunction, 'Do not ask for the meaning. Ask for the use.' Secondly, it does not follow from the fact that philosophical theories are not tested by observation and are therefore neutral with regard to matters of fact that philosophy is not concerned with facts.

If we talk of philosophy as description we shall admit that it is description of a particular kind. Tillich would probably say that this is precisely what he imagines philosophy to be—that particular kind of description which is a description of reality as such. Now the question is, 'Just what do we mean by the term "reality"?' The noun 'reality' is a word we learn to use only after we have become familiar with such words as 'real' and 'really'. Let us look at the scientific, moral, and artistic uses of the word so that we shall be able to come back to the definition of philosophy as a study of reality and estimate its significance. The scientist will say that the stick which in water looks as if it were bent is 'really' straight. The moralist will say that even though giving money to an alcoholic beggar appears to be an act of kindness it is not 'really' good or right. Then the artist will say that though we may think Gauguin's use of colour is wild, it is 'really' a beautiful colour effect that is achieved. It would be a mistake to imagine that the word has the same meaning in these three contexts. Nor again can we, as it were, obtain a lowest common denominator by saying that what a thing is really is what it is like as a part of reality. For the reality in one context differs from the reality in another context. If we walk through the woods with two friends, one of whom is an artist and the other a scientist, and we discuss the colour of the sky, we shall find that the two cannot agree about the 'reality'. 'Look at the sky through this foliage,' says the artist, 'and you will see that it is a deeper blue than is the sky yonder.' Here the physicist interjects, 'But look here. You don't mean to say that the sky here is a deeper blue really than it is over there. It is simply an optical illusion.' The artist will not have

this and replies, 'Can't you see that it is a deeper blue? If this is not a deeper blue than that, then I don't know what is.' We see at once the completely different standpoints of the artist and the scientist. For the former it is what he *sees* that is of decisive importance, whereas for the scientist how the thing looks is precisely what he discounts as irrelevant. Therefore the way in which the artist draws the distinction between what is 'really' and what is not 'really' something is very different from the way in which the scientist draws the distinction. And since they draw the distinction on different grounds, it is nonsense to say that either the artist is right or the scientist is. In this way the demand for an unambiguous answer to the question as to what is 'really' so-and-so can lose all meaning. And as with 'really' so with 'reality'. Dr. F. Waissman says very well that the word 'reality' is a blessing, and did we not have it in our language we would have to invent it. 'On the other hand, when the philosopher looks at it closely, tears it from its context and asks himself, "Now, what *is* reality?" he has successfully manœuvred himself into a fairly awkward position.'¹⁹

The importance of this definition in Tillich's thought is that it enables him to go on to show that philosophy and theology are therefore necessarily correlated if not indeed identical—at least in some respects. This is what he says:

Philosophy necessarily asks the question of reality as a whole, the question of the structure of being. Theology necessarily asks the same question, for that which concerns us ultimately must belong to reality as a whole; it must belong to being. . . . The structure of being and the categories and concepts describing this structure are an implicit or explicit concern of every philosopher and of every theologian.²⁰

What Tillich has done here is to define both philosophy and theology in the same way and then to deduce that every theologian must be concerned with the basic question of philosophy. But this is really nothing more than a tautology, since the truth of the statement follows from the definition of the terms. It is exactly like such a mathematical statement as ' $x=y$ and $z=y$ so that $x=z$ '. The correlation that Tillich wants to establish has been put beyond all doubt; for if anything is theology then what makes it theology also makes it philosophy. It may be suggested that we are doing violence to Tillich's argument, since it is not so completely formal and empty as we make it. It is true that his next step in the argument of this section is to show how philosophy and theology are related and how they differ. But even within this attempt to give the tautology content we have the same recourse to the cast-iron certainty of the tautology. He says that 'every creative philosopher is a hidden theologian'.²¹ But what is this again except a tautology, a truth of logic.

The meaning of the remarks about active commitment²² is not clear, but as far as we can judge, what Tillich means is something like this. Since theology is the study of reality which has as its object the real which is related to it existentially, then philosophy, which is also the study of reality, becomes theology whenever it has any existential concern. Now the point is not that we should not say this—Tillich is perfectly at liberty to say whatever he likes. But it is important to note that this is true only because the terms have been defined in a particular way. It is also true that the meaning of these terms has been legislated unnecessarily, so that it is misleading rather than helpful. Jean Paul Sartre is a philosopher who would reveal all these characteristics. But if we

call Sartre a theologian, then we must introduce so many caveats when we go on to say that Karl Barth and Emil Brunner are theologians that our language becomes complicated beyond reason. It is therefore best that the term be not defined in this way. It is very significant, I think, that Professor Randall does not take this at all seriously when he discusses Tillich's ontology.²³ It is like saying that a dog is an animal with four legs, a furry coat and a tail, and that in so far as a cat has these characteristics it is a dog!

As with Tillich's definition of philosophy, so with his definition of theology. A sound emphasis is wrongly expressed. His existentialist emphasis (to use a not very elegant term) is clearly both important and valuable. It is also important to notice a danger that lies hidden in this wholesome emphasis. If theology is possible only when there is this commitment, then it might become a series of assertions whose main reference is to the theologian. This is not quite the criticism that Karl Barth levelled against Schleiermacher and Ritschl, though that is a perfectly good point in its original context and may even be a proper criticism of Tillich's description of theology as the theologian expressing his 'ultimate concern'. The point here is that theology is as intellectual and rational a discipline as any other. To say that the theologian is determined by his faith can thus be misleading, for though it is true that the theologian uses concepts which have a tremendous personal significance for him, he is concerned to talk some kind of sense with them and certainly to talk sense about them. Thus Anselm's formula '*Credo ut intelligam*' has always been characteristic of the mood of theology and an expression of its essential movement, the movement from pure personal concern to understanding. So long as a man is simply committed, so long he need not be a theologian. To risk a dangerous statement, let us say that he is a theologian when he turns his attention to the concepts.

One other point must be discussed before we leave this subject, and that is what Tillich has to say about the possibility of a conflict between philosophy and theology. He denies the necessity of such a conflict. 'A conflict', he says, 'presupposes a common basis on which to fight. But there is no common basis between theology and philosophy.'²⁴ This is very difficult to understand in view of what Tillich has had to say about the correlation of the two subjects, and anyway it seems very odd. When the theologian says something about God he is claiming that he knows something, and the philosopher who is concerned with the puzzle of knowledge instantly recognizes that the theologian's knowledge is different from any other. Tillich may say that he is quarrelling with the theologian (assuming that there is a conflict) about a philosophical matter. This is really too simple—for the nature of the theologian's knowledge is as much his concern as it is the philosopher's. Tillich himself has given an instance of the possibility of skirmishing on the border-line of philosophy and theology in his discussion of the nature of theology and its proper method. The whole question of theological discourse and its relation to religious language is the no-man's-land where theologian and philosopher meet and either agree or conflict.

To sum up: Tillich's correlation of theology and philosophy is one of the weakest parts of his whole system since it is really nothing more than the construction of a tautology, in which the very definitions are inadequate. The valuable content which is packed into this structure we have tried to discover and expound. This consists of a view of philosophy as something more than

logical analysis of language and an understanding of the special character of theology as a study of what is most vital to man in order that man's ultimate concern be the better expressed.

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¹ *Systematic Theology*, I.p.18.

² *ibid.*

³ *The Theory of Paul Tillich*, p.200.

⁴ *ibid.*, p.137.

⁵ *The Protestant Era*, p.95.

⁶ *ibid.*, pp.96-7.

⁷ *ibid.*, p.96.

⁸ *ibid.*, p.96.

⁹ McTaggart, *Some Dogmas, of Religion*, p.1. Cp. *The Nature of Existence*, Volume 1. pp.3ff.

¹⁰ *Protestant Era*, p.97.

¹¹ *Systematic Theology*, I.22.

¹² *ibid.*, I.25-6.

¹³ *ibid.*, I.26.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, I.27-8.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, I.27.

¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, pp.5-6.

¹⁹ Weissman, 'Verifiability', *Logic and Language*, I.134-5.

²⁰ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, I.24-5.

²¹ *ibid.*, I.29.

²² *ibid.*, I.28.

²³ *Theology of Paul Tillich*, p.136.

²⁴ *Systematic Theology* I.30.

DOCTRINES OF CREATION AND THE RISE OF SCIENCE

THE TENETS of the Christian Faith were phrased in the language of Greek philosophy soon after the appearance of Christianity in the world. During the following ages the compromises and antitheses between Greek reason and Judeo-Christian beliefs often led to paradoxical consequences. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries fidelity to Christian doctrines aided the current of resistance to Greek theories of nature. More affirmatively, the doctrines fostered the growth of mechanism and materialist science.

Among the convictions of the faith that were inherited by the scientific philosophers of the age were articles concerning the creation of the world.¹ In

contrast with the teaching of Greek theology and cosmology, Christian instruction had transmitted the belief that the world had been made at a point of time, or within a limited period, by a personal and omnipotent Being. The dogmas of creation, implicitly held by natural philosophers, included the belief that the Creator exists eternally; He is before the world was made and will be after the world has passed away. The theologians who formulated the doctrine were well aware that in using temporal words to describe eternal existence they were speaking in metaphors and according to human understanding, but it is unnecessary to dwell upon these considerations here. In attempting to make explicit the doctrine that the world had a beginning within the timelessness of eternity, theologians had asserted that time began when the world was created; and the same idea was applied to space.

There were further aspects of the cardinal doctrine which must be mentioned. Theology taught that God created the world *ex nihilo*, from nothing. The Christian Creator is not the demiurge of Plato; the Church rejected the notion that the world was fashioned out of an uncreated primitive material, the formless element of chaos. This part of the doctrine, the repudiation of any pre-existing material, was a corollary from the Christian conception of the One who determines all things and is conditioned by nothing. 'The idea of absolute creation, of a creative act which presupposes nothing at all, whether a pre-existing matter or a pre-existing form, is an idea which originated with Christianity.'²

Another part of the tremendous dogma was the belief in the providential direction and maintenance of the created world. Theology taught the natural philosophers that all created things owe their continued existence and their ordered courses to the constant care of the Creator. If the unceasing supervision of Providence were withdrawn from the world, all would fall into nothingness. Many passages in Scripture speak of the periodic recurrences of events in the heavens and on the earth, and theologians used these texts to point the lesson of sustaining Providence. Scholastic thought had explained the relation between the divine guidance of creation and the laws of nature by the notion of *Concursus Divinus*, in which God was said to be *causa prima* and natural causes, *causae secundae*. The distinction influenced deeply the new men of science, but, as we shall notice, they made copious use of the doctrine of upholding Providence.

Finally, men of the seventeenth century accepted without question the belief in the divine purpose in creation. They never doubted that the structure and course of the world and of all that is in it concealed a divine plan. Popular Christian thought had taken this belief in a naïve manner, looking to natural processes to furnish moral illustrations or to symbolize theological truths. There are numerous instances of this view of nature in seventeenth-century sermons. But the scientific developments of the age produced fresh interpretations of divine purpose in nature.

These articles of the dogma of creation were embraced by the great masters of the scientific revolution; by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, and by many lesser men in the new movements of thought. These men were Christians before they were natural philosophers, and in that age they never lost sight of their faith. During the confused revolt from the authority of Aristotle which accompanied the rise of science, the disagreement between the Aristotelian doctrines of cosmology and the Christian doctrine of creation had served to

strengthen the rebellion; and the rejection of Aristotle's ideas was an essential part of the new conceptions of astronomy and physics. In former centuries Christian beliefs on creation had often been quietly associated with the Aristotelian system, without sense of strain. The most widely read text-book on astronomy was the *Tractatus de Sphaera* of Sacrobosco, which had been composed in the thirteenth century. After describing the general system of the universe according to Aristotle, the author of the treatise adds the words, '*Sic enim deposuit deus gloriosus et sublimis*'.³ Such theology would have been hazardous in the seventeenth century. God's disposition of the spheres was not denied, though it was now held to be less direct, but the evidence of the comets and the new stars had compelled philosophers and theologians to abandon the ancient descriptions of the ways in which He had disposed the World.

Yet the dogmas remained, and not only were they adjusted to the new scientific discoveries; they supplied also motives for the repudiation of the traditional physics. The doctrine of the Creator's omnipotence and absolute freedom in the act of creation was frequently recalled by natural philosophers when they advanced bold hypotheses and unorthodox speculations. In the Middle Ages original thinkers had appealed to the infinite power of the Creator in arguing for novel theories of physics.⁴ In the period we are considering the absolute liberty of the Creator to frame His creation as He wills was invoked in the startling speculations concerning the plurality of worlds. Giordano Bruno revived the old hypothesis that there may be a multitude of universes beyond that with which we are acquainted, and he supported his theory by appeals to the divine freedom in creation. To restrict the creative power of God to the making of one world was, he argued, to place an arbitrary restriction on divine omnipotence. Why, asked Robert Burton, should not an infinite cause produce infinite effects? The idea of countless inhabited worlds excited passionate debate. Conservative minds were troubled by the idea, and it became a standard example of man's impious curiosity, as Donne and Milton attest. Yet it was taken seriously by men of science. It is sufficient to cite Galileo, who, in discussing the immense size of the stellar universe, calls to his aid the power of God; it is presumptuous to suppose that He could not have created a universe greater than the mind can grasp.⁵ In a very different context, the messenger of applied science, Francis Bacon, spoke of inventions as imitations of the works of God.⁶

Men of science were impressed by the ancient theories of atomism, and the views of Epicurus and of Lucretius were revived by Gassendi. But none of the new physicists entertained the belief that the world came into existence by chance, by some fortuitous concourse of material elements. The Epicurean thesis was met by philosophical argument. Robert Boyle, who warmly accepted the atomic account of the origin of material substances, pointed out that the Epicurean doctrine assumed that the particles of matter have existed from eternity and, further, that they moved themselves in such manners as to turn chaos into the orderly fabric of the world.⁷ The Christian doctrine could explain the production of the atoms from nothing at a moment of time and account for the marks of design in nature. Men of science, in seeking to define the primary elements and forces from which the complex phenomena of nature could be necessarily derived, attributed the fabrication of the fundamental factors of things to the Creator. Kepler believed that the *species* of earth's movement was originally

communicated to the earth by God; it was thereby endowed with an instinctive life. Gassendi supposed that the atoms had been created by God and that He alone retained the power to annihilate them, for no natural force was capable of doing this. It is well known that Descartes founded his comprehensive plan of mechanism upon a theological metaphysic, in which any universe created by God out of extension and local motion must result in the kind of universe of which we are aware. For him, also, the invariability of motion in the universe depended upon the immutability of the Creator. None of these great men relied more on the doctrine of creation than Newton. He dwelt on the evidence of design by an all-powerful and intelligent Being which is displayed in the structure and motions of the solar system. If the cause which had brought the system into existence had been blind, the sun would have been of the same nature as Jupiter, Saturn and the earth, without light or heat. He believed, also, that the disposal of the sun and the planets pointed to a Being supremely expert in geometry and mechanics. But the most celebrated aspect of Newton's references to the Deity occurs in the *Opticks*, where infinite space is seen as the *sensorium* of God, by which He is able to perceive all things at once. Bentley, in his Boyle Lectures of 1692, asserted, on Newton's authority, that the system of the *Principia* postulated a Creator.

The divine creation of the primitive components of the universal mechanism was an organic part of the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century. Further, the accumulation of fresh knowledge in every field of inquiry extended and strengthened the argument from design. The pages of the physicists, chemists and anatomists are filled with descriptions of the exquisite construction everywhere manifested in nature. The proofs of providential design in the world culminated in John Ray's encyclopaedic *The Wisdom of God in Creation*, 1691, in which he explores the evidence in the planetary system, the elements, the atmosphere and the bodies of animals and birds. The vastness of the universe shown by the recent astronomy recalled to men of science the dogma of Creation *ex nihilo*. 'How boundless a power', wrote Boyle, 'or rather what an Almightiness is eminently displayed in God's making out of nothing all things, and without materials or instruments constructing this immense fabric of the world.'⁸ But there were principles in which the mechanical science of nature and the doctrine of Creation drew mutual support from one another.

Scientific understanding offered what the ancient principles had failed to offer, a vision of intelligible construction. It answered the demand to discover how things are composed which the substantial forms and essences of the schools had not answered. Traditional science was sterile, partly because it was governed by metaphysical definitions, partly because it attempted to explain physical changes in terms of immanent ends. No conclusions could be derived from such principles that were capable of being empirically verified, calculated with precision, and fruitfully applied. Among the many features of the new experimental and mathematical way of science were the conception of the determined interconnection of moving material parts and the conception of an external maker.

The latter conception, that of the Great Artificer, was necessary to the former, the idea of intelligible mechanism. The business of science was to discover how the parts of things, a piece of iron or the solar system, are fitted together and move in relation to one another. Natural objects, regarded as machines, become

instruments of conscious purposes outside themselves, as clocks, the favourite models of seventeenth-century men of science, are constructed by clock-makers to record the time. Mechanistic science and craftsmanship, vindicated and clarified the Christian dogma of Creation, and the dogma promoted the science. For technical investigation revealed everywhere the wonderful skill of the Creator, though in many cases the purposes of the delicate machines which He had made were obscure. The new philosophers were fond of showing that expert scientific knowledge was necessary in order to appreciate the ingenuity of nature. Boyle exhibits these associations between theology and science so abundantly that passages from his works readily present themselves. On the relation between scientific knowledge and recognition of design in nature he writes many comments of this kind. 'He that is a stranger to anatomy shall never be able to discover in the circulation of the blood, the motion of the chyle, and the contrivance of all parts of a human body, those proofs as well as effects, of an omniscient Demiourgos or Artist, which a curious anatomist will discover in that elaborate and matchless engine.'⁹

The discovery that nature is composed of engines and is in its totality an engine provided convincing proofs of a creation, insight into the manner of its action and a vindication of the dogma of the absolute independence and supremacy of the Creator. Mechanism, determinism, and materialism logically assumed the dogma. Even when the corpuscular theory was adopted, the immutability, omniscience, and independence of an omnipotent First Cause were affirmed. God, after resolving to make such a world as this world, separated the matter that He had provided into innumerable figured particles and put them into such motions, so that the world must result.

Nor did the men of science overlook the doctrine of the providential preservation of nature in their general accounts. The new modes of interpretation confirmed, in ways not open to the traditional physics, the maintenance by the divine care of the vast machine and of the lesser machines of which it was composed. The celestial bodies declare this constant vigilance. The skill with which the masses of matter in the spaces of the heavens are kept from straying from their stations was a favourite theme of cosmic mechanists and, as we have noticed, was dwelt upon by Newton. The watchful eye of Providence was seen in the extraordinary accounts by the new school of zoologists of the nourishment and preservation of animal species; the evidence of foresight was far more impressive than the evidence supplied by the fantastic legends of the Bestiaries.

The independence of the Creator, asserted in Christian dogma, and His supremacy over the world of time and space, were contended for by the new physicists who were abandoning the Aristotelian frame of conceptions.

The old system had tended to ascribe the purposive order of the world to nature. In the Platonic revivals of the sixteenth century a kind of soul, *anima mundi*, had been attributed to the world. Elizabethan writers accepted the belief in 'the not erring intelligence, called the soul of the World and Nature', which gave life and preservation, endowed all things with forms, and directed everything deprived of understanding to its special end.¹⁰ Veneration of nature had been encouraged by the divinity given to the heavenly bodies by the teachers of Aristotelian cosmology. Scholars had grown used to speak of nature's propensities: nature, they declared, dreads a vacuum; bodies seek their natural places.

In short, there was an inducement to view nature as self-sufficient and self-governing, sometimes as an instinctive life or formal tendency in things, sometimes as a personal force guiding the processes of the world.

The men of science, such as Boyle, who were as zealous for religion as for science, disapproved of the habit of spiritualizing nature, just as they recoiled from the immaterial and occult principles of the traditional philosophy. They disapproved both as men of religion and as men of science. They declared that the determined motions of matter sufficiently saved the appearances without the introduction of a living being called Nature. And they pointed out that those who interposed such a being between the divine spirit and the material system of the world transferred to this being the attributes and prerogatives of God; they made nature self-creative, intelligent and all-powerful. The new school of inquirers protested against this animism. Kepler branded the belief that the stars were moved by divinities as anti-Christian. Bacon eloquently criticized the natural philosophers, who, relying on Aristotle, were infecting their science with theology and substituting Nature for God.

Clerical mathematicians and religious workers in laboratories followed Bacon in rigorously separating sacred theology, the circle of spiritual truths based upon revelation, from science, the investigation of the mechanical properties of things, magnitude, figure, and local motion. By this policy the mysteries of divinity were preserved from the methods of human knowledge, which proceeded by sense and reason. The divine will in nature cannot be sought by scientific means. On the other hand, science was free to advance without the stultifying concern for final causes and immaterial processes. Yet science was compelled by its own principles to assume the foresight of a Creator in the construction of the world and to recognize an original act of creation in the appearance of the elements from which the world of time and space necessarily proceeded. The new sense of design, that of the adaptation of material parts and determined processes to one another to form mechanisms, relied upon the sanction of the Christian doctrines of creation. The defects of the position were later exposed by Kant.

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¹ In traditional thought 'the world' means the cosmos seen by the eye: the earth, moon, sun, planets and fixed stars.

² R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, Oxford, 1945, p.77.

³ Lynn Thorndike, *The Sphere of Sacrobosco and Its Commentators*, Chicago, 1949, p.78.

⁴ Richard of Middleton, Walter Burley, and John Buridan are examples.

⁵ Galileo, *Dialogues on the Two Chief Systems of the World*, Third Dialogue.

⁶ Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I.cxxix.

⁷ Boyle, *The Usefulness of Experimental Philosophy*, Oxford, 1663, I.74.

⁸ Boyle, *Usefulness*, p.32.

⁹ Boyle, *Usefulness*, p.93.

¹⁰ Romei, *The Courtier's Academy*, tr. 1598, printed in *The Frame of Order*, edited by James Winney, London, 1957, p.201.

JOHN WESLEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF SUFFERING

IT IS generally acknowledged that any attempt to assess the life and work of John Wesley must take into account not only his ministry to the souls of men, but also his concern for their bodies. That he distributed pills as well as tracts, that he founded dispensaries as well as preaching houses, that he published *Primitive Physic* as well as sermons and journals—all this is well known; and though in detail perhaps it is not so well known as it ought to be, it is not necessary here to catalogue his many activities to relieve the sufferings of his fellow-men. What we are concerned to do is to inquire into the beliefs and attitudes of mind which lay behind all these labours.

Wesley's knowledge of medicine was for a man of the eighteenth century, not inconsiderable,¹ and his practical application of that knowledge was part and parcel of his deep interest in all that pertained to the life of man—whether of body or soul. On the title page of *Primitive Physic* he printed a line from Terence: '*Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto*' (I am a man; therefore I deem nothing human to be outside my interests). This exactly described Wesley's attitude. He was interested in everything that pertained to life—not life as a biological study or a theological abstraction, but life as lived, gloriously or sordidly, by men and women of flesh and blood. Accordingly, the sorrows and sufferings which, after all, make up such a large slice of life were bound to fall within his purview.

At the same time, when we have taken into account the breadth of his interests, his deep sympathy with men and women, and his very practical turn of mind, we shall still not have fully explained the selfless zeal with which he pursued his healing ministry. If we are really to understand his work, we must also take account of his beliefs—his views of God, of man, and of the nature and origin of pain. To discover these will be to lay bare the mainspring of all his energy.

The first source of information is the Preface to *Primitive Physic*² which begins with a literal interpretation of the Genesis story of Creation and the Fall of man. Wesley argues that man was created in the image of God, 'clothed in body as well as soul with immortality and incorruption'. In this state of pristine innocence 'there was no place for physic or the art of healing'. Nature itself was 'mild, benign and friendly to human nature'. Then came the Fall, which Wesley regards as a momentary act of transgression. Man rebelled against his Creator, and Nature in turn rebelled against man:

The sun and moon shed unwholesome influences from above: the earth exhales poisonous damps from beneath: the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, the fishes of the sea are in a state of hostility: the air itself that surrounds us on every side is replete with the shafts of death: yea, the food we eat daily saps the foundations of that life which cannot be sustained without it.

Thus in Wesley's view, suffering is bound up with sin, at least in origin. This is not to say that he traced every illness to an actual committed sin; but he did contend that sin has brought suffering in its train. This view is confirmed by a note in his *Journal* (25th June 1776):

I visited a poor backslider, who has given great occasion to the enemy to blaspheme. Some time since he felt a pain in the soles of his feet, then in his legs, his knees, his thighs. Now it has reached his stomach, and begins to affect his head. No medicines have availed at all. I fear he has sinned a sin unto death; a sin which God has determined to punish by death.

Returning to the Preface to *Primitive Physic*, we notice that Wesley does not complete every link in his chain of argument. There is a gap between the innocent state of man before the Fall and the Fall itself. He does not say how Primeval man fell into rebellion, or how a being who was created perfect could generate unrighteousness, or why as a consequence, Nature should turn hostile.³ His basic belief is that man suffers because he has sinned, and sin is rebellion against God. 'Why is there pain in the world?' he asks. His answer is: 'Because there is sin. Had there been no sin, there would have been no pain, but pain (supposing God to be just) is the necessary effect of sin.'

Wesley's next step in the argument is rather a strange one, for he goes on to say that this benign God has Himself given rebellious man the opportunity to combat the evils which have befallen him as a result of his sin. 'In the very sentence that entails death upon us' Wesley sees a 'grand preventive of pain and sickness'. He has in mind Genesis 3₁₉: 'In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the ground.' He takes this to be a reference to physical exertion, which he always maintained was one of Nature's own means of maintaining fitness.⁴ 'The power of exercise', he writes, 'both to preserve and restore health is greater than can well be conceived, especially to those who add temperance thereto.' This leads him to the general conclusion that both affliction and healing are grounded in the purposes of God.

There is one feature of Wesley's theology that is more difficult than any other to reconcile with our modern ways of thought: that is, his belief in the activity of evil spirits and of a Personal Devil whom he calls 'Satan' or 'The Tempter'. In his sermon 'On Evil Angels', Wesley is quite explicit:

Such is the malice of the wicked one that he will torment whom he cannot destroy. If he cannot entice men to sin, he will, so far as he is permitted, put them to pain. There is no doubt but he is the occasion, directly or indirectly, of many of the pains of mankind, which those who can no otherwise account for them, lightly pass over as nervous.⁵

In *Notes on the New Testament*, Wesley's comment on Matthew 10₈—'Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils'—reads:

And suppose God gives an evil spirit a greater power to affect immediately the origin of the nerves in the brain, by irritating them to produce violent motions, or so relaxing them that they can produce little or no motion; still the symptoms will be those of over tense nerves, as in madness, epilepsies, convulsions; or of relaxed nerves, as in paralytic cases. But could we conclude thence, that the devil had no hand in them? Will any man affirm, that God cannot or will not, on any occasion whatever, give such a power to an evil spirit? or that effects, the like of which may be produced by natural causes, cannot possibly be produced by praeternatural?

Wesley's belief was thus that God permits evil spirits to work their will and that they can so prey upon the organs of the body as to produce results indistinguishable from those due to 'natural causes'. John Lawson⁶ has rightly pointed out that Wesley is here guilty of introducing unnecessary causes for disease, although since medical science was in its infancy in his day, and much less was known about such causes than is known today, we can exonerate him to some extent. Yet is there not an important principle involved here? Eighteenth-century medical opinion was prone to reduce everything to purely natural 'cause and effect'. Wesley, on the other hand, was trying to say that even a natural explanation does not exclude God, and that over and above all 'natural causes' there are such 'praeternatural' factors as faith, prayer and even divine intervention. The fact that he uses such terminology as 'demons', 'evil spirits', 'Satan', etc., does not invalidate that underlying belief which we cannot but share with him. Wesley held that God was ever working His beneficent will, which was to be discerned even in suffering, so that in God alone was all cure ultimately to be found. That is why he constantly affirmed that a physician that feared God was of much more value than one who did not.

A theology which found room for evil spirits also accommodated witchcraft. 'While I live', wrote Wesley in 1785, 'I will bear the most public testimony I can to the reality of witchcraft.'⁷ He was, of course, a child of an age in which the common belief was that epilepsy, madness, and kindred ailments were due to evil spells of witches. Not only did he believe in the reality of these occult powers, but he went so far as to give them a religious sanction. 'The giving up of witchcraft', he said, 'is, in effect, giving up the Bible.'⁸ Once again, however, we must beware of dismissing this simply as an outmoded way of thinking, for it is another instance of Wesley's expressing in eighteenth-century language and thought-form what is fundamentally true. Behind Wesley's thinking was the position that to surrender belief in witchcraft and demonology was to hand religion over to the Deists and the Rationalists, and to reduce religion to purely material or natural causes. He was concerned not to exclude the operation of the supernatural.

Medical opinion in Wesley's day was reacting, quite understandably, against witchcraft; but it was doing so by an excessive swing against all 'un-natural' causes. Wesley was for keeping the door open, at all costs, to those 'un-natural' causes, and did so at the cost of retaining witchcraft. An illustration of this is to be found in his *Journal* for 1st July 1770. He was in Halifax at the time, and came across a girl who was seized with convulsions and all the violent symptoms of an epileptic fit. He writes:

When old Dr. Alexander was asked what her disorder was, he answered, 'It is what formerly they would have called being bewitched.' And why should they not call it so now? Because the infidels have hooted witchcraft out of the world; and the complaisant Christians, in large numbers, have joined them in the cry.

Here is a fundamental refusal to explain everything in purely 'natural' or 'material' causes; and in this, we venture to say, Wesley is at one (allowing for differences in terminology) with trends of present-day psychotherapy. In endeavouring to show that there are causes of disease and lines of treatment

other than the purely physical, Wesley resorted to evil spirits and the like; we, on similar grounds, resort to psychology. Fundamentally, however, the presuppositions are the same, and behind his eighteenth-century thought-forms Wesley was pioneering, all unconsciously, a territory which we are still exploring today.

Wesley was one of the first to stress that mental disturbances can issue in physical ailments. Take, for instance, this extract from the *Journal*:

Reflecting on the case of a poor woman who had continual pain in her stomach, I could not but remark the inexcusable negligence of most physicians in cases of this nature. They prescribe drug upon drug, without knowing a jot of the matter concerning the root of the disorder. And without knowing this, they cannot cure, though they can murder the patient. Whence came this woman's pain (which she would never have told had she never been questioned about it)? From fretting for the death of her son. And what availed medicines while that fretting continued? Why, then, do not all physicians consider *how far bodily disorders are caused or influenced by the mind*, and in those cases which are utterly out of their sphere *call in the assistance of a minister*: as ministers, when they find the mind disordered by the body, call in the assistance of a physician? But why are these cases out of their sphere? Because they know not God. It follows, no man can be a thorough physician without being an experienced Christian.⁹

Perhaps Wesley was too censorious of the physicians of his day, but very few of them could have made this accurate diagnosis; and even in this enlightened century we are only just beginning to recognize the part which a minister can play in dealing with disorders which are psychological or spiritual, rather than physiological in origin. Incidentally, the above quotation would justify the opinion that Wesley would have been in agreement with much that is being done in the realm of spiritual healing. It is a remarkable fact that two hundred years ago Wesley was advocating those things for which we are striving to win more adequate recognition today, viz. that there are certain spheres in which minister and doctor can work together, that man is more than body or mind, and that certain physical disorders can respond to what Dr Weatherhead has called 'relevant methods of healing' as applied by surgeon, psychiatrist, or minister.¹⁰

The next point to notice is that Wesley recognized that physical conditions often account for the mental state of the patient. He held that depression, for example, can be the direct outcome of ill-health. In one of his sermons, he asks, 'What are the causes of sorrow and heaviness in a true believer?' He admits that such causes may be many and complex, but says—

among these we may rank all bodily disorders: particularly acute diseases and violent pain of every kind, whether affecting the whole body or the smallest part of it.¹¹

In a letter to one of his preachers who had fallen victim to acute depression, he wrote that there were three causes of his 'inward trials', one of which causes is 'bodily disorder by means of which the body presses down the soul'.¹² He is prepared to acknowledge that there are some people—'prodigies of nature', he calls them—who would appear to be insensible to pain¹³ and who cannot

understand why 'sickness or pain of body should bring heaviness upon the mind'. Yet, for the majority of sufferers, depression of spirit is one of the natural effects of pain:

All diseases of long continuance, though less painful, are apt to produce the same effect. When God appoints over us consumption, or the chilling and burning ague, if it be not speedily removed, it will not only 'consume the eyes' but 'cause sorrow of heart'. This is eminently the case with regard to all those which are termed *nervous disorders*. And faith does not overturn the course of nature: natural causes still produce natural effects. Faith no more hinders the *sinking of the spirit* (as it is called) in an hysteric illness, than the rising of the pulse in a fever.¹⁴

There is, of course, much here that a theologian or a psychologist could comment upon, and most of us would regard faith as of much greater significance than Wesley allowed in dealing with both mental and physical disorders; its value as a curative agent is now widely recognized. At the same time, it ought to be pointed out that Wesley is a valuable corrective to those who go to the other extreme of regarding faith as a 'cure-all' and who ascribe any failure of cure to lack of faith. After all, as Dr Martin points out, faith is not a therapy to be applied when other means fail.¹⁵

We must now return to some of the basic theological assumptions which fashioned Wesley's attitude to suffering and which were the mainspring of his work for the sick. To begin with, he believed in the love of God to all men individually. He held this position in spite of all he taught about Original Sin and the existence of Satanic powers.¹⁶ Wesley was engaged in a dual struggle. On the one hand he was grappling with the stark fact of pain, on the other hand, he had to face the theological problem of the origin and purpose of it. He was not by nature an abstract thinker, nor had he the leisure to work out a neat theological system. On the whole his theology was traditional and Biblical rather than speculative and philosophical. Even if his wide reading and great erudition are taken into account, it is probably still true to say that he was much more concerned with dealing with suffering than arguing about it;¹⁷ but fundamental to all he thought and did was the unreserved conviction that God is good and that He works for the ultimate good of all His children. Furthermore, he held that the sufferings of every individual are known to this God who is 'our Father'. Early Methodist sick-visitors were bidden to take this message as they went on their errands of mercy:

He knows all you suffer. He knows all your pains: he sees all your wants. He sees not only your affliction in general, but every circumstance of it. Is he not looking down from heaven and disposing all these things for your profit?¹⁸

His attitude to the human body was consistent with this view of God. The body was a sacred gift:

God has entrusted us with our bodies (those exquisitely wrought machines so 'carefully and wonderfully made') with all the powers and members thereof . . . sight, hearing and the rest. . . None of these are lent us in such a sense as to leave us at liberty to use them as we please for a season.¹⁹

For the use of the body, every man was accountable to God:

To him we are equally accountable for the use of our hands and feet, and all members of our body. These are so many talents which are committed to our trust, until the time appointed by the Father. Until then, we have the use of these; but as stewards not as proprietors.²⁰

Thus it can be appreciated why Wesley so tenaciously held that God was not to be bound by the limits of human resources. It is important to see that element in Wesley's thought, even though it is expressed in thought-forms that are strange to us today. Wesley believed that if God willed, He could cure by means that men knew not of. How far modern physicians and psychotherapists would go in this is a matter of conjecture; but at least we must admit that Wesley was right in refusing to surrender the universe in general and man's constitution in particular to the materialists. After all, we must allow a place for Wesley's contention that God is not imprisoned within His own universe, and that ultimately His power must always be conditioned by His love.

Wesley's theology was thus the greatest single factor in fashioning the physician in him. If it is true that 'a physician without a philosophy is little more than a medical technician',²¹ Wesley was no mere technician. The art of healing was to him not merely an act of expediency, urgent as it was to tackle the diseases of men in his day. Nor was it just the response of a naturally sensitive and sympathetic soul to the conditions of his fellow-men. Behind all he did there lay a certain view of God, of a universe whose supreme values are spiritual. He sought to heal men and women because he believed that he was thus fulfilling a God-given mission, and because they were children of the same God and precious in His sight. The pursuit of that vocation led him into hovels where physicians were never invited, and never ventured uninvited.

Wesley's theology of suffering may have begun with the conception of Original Sin; but it did not stay there, much less end there. His message to the sick was not of Original Sin, but of a God who knew their needs and willed for them Life abundant. Perhaps that very message brought health in its train; perhaps the faith which men had in God was at times indistinguishable from a faith they had in John Wesley. Be that as it may, his was a timely mission and a timely message to those people of 200 years ago. 'God loves you' was doubtless administered with many a pill; and who can say which was the most potent to heal—the message, the medicine, or the faith in God and His servant John Wesley?

JOHN C. BOWMER

¹ According to the *Journal*, Wesley read the following medical books: *Cheyne on Fevers* (1.66)—according to a letter to his mother (November 1724), he also read Dr Cheyne's *Book of Health and Long Life*; Cheyne, *Natural Method of Curing Diseases* (II.534); Drake's *Anatomy* (I.185); Author unknown, *The Art of Surgery* (I.217); Hodges, *Account of the Plague* (III.367); Author unknown, *Medical Essays* (V.480); *Medical Transactions*—referred to in Preface to *Primitive Physic*; McBride, *Practice of Physic* (V.169); Perry, *Treatise upon the Gravel and Stone* (VII.123).

² Those who do not possess the work in its entirety will find the Preface in *Wesley's Works*, XIV.307-18).

³ The subject is treated further in his *Treatise on Original Sin* (*Works*, IX.378) and in Sermon LVII, *On the Fall of Man* (*Works*, VI.215).

⁴ He constantly commended physical exercise to others and practised it himself. See for example, his note to his failing brother Charles: 'You must go out every day or die' (*Letters*, VIII.36).

⁵ *Works*, VI.378.

⁶ Lawson, *Selections from John Wesley's 'Notes on the New Testament'*, p. 75.

⁷ *Letters*, VII.300.

⁸ *Journal*, V.265, VI.109.

⁹ *Journal*, IV.313—italics mine (J.C.B.).

¹⁰ See also the case of melancholia at Misterton on 27th April, 1766: 'Let physicians do all they will or can, yet it will be found in the end that "this thing goeth not out but by prayer and fasting".' In other words, Wesley recognized that the trouble was spiritual, and so realized that the cure must also lie in the spiritual, not in the physical realm.

¹¹ Sermon, *Heaviness through Manifold Temptations*; see Sugden, *The Standard Sermons of John Wesley*, II.268.

¹² *Letters*, VI.241.

¹³ Probably he would regard as exceptions such people as the martyrs who professed to feel no pain on going to the stake.

¹⁴ The italics are Wesley's. See Sugden, *op. cit.*, II.269. For Wesley's definition of 'Nervous Disorders', see his tract, *Thoughts on Nervous Disorders* (*Works*, XI.515ff.). He says: 'When physicians meet with disorders they do not understand, they commonly term them *nervous*, a word which conveys to us no determinate idea, but it is a good cover for learned ignorance. But these are often no natural disorders of the body, but the hand of God upon the soul, being a dull consciousness of the want of God and the unsatisfactoriness of everything here below. At other times, it is conviction of sin either in a higher or lower degree. It is no wonder that those who are strangers to religion should not know what to make of this; and that, consequently, all their prescriptions should be useless, seeing they quite mistake the case.' Here again we see the medical opinion of the day struggling towards an explanation of something that cannot be fully accounted for on purely material grounds. The answer of Wesley is one which is being confirmed by much research in psychosomatics today!

¹⁵ Denis V. Martin, *The Meaning of Faith in Faith-healing* (Epworth Press), Dr Martin's valuable address to the Methodist Society for Medical and Pastoral Psychology.

¹⁶ See Sugden, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-1 (Sermon XXIX).

¹⁷ See Lindström, *Wesley and Sanctification*, p.40.

¹⁸ Sermon XCVII, *On Sick Visiting* (*Works*, VII.122).

¹⁹ Sermon LI, *The Good Steward* (*Works*, VI.138).

²⁰ *Ibid.* The supreme illustration of accountability to God is to be found in John Wesley himself. No one had a greater sense of mission than he; and he was sustained by a belief that he was raised up and preserved, almost miraculously, to accomplish that mission; he believed that God withheld the rain or tempered the sun for the convenience of that mission. He saw in all things, except sin, a providence of love.

²¹ See an article, 'The Theological Basis of Medicine', by the Rev. John Wilkinson, M.B., Ch.B., in *The Scottish Journal of Theology*, June 1955.

Recent Literature

EDITED BY R. NEWTON FLEW

Medieval Thought from St Augustine to Ockham, G. Leff. (Pelican, 3s. 6d.)

The fact that it is felt to be worth while to include in the 'Pelican' series so recondite a subject as medieval philosophy is one indication among many of the much greater appreciation of the Middle Ages in our times than was formerly the case. Hallam had no use for the Scholastics, 'the dust on whose untouched pages', so he said, 'is as eloquent as the grass that waves over Babylon'. The falsity of that judgement has long been made evident and while there was doubtless much barren speculation in medieval thought, there was probably also as much serious discussion as there is in these happy days of logical positivism. Mr Leff has produced, for all its popular paper-backed format, a very solid work on medieval thought from about AD 400 to 1350. He divides his subject very usefully under three heads: 'The Aftermath of Rome', which takes us down to the Carolingian revival; 'The Triumph of Scholasticism', which includes a section on the philosophy of Islam (a very important factor that is apt to be neglected); and 'Scepticism *versus* Authority', which concludes with Ockham. He confines himself deliberately to philosophical rather than political thinking, which, perhaps for the sake of compression, was somewhat inevitable. Nevertheless, in Section 3 particularly it is a pity that he has given himself this limitation, for scepticism arose far more from the clash of political ideals and practice than from the growth of purely philosophical doubt. The root of philosophic scepticism was found in Abelard, whose *Sic et Non* would have been very shattering to the orthodox had they seen its tendency, but after the massive work of Aquinas philosophic doubt could make itself heard only in the guise of mysticism of the type of Eckhart. On the other hand, the acid criticism of the existing politico-religious order was represented by many great writers, of whom Dante and Marsilius of Padua were the chief, and it was this which led to the conciliar movement which in turn affected both philosophy and politics. To the medieval thinker the distinctions between philosophy, theology and politics were very difficult to draw. They are certainly not drawn in Augustine, nor are they altogether clear in Aquinas. Philosophy could be looked upon as the framework of politics or, the other way round, politics as the framework of philosophy, but they were interconnected. Within his limitations, however, Mr Leff has given us a very comprehensive and detailed account. It is certainly not an 'introduction' for the beginner. Not only is it very technical and heavy, but for the English reader the Bibliography—which presumably is intended 'for further reading'—is almost of no use at all. Out of twenty-eight items, sixteen are in French and two in German. With four exceptions all are Roman Catholics. The name of Rashdall appears, but those of Poole, Powicke, Carlyle, Haskins, Webb, Figgis, Mullinger, and a few others of similar standing do not appear at all.

A. VICTOR MURRAY

British Baptists in China, by H. R. Williamson. (Carey Kingsgate Press, 21s.)

This book is an authoritative account of the work of British Baptists in China since the decision was taken in April 1859 to open up work there. But it is more than that. For it places the work of the Baptist Missionary Society in the setting both of the Christian movement in China from its earliest beginnings over the whole country, and also of the troubled history of the country itself since the turn of the century. Dr Williamson spent thirty years in China, the last twelve of them on the staff of the

Extension Department of the Shantung Christian University. After that, he was called home to be, for another twelve years, the Foreign Secretary of the B.M.S. In this office he was largely responsible for policy and administration in a most critical period for the work in China, and in close touch with the development of events in every part of the field. He is, moreover, an authority on Chinese language and literature, and the author of a number of books; he has a readable style and a gift for seeing the significant thing. All of which adds to the value of this latest book of his, which can be warmly commended to anyone interested in China and the cause of Christ there. Among many useful things the book does, two or three may be singled out. One is that it brings out the stature and significance of Timothy Richard. This great missionary, by his courtesy and understanding of the Chinese mentality and appreciation of Chinese culture, won a unique place in the esteem of the intelligentsia. And this, together with such practical works of mercy as the organization of famine relief, opened doors for the gospel and the spread of the Christian Church, and gave him influence in the highest councils of the country. He was called into consultation, for example, after the Boxer troubles in 1900, and made the suggestion that was the basis of the settlement after. Another useful thing about the book is that it tells of the development of the ecumenical idea in China, the formation of United Church Councils, the National Christian Council, and, finally, the emergence of the Church of Christ in China, which were all established just in time to fulfil vital functions when the Communists took over control and compelled the churches to sever all connexion with Churches and missionary societies in other lands. Dr Williamson gives the text of important documents, notably the statement of policy issued in November 1950 by the National Council at a time of much heartburning and anxiety. He also supplies some useful tables of statistics. Indeed, anyone wanting to find the salient facts in the development of events these last few years, as far as they are known and touch the life of the churches, will find this book a mine of useful information.

F. C. BRYAN

The Doctrine of the Trinity, by C. C. RICHARDSON. (Abingdon Press, via Epworth Bookshop, \$3.)

Dr Richardson is Professor of Church History at Union Seminary, New York. His research in the period in which the doctrine of the Trinity was first formulated has led him to ask whether the Christian doctrine of one God existing as three Persons really does make sense, illuminate faith, and guard truth. The purpose of the inquiry is not merely negative. There is a genuine desire to remove stumbling-blocks in the way of the thoughtful Christian by clarifying what, in the author's view, the classical accounts attempt to express but often obscure. In examining the biblical roots of the doctrine, Dr Richardson recognizes that the N.T. writers were seeking appropriate symbols to express the God revealed in Christ, but suggests that the terms available were from a particular context and that not necessarily the best. 'Father', 'Son', 'Holy Spirit' express, respectively, vital truth and point beyond themselves to necessary distinctions in the Godhead, but they are not themselves the actual distinctions and cannot properly express them. Distinctions there are, and of different kinds, but they are not readily summed up under the N.T. symbols to form a neat trinitarian pattern. Here is raised, in the most radical form, the great contemporary issue as to how to distinguish the message from its symbolic clothing and it is a weakness of the argument that Dr Richardson leaves the matter there. He does go on, however, to examine the major patterns of trinitarian thinking in the Church from Tertullian to Dorothy Sayers, and finds, along with something of value

in each, elements that are arbitrary and unsatisfactory. The Fathers were under the handicap of having to use terms, as the data for their formulas, which, while not the fittest, could not be questioned because they were scriptural. The real issue is to distinguish God as absolute and transcendent from God as active and related to the world. But, he argues, the N.T. symbols are too ambiguous to give adequate expression to this basic antinomy. In the event, from the fourth century onwards, theologians have been confined to 'threeness'; to words for expressing ideas for which they are inadequate; and to a doctrine not specifically found in the N.T. writings of which some elements point to the doctrine and others away. The fact that Dr Richardson tends to treat religious symbols and the realities of experience as on the level of philosophical concepts makes one wonder whether he has read the Fathers aright. Further, although he explicitly dissociates himself from all the Christological heresies, it is not certain that he does, in fact, do so. There are several passages which smack pretty strongly of Adoptionism and Nestorianism. Yet there is much about this book which is provocative, even exciting. Dr Richardson has seen the difficulties in the expression of the doctrine even if he falls short of his declared purpose of clarifying what it attempts to express. It should prove an excellent medium of discussion in its high theme—not milk for babies but meat requiring strong powers of digestion. It may well stimulate, perhaps more by disagreements than agreements, fresh and serious discussion of the doctrine. If so, it will have served an even greater purpose than that for which it was designed. Already it has demanded of more than one reader a radical re-assessment of thought.

MARCUS WARD

An Outline of Old Testament Theology, by Th. C. Vriezen; translated by S. Neuijen. (Blackwell, 42s.)

This important book by the Professor of Old Testament Studies in the University of Utrecht was first published in Holland in 1949. The present translation is based upon the revised and enlarged Dutch edition of 1955. While earlier books on the subject have sometimes tended to present a summary of the biblical data upon which a theology might be based, rather than a theology as such, Professor Vriezen does far more than this, and achieves a remarkable synthesis of what have often seemed diverse elements. Better still, he deals with the whole problem of the nature and scope of Old Testament theology, and provides a most stimulating and valuable contribution to the current debate. In the first part of his work, the author deals with such topics as the Church and the Old Testament; its historical character and spiritual structure; the Old Testament as the Word of God; and the basis, task and method of Old Testament theology. He affirms that while the critical approach has tended to undermine the still tacitly-accepted authority of the Old Testament, the results of critical study must none the less be fully utilized in the work of interpretation. Again, while Old Testament theology must be distinguished from the history of Hebrew religion, the vital importance of the history of Israel is stressed, since the study of this reveals not only contacts and parallels with contemporary religious ideas, but also the revolutionary character of the prophetic message. The latter, emerging out of the 'catastrophic' period 722-539 B.C., dominates the spiritual structure of the Old Testament. To Professor Vriezen, Old Testament theology is to be viewed as a part of Christian theology. The Old Testament is authoritative, not in its historical statements or ethical judgements as such, but to the extent to which it shares in the truth revealed in Jesus Christ. Biblical revelation is not to be identified with the canon of scripture, which must be viewed and judged in the light of Christ. The conclusion is reached that 'Old Testament theology in the full sense of the word, gives an insight into the Old Testament message and a judgement of this message

from the point of view of the Christian faith' (p.122). The second part of the book deals with the content of Old Testament theology under the headings, God, Man, the Intercourse between God and Man and between Man and Man, and God, Man and the World in the Present and the Future. The dominant theme here is that the essential meaning of all revelation is communion between man and God. The various specific media of revelation, such as dreams, visions, prophecy and priesthood, all testify to its reality. God's intercourse with man is further demonstrated through the redemption and judgement discerned by Israel's prophets in their nation's history. The cult exists to maintain communion between man and God. Finally, Hebrew piety, essentially joyous and exuberant rather than narrow and legalistic, has at its heart this same sense of the vital link between the whole cosmos and its Creator. The author is consistent throughout with his thesis: Old Testament Theology is part of Christian Theology. In his final chapter on the Kingdom of God and the future hope, he shows how Israel's great visions are 'actualized' in Jesus Christ.

S. C. THEXTON

The State and the Church in a Free Society, by A. Victor Murray. (Cambridge University Press. 22s. 6d.)

In his Hibbert Lectures Dr Murray has given us a book of outstanding merit on a subject of pressing importance. From start to finish we are held by the clarity of style and the cogency of argument, so that our interest never flags, but rather deepens. The author has read widely and pondered deeply on his theme, and the result is a soul-stirring and heart-warming volume. Incidentally, it is a masterly and convincing apologetic for *real* Christianity. Like most people of philosophic mind, Dr Murray insists on defining his terms; he will tolerate nothing 'woolly'. There is an illuminating Preface, foreshadowing good things to come, and the statement that 'ideologies which are passionately attached to logical completeness must in the long run be defeated by human nature' finds support in the following chapters which are a kind of running commentary on this text. There is an admirable discussion of the 'Free Society' and Church and State relations, establishing the propositions that 'the only genuine Society that persons can ever have lies in the goodwill of other persons' and 'the relations of Church and State must be determined by the free society in which we all wish to live'. The chapter is a polemic against authoritarianism in either Church or State. The distinction is clearly drawn between the Church as an Institution and as an Ideal, Invisible Society. The latter is difficult to define, but may be regarded as consisting of all real Christians, whatever the communion to which they may belong. The relation between the two, Institution and Ideal, can be regarded either as a sanction and a justification or an ideal and a challenge. The discussion on the nature of the State proceeds on corresponding lines. The subjects, as set forth in the chapter headings, are most alluring, and the treatments of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity are particularly valuable. A clear and timely distinction is drawn between Mercy and Justice and of special interest is the section dealing with Natural Law. The author has the ability to sum up a situation in a few concise, almost epigrammatic words: 'Fundamentally, both Catholic and Protestant have shown an almost eager willingness to decry the intellect and have not scrupled to identify orthodoxy with ignorance', and 'The allocation of offices, whereby the Church exercises authority in spiritual things, while the State is supreme in things temporal, is quite unworkable, because we are dealing with the same people all the time and their personalities cannot be so divided. . . . Human nature is refractory material for planners.' This respect for human personality is an outstanding feature of the lectures.

W. L. DOUGHTY

An Analysis of Knowing, by J. Hartland-Swann (Allen & Unwin, 15s.), *Language and Christian Belief*, by John Wilson (Macmillan, 9s. 6d.), and *The Truth of Religion*, by John Wilson (S.P.C.K., 4s.).

No Christian student, least of all one who is also a preacher or teacher, can afford to ignore the work of the linguistic philosophers who have succeeded the Logical Positivists. The facts that they exist, and that their writings are increasingly influencing the thought of educated people, invite our attention; the intrinsic importance of their work demands our attention. Those who have been trained in more ancient philosophical ways need to curb their impatience with writers who, so often, brush aside the labours of their ancestors. In *An Analysis of Knowing* we are provided with an eminently readable example of this type of philosopher at work. His book will interest the specialist, especially for his modification of the distinction, made by Professor Ryle and echoed by many, between knowing *that* and knowing *how*. This reviewer finds Mr. Hartland-Swann very convincing on this point. The non-specialist reader who often says, 'I know', and the preacher who declares, 'I know whom I have believed' and 'I know that my Redeemer liveth', will find much in this book to stimulate thought, even though the author is not directly concerned with religious and theological language. Such language is, however, the exclusive theme of two books by Mr John Wilson, who makes use of Ryle's distinction mentioned above. Mr Wilson is a young teacher of divinity in a public school. His smaller book, *The Truth of Religion*, is clearly the by-product of his professional duties. Here he seeks to clear a logical way through real ambiguities and alleged logical ineptitudes in theological language. He seeks to show that Christian belief *may* be logically respectable. In the larger book, *Language and Christian Belief*, his approach is both more positive and more critical. Holding that Christians dare not decline to provide religious statements with a method of verification 'which will stand up to scientific standards, without involving itself in the physical sciences', Wilson surveys a considerable part of Christian doctrine. In some instances, e.g. the doctrines of the Trinity and of Sin and Judgement, his main aim appears to be a defence of these doctrines from the logical point of view. In other matters, notably the Sacraments, he is concerned to insist that we must 'change our style of thinking radically'. In the smaller book he arrives at a concluding chapter upon the all-importance of religious experience; in the larger he starts from that premiss. Perhaps the most important question left in the reader's mind is about what Wilson means by religious experience; in particular, how is it related to reflection upon experience? These two books may be commended as a stimulus to a necessary pursuit; only a much longer review could fairly criticize their arguments. FREDERIC GREEVES

Matter, Mind and Man, by Edmund W. Sinnott. (Allen & Unwin, 18s.)

This book is in a series called 'World Perspectives', all written by very eminent authors. Dr Sinnott, a former Director of the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale, is a distinguished scientist who has made this contribution to the large volume of literature on the relations of science and religion. It is really a modern restatement of the teleological argument. He starts from the view that what he calls protoplasmic goal-seeking is an essential concept of biology. He then extends this notion into the realm of psychology and concludes that protoplasmic self-regulation is the basis of purpose and thus, in time, of mind. This is then further extended to cover what he calls the human soul; and by way of considering the appeal of beauty and of moral obligation he is led to take a favourable view of the idea of communion with a greater Spirit. He faces the difficult questions of free will and the problem of evil, but is not deterred finally from asserting not only a kind of theism but even immortality.

He admits that much of this is speculation, but he claims that it is speculation with a foundation in biological fact, and he rightly regards it as a more robust philosophy than materialism or logical positivism. Such a philosophy, he claims, both respects the demands of intelligence and recognizes the values of the spirit. We are always grateful for books which seek to bridge the gulf between two disciplines, in this case biology and philosophy, not to mention theology. Such works are often the most fruitful contributions to thought, but they nearly always are attended by the difficulty that the writers do not have an equal knowledge of both disciplines; and this eminent scientist is in the field of philosophy, and still more in theology, a layman. Consequently, his discussions of such topics as sin will strike theologians as decidedly superficial; incidentally, his remark that there is no problem of evil in the animal kingdom is open to question. A number of his views are very unorthodox, as that 'man has a dual nature, half beast, half god'. Of the Christian revelation we hear practically nothing. But that is not the purpose of the work; it is a friendly and well-meant approach from the scientific side. We do not complain that it is speculative and contains no proof, for that kind of proof is no longer expected by the theologian. It is enough that the book shows that the assertions of theism are at least compatible with a scientific view of the universe. More than that the book does not and cannot do. It should not be put into the hands of a completely sceptical biologist, for it contains no proof that will break down his scepticism; but a biologist who is favourable to theism and yet wonders whether he ought to be may be helped by it.

A. RAYMOND GEORGE

Concerning Human Understanding, by Nikunja Vihari Banerjee. (Allen & Unwin, 30s.)

The first two-thirds of this book consists of a critical study of problems in the borderland between ontology and epistemology—the problems of the nature and knowledge of the external world and of the knowing self. Professor Banerjee insists that in these matters philosophy must not attempt to oust common sense, but only to refine it. Hence he rejects many of the traditional problems of philosophy as pseudo-problems, as needless questionings where there ought to be sheer acceptance of fact. He insists also on the separateness of the problems of relativity and of error, and on the sheer givenness of direct knowledge of things-in-themselves, in sense-perception. But, as against common sense, he will not admit the possibility of direct empirical self-knowledge: the self can only be known transcendently. Does Professor Banerjee's stand out among the numerous books on these problems? Its merits are indeed great: it is full of passages of real philosophical power, and the whole argument is acute and clear and learned. But there is also, in the matter, much arbitrariness. When so many ancient problems are by-passed as pseudo-problems, raised wantonly when sheer fact should be accepted, why cannot inter-causality of matter and mind and direct knowledge of an empirical self be likewise accepted? Professor Banerjee freely uses the Western classic thinkers from Descartes to Kant (he is brilliantly at home with Kant; indeed, perhaps his book's best justification would be a commentary on Kant), and again the recent Western Realists, especially the American Neo-Realists. But Idealism is scarcely dealt with except as represented by Berkeley; the rich Indian dialectic on these problems, on which one would have hoped an Indian author would have drawn copiously, is hardly mentioned. The last third of the book outlines a philosophy of religion, with due notice taken of Logical Positivism and of Indian thought, but with increased arbitrariness. A very sophistical argument denies that value and existence can go together: this is made the basis for a denial of 'the religion of God'. But it is also maintained that values are objective, and the mutual obligations thus given mean that each self is 'essential' to every other: hence the

non-existent ideals are the basis of an essential togetherness of human, mortal selves, and the religious quest is resolved into the overcoming of that 'Ignorance' (the term is Indian) whereby man so often replaces his mutual need by ego-centricity. An original and interesting, but cavalier, form of 'the religion of man'. J. F. BUTLER

An Order for Morning and Evening Prayer and a Service of Worship: The Church of South India. (O.U.P., 1s.)

This booklet contains three orders of worship. The first is based on Anglican forms, but after the reading of Scripture sentences goes straight on to 'O Lord, open Thou our lips' with its responses, followed by a hymn or lyric of praise. Then there is responsive adoration, after which comes confession. The rest is virtually the Anglican order, but with some rearrangement. The Benedictus follows the first lesson and the Te Deum the second; the sermon is inserted between the Te Deum and the Creed. The second order of service contains prayers which are for the most part modern and of no special merit; its arrangement is something of a muddle. The third is a skeleton order of service for those who prefer prayer to be extempore; it is logically contracted and has the creed, the thanksgivings and intercessions, and the offering after the sermon. J. A. KAY

John Wesley among the Physicians; a Study in Eighteenth-century Medicine, by A. Wesley Hill. (Epworth Press, 10s.)

John Wesley was no mean doctor himself. Shocked by the sufferings of the people, Wesley was confronted also by the smugness and ignorance of the medical profession. He set himself to explore, like Livingstone after him. He studied medicine for himself. He treated patients. He eventually wrote *Primitive Physick*, which ran into many editions, and which gave the public at large a concise, common-sense, and practical handbook on simple remedies for ordinary complaints. He went further. Impressed by experiments already made in the little-known realm of electro-therapy, he carried his enthusiasm for it almost to extremes, not hesitating to try it out upon his own person. He brought about no revolution in the art of healing, as he did in that of religion and social betterment, but it was not for lack of will. The fiery energy that characterized his spiritual activities were manifested also in his drive to awaken the surgeons and physicians of his day to the vast field of new knowledge they had hardly begun to explore. None would have rejoiced more than Wesley in the vast expansion of medical practice today. Dr Hill has laid us under a great obligation by this well-written and absorbing book. FREDERICK W. DODDS

Livingstone's Africa; Yesterday and Today, by the Right Hon. James Griffiths, M.P. (Epworth Press, 7s. 6d.)

Within sight of one of our Mission stations in Rhodesia stands a big tree on a hill-side, under which David Livingstone once sat to map the course of a hippopotamus-filled river below. Could he return, a century later, it would be to find changes which would stagger him. The tree is there still, and the hills and the river. But Africa, then the Unknown, an unmapped wilderness, is likely to become a key continent of the world. Into the regions Livingstone so painfully explored the white man has bored with his roads and rails and aeroplane routes, his towns and settlements and farmsteads. The effect on African life and character has been profound, in some ways alarming. It is to these changes that the Rt Hon. James Griffiths has devoted

his Beckley Lecture of 1958. He confines himself mainly to the lands that Livingstone knew. Deftly, with a deep knowledge and insight gained while Colonial Secretary under the last Labour Government, he traces the changes that have taken place, both in their beginnings and development and in their present-day results, and ventures into shrewd foreshadowings of what may yet be to come. What, for example, if in Africa there should arise a Colour Bar in reverse? The whole lecture is an essay in Christian political action, and is one of the most important contributions to thought on this subject that has ever been made.

FREDERICK W. DODDS

The Physicist's Conception of Nature, by W. Heisenberg. (Hutchinson, 16s.)

The physicist's conception of Nature has changed almost beyond recognition during the present century. Popular accounts of those changes are always to be welcomed, not least because the changes mark a recovery of the modesty which modern science showed in the early days, but largely lost during the nineteenth century. Professor Heisenberg looks upon this recovery of a proper sense of self-limitation as a real advance, and a main purpose of the book is to show how it has happened. No one could be a better guide for us than the Director of the Max Planck Institute of Physics at Göttingen. The Principle of Indeterminacy which he enunciated has been a key concept in Quantum Theory, a centre also of philosophical discussion, and one of the most potent causes of the changed conception of nature. The interesting note at the end of the book about the author's work and writings leaves no doubt about his own contribution to modern physics. The book falls into two parts. The first is made up of three essays; the second, and much larger part, of extracts from the history of science, ranging from Kepler to de Broglie. The essays have the appearance of being separate addresses. The third is, in effect, the personal testimony of a classical scholar turned scientist, of the value of a classical education. The opening essay records the older materialistic outlook, and the subjectivism which has often taken its place, for which 'even in science the object of research is no longer nature itself, but man's investigation of nature'. The treatment is too slight to offer justification for a sweeping statement of this kind. The title of the second essay arouses the keenest expectations: Atomic Physics and Causal Law. There are statements which whet our appetite—'all particles are basically nothing but different stationary states of one and the same stuff. . . . There is only one kind of matter, but it can exist in different discrete stationary conditions', or again, 'small-scale space-time processes may run in reverse to the causal sequence'—but their treatment is far too slight for what is in reality the central subject of the book. The theologian will be bound to think of the more illuminating account Heim has already given (the Bibliography should mention the English translations), or of the more cogent and cautious essays of von Weizsäcker in *The World View of Physics*, and the physicist will remember de Broglie's brilliant *Revolution in Physics*. The extracts of Part 2 are to show how 'science has given birth to its own, *inherently uncritical, philosophy*'; and then, in passing from D'Alembert, De la Mettrie, and Ostwald, to show how a wiser understanding was achieved of what science is able to accomplish. Such extracts are always valuable, though not necessarily easy to read. But we would have sacrificed some of them for a longer and more coherent treatment by Heisenberg himself of the subject of his book.

A. W. HEATHCOTE

Divorce and Re-Marriage in Anglicanism, by A. R. Winnett. (Macmillan, 30s.)

The increase in divorce has meant a growing pressure on the Church to allow the remarriage of divorced persons with the Church's rites, and the differing practices

of the Protestant Churches have created confusion. Dr Winnett, faced with applications from divorced persons, set himself the task of finding out what the Church has taught on this subject. The result is a lucid, scholarly account of the attitude of the Church of England from the time of the Reformation to the present day. The Church of England in the sixteenth century had the choice of continuing the pre-Reformation, according to which marriage is indissoluble, but which in practice allowed many dispensations and exemptions, or of accepting the view of the Continental Reformers that unfaithfulness or desertion may dissolve the marriage bond, and that remarriage is therefore possible. In typical Anglican fashion, opinion has veered between these two views, and though on balance the indissolubilist view has been in the ascendancy, there have been eminent divines in all periods who have advocated the view of the Reformers. Indeed, in the eighteenth century this view came to prevail, and there were many cases of remarriage in church, even of guilty partners. In modern times, however, opinion has hardened, and the Lambeth Conferences have tended to take a stricter line. At the same time there is a tendency to abandon the word 'indissoluble' in favour of the word 'permanent', for a committee of the Lambeth Conference of 1948 recognized that sin can so destroy the marriage relationship as to be equivalent to the dissolution of the marriage bond by death, thus departing from the traditional Western view. Convocations today uphold the view that the remarriage of divorced persons should not be solemnized with the Church's rites, but the division of opinion still exists. The author holds the balance fairly, but his own conclusion is that 'in the present situation the Church is entrusted with the task of upholding the Christian standard of indissoluble marriage', and that 'it is unthinkable that the Churches of the Anglican Communion should go back upon the almost universally recognized rule that no marriage of any divorced person should take place with the Church's rites so long as the other partner lives'. The book gives an admirable summary of the Church's position through the centuries, but it leaves one with a number of questions. Can the Church give a clear and unequivocal lead on this matter when opinion has been divided for so long, and when great names can be quoted on both sides of the controversy? When scholars cannot agree on the teaching of our Lord and give such widely different interpretations of the Matthaean exception in Matthew 19, can the man in the pew, still less the man in the street, be blamed for his bewilderment as he tries to understand the attitude of the Church? The author is inevitably concerned mainly with the legal and canonical issues and with historical precedents, but it still remains for the Church to present unmistakably the spiritual and theological basis on which true marriage is founded. When all the evidence has been considered, there will always be those who will feel impelled to say with Bishop Mandell Creighton, 'I prefer to err on the side of charity'.

LEONARD CONSTANTINE

Buddhist Wisdom Books, by Edward Conze. (Allen & Unwin, 13s. 6d.)

The 'Diamond Sutra' and the 'Heart Sutra' are two of the most venerated texts of Mahayana Buddhism. Dr Conze has produced new translations from the Sanskrit of both these 'Sutras', together with a Sanskrit transliteration of the 'Heart Sutra'. But he rightly believes that such texts cannot be understood by the Western reader without a commentary; and that commentary also he has set out to supply. What is new in his work is that he seeks to base his exegesis entirely on the great Indian commentaries, particularly those recently made available by Professor Tucci. His own contribution he has limited to the attempt to translate the Buddhist thought-forms into terms intelligible to the Western mind. In so far as this can be done,

Dr Conze has done it, and with scrupulous scholarship. But when one has wrestled with both text and commentary, what is the impression left by the two 'Sutras'? To the Western Christian they appear as a series of wordy and repetitive paradoxes, so consistently negative as to leave almost everything unsaid. We may recognize that truth is often paradoxical, and can be experienced rather than explained; and it is true that an English translation cannot reproduce the hierophantic fluidity and assonances of the Sanskrit original. Even so, there seems to be here just one long variation on the 'Nethi Nethi' (not this, not that) theme of Yajñavalkya in the Hindu Upanishad; and the Christian must feel either that there is a complete failure of communication or how strange it is that Eastern piety has been able to subsist on such arid diet for so long.

G. ERNEST LONG

Mental Seduction, by Joost A. M. Meerloo. (Cape, 21s.)

The author of this alarming book speaks out of his own experience, for he himself during the war was subjected in some measure to the brain-washing techniques he describes. He was formerly Chief of the Psychological Department, Netherlands Forces; now in the U.S.A. he is concerned with training men to resist psychological conditioning. Here set out in detail is the sinister side of modern psychology. In a pertinent examination of some of the aspects of what has come to be known as the 'Welfare State' he also shows how often bureaucracy, with the best intentions in the world, can likewise condition minds until they are unable to consider any question purely on its merits. Pavlov and his dogs have many imitators even in the so-called 'free democracies'. In these pages we watch men changed persistently into puppets, and are shown how it is done. Conduct and judgement can be so rigidly conditioned that it seems as though the will abdicates. The book from beginning to end lights up the fundamental challenge to any system of religious thinking that underlies most present-day psychological techniques, a challenge so far not sufficiently recognized by the Christian Church. Man, they assume, can be conditioned and trained just like any animal. There is really for him no ethical choice. His decisions and conduct, if not due to 'menticide', are nevertheless the inevitable result of something which happened to him in the cradle. He is relieved of all responsibility. It is in the stark and precise outlining of this fundamental challenge that the importance of this book lies for Christians. Dr Meerloo has some things to say about withstanding this attack on human integrity that ought to interest us. He has observed that those with a rigid simple belief came off better than others. A deeply rooted and religious faith strengthened a man's inner defences far more effectively than a questioning intellectualism. He talks about the depressive effect of loneliness and hints, objectively, that in some Christians, at least, a consciousness of their Lord's presence has scattered the depression. The need for personal moral standards is clearly emphasized, in refreshing contrast to Pavlovian conditioning. He does not define what he means by 'conscience' (it may only be our familiar friend, the superego), but nevertheless he stresses the importance of the individual possessing one. He pleads for more zest in our civilization and makes an indirect appeal for a quiet Sunday. If automation comes universally it is bound to dwarf man's self esteem and lead him to worship the machine. All of which leads to the devaluation of man with the corresponding need of the Christian emphasis on his value in the sight of God. It will be seen that this sombre book has indeed Christian overtones. His defences might have been strengthened by an examination of the long history of Christian martyrdoms. May it be that it is religion that alone has the final answer to psychological disintegration? There is much here to suggest it. Without perhaps meaning it, the author has provided Christians with a tonic!

JOHN CROWLESMITH

Les Églises Réformées en France, by Samuel Mours. (Librairie Protestante, 140 Boulevard St-Germain, Paris, fr. 120.)

This book will provide hours of fascination for anyone who can read French and is interested in the story, past and present, of the Reformation in France. M. Mours, who already has several smaller historical studies of this kind to his credit (parts of which he has incorporated in the book under review), presents by narrative, statistics, and maps a comprehensive and assimilable picture of the French Reformed Church which, as the writer of the Preface says, 'gets you thinking while he teaches'. This he achieves in various ways. Firstly there is his full, informative chronological table of the history of French Protestantism with its trenchant comments: 'because the "Philosophy of Light" penetrated the Lausanne Seminary, most of the ministers preached morality more than doctrine'. Then, clearly tabulated, he gives his sources for each century, whether from national or municipal archives, book or pamphlet. Next the section containing a full list of Reformed Churches with the date of their foundation, followed by detailed maps on which they are marked, and an attempt to ascertain the 'Reformed' population through the centuries and trace its decrease. The reader really does think as he is taught, comparing date with date and map with map, and though the 'Conclusion' is short, its mature reflections provoke deep thought and inspire reasonable hope.

J. A. D. RIDHOLLS

Visible Saints, by Geoffrey F. Nuttall. (Blackwell, 25s.)

It is becoming urgently necessary for all Free Churchmen to investigate their own roots and those of the others. Dr Nuttall is giving us a scholarly, and very readable, account of 'the Congregational Way', as it was taught and preached and lived in the seventeenth century. He begins by giving a necessary narrative of Independency up to 1660. He does not disparage, as some recent writers have done, the part played by the volatile and harassed Robert Browne in the early history of the movement, but he brings out clearly the centrality of John Owen in its normative stages. Then we are launched successfully on the principles of Congregationalism and their embodiment in practice, during tumult and calm, encouragement and persecution. Dr Nuttall draws freely on the original sources, and frequently produces significant passages which have escaped the notice of earlier historians. It emerges clearly from the work as a whole that Congregationalism stands four-square on the need for separation from the 'political' Church (that is, the Church which is identical with a political or national entity), on the fellowship sealed by covenant, on the act of a willing mind by which alone a man enters the Body of Christ, and on the holiness in virtue of which the seventeenth-century Independents were content to be called 'visible saints'. It pleased the authorities of the Established Church to dismiss the men who lived by these principles as 'sectaries', and worse; but in the cooler atmosphere of history we can see that we have to do here, not with the 'dissidence of Dissent', but with a set of valid theological principles which came into inevitable conflict with those of Anglicanism. The full reconciliation still awaits the statesmanship of ecumenical theology. Meanwhile, Dr Nuttall has helped us to give adequate thought to the authority of the individual congregation, the real meaning of toleration, and the doctrine that the Church is so much prior to the ministry that it can exist without it! And as he does so, he revives something of the excitement which must have moved the Puritans as they tried to restore 'the old, glorious, beautiful face of Christianity'.

X.Y.Z.

From My New Shelf

BY R. NEWTON FLEW

Reflections on the Psalms, by C. S. Lewis (Bles, 12s. 6d.). Most of us are familiar with the brilliant series of books on religion written by Professor C. S. Lewis. The beginning of this new book is disarming. He writes 'as one amateur to another'. His work is just 'comparing notes'. But in the first chapter we must face 'The Judgment', including an illustration from a modern income-tax office, which I hope is not typical. The third chapter ('Cursings') and the fourth on 'Death' are followed by 'The Fair Beauty of the Lord'. 'Sweeter than Honey' is followed by ten pages on 'Connivance', which is the most challenging in the book. The eighth chapter is called 'Nature', and the meaning of 'Creation', that rare doctrine, is painted in vivid colours. Dr Lewis gives four pages to the Egyptian 'Hymn to the Sun', which was written by a lonely monarch in the fourteenth century B.C. It is monotheism of 'an extremely pure and conceptual kind. He did not even identify God with the sun.' But I am uneasy about Professor Lewis's comment on Psalm 23. He takes Moffatt's translation as his guide: 'Thou art my Host, spreading a feast for me, while my enemies have to look on.' Dr Lewis comments: 'The pettiness and vulgarity of it, especially in such surroundings, are hard to endure.' Do we have to endure it at all? We are in sterner company than 'those horrid Joneses', the suggestion made by Dr Lewis. There have been three major commentaries in English in the twentieth century. All three would repudiate the Moffatt emphasis. 'The Psalmist fancies himself among the dangerous ravines of Palestine, pursued by enemies, and fainting for food. Yahweh may spread his table, and he may eat and drink undisturbed. A yawning chasm separates him from his foes. Yahweh has armed him with a rod (a shēbet), an iron-shod club, used against wild beasts, and sometimes in war. The staff is the shepherd's crook for steadying his steps' (Barnes). And now as one amateur to another, instead of having the Joneses for the enemies, please substitute the footpads, who, 160 years ago, would lie in wait in the fields separating the village of Islington from Wesley's Chapel, City Road. The good Methodists were armed and would never travel alone or without lamps, when returning from their class meetings. Surely the Professor will allow them to have some food on the journey with their enemies looking on.

The Coming World Civilization, by W. E. Hocking (Allen & Unwin, 16s.). There is a generosity of vision that permeates every page which Professor Hocking writes. Witness the correspondence at the end of this book between the Professor and the author of a book entitled 'Is There a God?' I wish we could see that virtue (St Paul and Ignatius call it *epieikeia*), 'great-heartedness', in every reviewer's work. On the other hand, it is possible to dissent from some of his conclusions, e.g. 'the several religions are already fused together, so to speak, at the top.' This, surely, was the initial mistake made by Aldous Huxley in *Ends and Means* (1935). Again, take this Professor Hocking (p.139): As contrasted with Christianity, the religions of India commonly encourage a Way through personal effort. 'For the Christian it is, in the end, felt to be a gift of grace.' The qualification, 'in the end', is revealing. Why this hesitation? The author does not seek to palliate the dreadful reality of moral evil. He says (pp.105-6) that Vivekananda was mistaken in his cry: 'It is a sin to call men sinners.' Rather let us say that 'through its dwelling upon sin that Christianity for the first time does full honour to human nature. It does not dwell thereon in despair!' But having gone thus far with the distinctive message of the gospel, why does he not go on from the diagnosis to the Saviour? His answer is delayed, but when

it comes it is simple and clear. Curiously enough, it is given through the crowning words of the Letters to the Seven Churches: 'I will come in and sup with him and he with Me.' Dr Hocking's admiration for Royce has not hindered him from pledging his loyalty to Jesus Christ, instead of reserving it almost wholly for the beloved community'. The English theological student will probably have to read this book two or three times, and then he will begin to understand why von Hügel said that Christianity might admit a 'preliminary pantheism', but certainly excludes 'complete and final pantheism'.

The Whole Gospel for the Whole World, by Alan Walker (Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 8s. 6d.). This book should be put into the hands of Church members. The author has had great experience in leading the 'Mission to the Nation', which was organized by the Methodist Church in Australia in 1953. He is aware of the weaknesses which still beset the evangelism of the twentieth century—a disabling inheritance from the nineteenth! A presentation of the gospel message which ignores the added riches which modern scholarship ought to be presenting to our congregations, a personal evangelism which has no social dynamic, an inadequate relationship with the Church as the Body of Christ; an exaggerated trust in mass meetings—all these he recognizes in Australia, as we do here in England. The third chapter ('What shall the Christian say?') deals with the most crucial question of all—it overflows into the fourth ('Personal Evangelism and Social Witness') and also into the fifth ('The Presentation of the Gospel'), the seventh ('The New Testament Picture of the Church'), the ninth ('Preaching for a Verdict'), and the tenth ('The Price of Evangelism'). This is as it should be: 'that the evangelist's message ought to reach the hearer as offer rather than as demand. To those outside the fellowship of believers the Beatitudes look an impossible series of demands. Once inside the circle of the companions of Jesus they can begin to rise to those 'impossible' heights. Two questions are raised by the author, and left unanswered. It is an unconscious tribute to his modesty. He wants to get brother Paul into a corner and ask him why, in his letter to the Ephesians (4₁₁) he said: 'He granted *some men* to be evangelists.' Why only some? Why not all? The answer given in the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* is that the word is only used thrice in the New Testament, 'and that all three times it probably means 'travelling missionary'. Methodism has scriptural precedent for the itinerancy from the first. That did not prevent the evangelist from combining his evangelism with the work of a deacon. Philip's mission to 'a town in Samaria is the first recorded evangelistic campaign outside Jerusalem' (Acts 8_{5, 12}). Timothy (2 Tim. 4₅) is exhorted to do the work of an evangelist, but there is exceptional urgency behind this part of his letter: 'I adjure you to preach the word.' Not all Christians have the gifts and fruit which ensure successful evangelism. Some of the students at any given period in a theological college have the gift which their teachers (secretly!) envy. But the way is open to them still. They can resolve that no lecture should forget prayer towards the end for which the church is set. The second difficulty is on p.42. 'The Kingdom, so central to Jesus, is scarcely mentioned in apostolic preaching.' This, surely, is a misleading interpretation of the first two centuries. (a) Almost all the books of the New Testament mention the kingdom. (b) The word does not occur in Philippians, but the kingship of Christ through the Cross is nowhere more triumphantly sung than in Philippians 2_{9, 10, 11}. If, as many scholars are inclined to believe, Paul is not the author of this lovely hymn, but has borrowed it for his adoration here, that would prove that Paul was not alone in regarding Jesus as the embodiment of the kingly rule of God.

NOTABLE ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS

The Hibbert Journal, April 1958.

The South African Race Problem; For and Against Apartheid, by N. J. J. Olivier and Christopher Gell.

Marriage, Divorce, and the Church, by Warren Sandell.

The Devil in Modern Philosophy, by Ernest Gelner.

Whitehead and Ferré Discuss God, by Wallace Gray.

do., July 1958.

Old Testament Historiography and Revelation, by Professor C. A. Simpson.

The Interpretation of More's Utopia, by Paul Coles.

Iqbal, a Reformer of Islamic Philosophy, by R. Harré.

Can Missions Rescue Modern Art?, by John F. Butler. (Full of facts and brilliantly written.)

Review of J. A. T. Robinson's *Jesus and His Coming*, by G. H. Boobyer.

Review of Bultmann's *Revelation and Existence*, by A. W. Argyle.

Review of Erich Grässer's *Das Problem der Parusieverzögerung*, by Paul Winter.

The Congregational Quarterly, July 1958.

Editorial tributes to Leslie J. Tizard and T. W. Manson.

Death and the Hereafter in our Hymns, by K. L. Parry.

In Appreciation of Oliver Cromwell, by George Phillips.

Christianity among the Religions, by E. L. Allen.

The Church and the Industrial World, by E. H. Robertson.

Man in Society; Some Aspects of the Thought of Martin Buber, by Edgar Jones.

Unbelief and its Causes, by A. G. Curnow.

The Harvard Theological Review, January 1958.

A Qumran Parallel to Paul, by H. J. Cadbury.

Divine Names in Classical Greek, by H. J. Rose.

A Hitherto Unpublished Fragment of the Epistle to the Ephesians, by W. H. P. Hatch and C. B. Welles.

Some Major Emphases of Hamann's Theology, by James C. O'Flaherty.

do., April 1957 (with apologies for delay).

The Cinderella of Theology; The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, by G. J. Sirks.

The Fourth Century Greek Fathers as Exegetes, by W. Telfer.

Pauline Problems, by Morton Smith.

Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides, by H. A. Wolfson.

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